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Abstract 
 
My research will consist of a literary investigation into changing representations of 
violence in the contemporary novel in the context of the paradigm shift from 
humanism to posthumanism, from reality to fiction. The core of my work, developed 
through the reading of some research in neuroscience, will concern the examination 
of the brain as metaphor machine. From here, I will argue that the problem of 
violence in relation to fiction today is due to the struggle in the human body between 
transcendence and immanence. The individual has a tendency to transcend reality 
and in so doing lives violence as fiction even when inflicting pain to the other. I will 
observe how this transcendence is translated in contemporary narrative forms and I 
will shape a rhetoric of contemporary literary violence. 
My intention is to conduct comparative research across British, American, French 
and Italian literary fiction of the past 20 years, with a few exceptions. I will explore 
whether and how, in a globalizing world, it is both possible and necessary to develop 
a comparative literary analysis of the forms of contemporary violence.  
I will observe how the advent of posthumanity or of the fictional man has generated 
a crisis in the definition of identity and reality in a context in which fiction has taken 
its place. I will show how the individual re-acts to this condition through violence in 
order to find authenticity. References will include the works of Deleuze, Badiou, 
Bauman, Baudrillard, De Man, Agamben, Hayles et alii.  
In order to explore the different ramifications of the substitution of fiction to reality 
and its connection to violence, I will focus on what I consider the main three tools 
for the creation of simulation today: language, desire and information, through the 
works of Wallace, McCarthy, Miéville, Ballard, Gibson, Palahniuk et alii. 
Finally, the work will focus on the new emphasis given by contemporary writers to 
literary responsibility after the irresponsible writing (after the death of the author) of 
postmodernism through the analysis of the New Italian Epic postulated by Wu Ming 
but applied to the English Weird Fiction writer China Miéville. I will suggest that an 
attempt to overcome postmodernism is taking place in contemporary global fiction 
based on a more ‘serious’ approach (as Wallace would have said), a new ethics of 
literature, which endeavours to depict the reasons for contemporary violence in 
fiction and advocates for a balance between the transcendence of fiction and the 
immanence of reality. 
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Foreword: Aesthetics and Ontology: The Problem of Transcendence 
and Immanence or, The Power of Narratives and the Voice 
 
Undertaking the study of violence in contemporary fiction necessarily involves a 
study of the nature and structure of fiction itself and, more precisely, of the narrative 
techniques, which constitute it. For this reason then, this study of violence in fiction 
runs parallel to the study of narratives. The importance of such a study today has 
been made evident by much research in cognitive science, and specifically that 
branch of research which shows how the brain relates to the material conditions of 
reality through metaphors and stories. In other words, the individual creates images 
in her head with which she processes the real. ‘The real’ is thus not some pre-given 
state of affairs, but a process, dependent upon a relation between the subject of 
perception and whatever it takes as its objects: both subject and object are 
constructed in that relation – and that relation is what we call ‘the real’ or ‘reality’. 
Consequently, the analysis of narratives offers a key to the way we perceive the 
world; and, within that, a study of narrative technique will help explain perceptions 
of violence. 
 
The Brain as Metaphor Machine 
 
This approach then requires at least and ideally a short introduction to the 
problematic relationship between reality and the brain. However, since this is a work 
of literary criticism I will outline the question mainly from a literary point of view, 
rather than resort fully to clinical matters. With this purpose in mind I will overview 
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David Porush’s analysis of Neal Stephenson’s Snow Crash (1992) in his essay 
‘Hacking the Brainstem: Postmodern Metaphysics and Stephenson’s Snow Crash.’1 
This overview will then yield a specific and paradigmatic framework for the work of 
the rest of this thesis. 
 
Sharing the ideas of cognitive science, Porush argues that the human mind is 
genetically made to conceive the world through metaphor. Far from being a mere 
rhetorical tool, metaphor is the process through which the brain gives a meaning to 
the data taken from the reality outside our heads. In Porush’s words:  
We are all programmed genetically to conceive of the world as if a facility 
hardwired into human cognition. Think about what the brain does. In 
simplest terms, it takes physical impressions from an irrational, inchoate 
reality and transmutes them into thoughts, sensations, and the will to action. 
That is, it takes information from out there and translates it into meaning in 
here, in a thoroughly different realm requiring a thoroughly different 
medium. At the risk of belaboring the obvious, the brain (not the mind, but 
the physical organ the brain) is a metaphor machine, operating continuously 
to carry meaning between realms that are in the larger sense thoroughly 
incommensurable.’2 
 
Taking the lead from this claim, we can state that metaphor is a mechanism of 
translation between the physical and the mental, between the data received through 
the senses and an image, a story in the brain. Cyberspace - because this is what 
Porush is dealing with in his essay - is an externalization of this metaphor machine in 
a shared virtuality.  
 
With this premise, Porush arrives at his definition of transcendence in the history of 
humanity as the equivalence between metaphor and cognition:  
                                                          
1 David Porush, ‘Hacking the Brainstem: Postmodern Metaphysics and Stephenson’s 
Snow Crash’, Configurations 2.3 (1994), pp. 537-571. 
2 Ibidem, pp. 549-550. 
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Cyberspace does not originate in--nor is it peculiar to--postmodernism, or 
even the twentieth century. Rather, the strong expression of this urge to 
exteriorize our own neurological drama can be found in any cultural moment 
when we confuse the metaphorical as the cognitive--or rather, the moment 
when we recognize that the cognitive is the metaphorical. This is my 
definition of transcendence.3  
 
This definition establishes that knowledge is possible only through metaphor, which 
is a rhetorical and artistic trope.4 This implies that in the same way as myth was in 
ancient times a collection of stories with which man tried to understand the 
phenomena of the world around him narrative is still nowadays the way man deals 
with reality. I will deal later with the question of myth in relation to violence.  
Studies in cognitive science confirm the importance of transcendence, or better, a 
tendency to abstraction in the creation of knowledge. In his Splendors and Miseries 
of the Brain (2009), the neuroscientist Semir Zeki underlines the importance of 
abstraction, which he defines in terms of ‘a ubiquitous function of the cerebral 
cortex, one in which many if not all of its areas are involved...’5 According to Zeki, 
abstraction is the only way to identify the world in its particularities:  
 
If my ability to identify a house as a house depended upon a particular house 
only, then I would soon be in trouble when confronted with another house. 
One way of overcoming this difficulty is to generate a concept of a house. 
                                                          
3 Ibid., p. 551. Emphasis in the original. 
4 Metaphor is after all present in Aristotle both in his Rhetorics and in his Poetics. In 
the latter work, Aristotle defines metaphor thus: ‘Metaphor consists in giving the 
thing a name that belongs to something else; the transference being either from 
genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds 
of analogy. (Aristotle. Aristotle on the art of poetry (Kindle Locations 528-530). 
Public Domain Books. Kindle Edition.) For Aristotle, then, metaphor is a 
substitution or misplacement of names and a transference. The passage from trans-
ference to trans-cendence is quite easy to infer, especially considering the 
substitution of the name of reality for the name of fiction. It is furthermore 
interesting to consider that metaphor for Aristotle is a passage and a movement, a 
concept that will be discussed later in this work. 
5 Semir Zeki, Splendors and Miseries of the Brain: Love, Creativity, and the Quest 
for Human Happiness, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011. Kindle Edition. (Kindle 
Location 505). 
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When the brain acquires a concept of a house, the point of view, the precise 
shape, the distance, the setting, the size and all else cease to matter for the 
purpose of identification of the house as a house.6  
 
The brain needs to abstract the concept of house from the single instances of house 
in reality in order to create a category that will allow the brain to recognise the next 
house. Abstraction becomes a continuous progress or march towards the creation of 
larger and larger concepts such as that of beauty or love or justice. 
 
This capacity for abstraction and for creating concepts in order to acquire knowledge 
represents for Zeki both the ‘splendors’ and the ‘miseries’ of the brain:  
 
The splendor of the brain is that it is capable, seemingly effortlessly, of 
generating so many concepts and thus acting as a very efficient knowledge-
acquiring or, if one prefers, knowledge-generating system. The misery that 
this splendid machinery entails is in fact the result of its very efficiency. The 
incapacity of our daily experience to live up to and satisfy the synthetic 
concepts that the brain generates commonly results in a state of permanent 
dissatisfaction.7  
 
The preference of hackers to live in cyberspace rather than in reality stems from the 
‘miseries’ of the brain, the failure of reality to live up to the concept. When the world 
does not fulfil the concept, the individual is frustrated and decides to escape in 
imaginative realities; and cyberspace constitutes one such reality, a reality that has 
been explored in much recent narrative fiction. Abstraction then is synonymous with 
idealization and as such from a means to understanding reality the metaphor machine 
becomes the instrument for the refusal of one form of reality and its replacement 
with another.  
 
                                                          
6 Ibid., Kindle Location 565-568. 
7 Ibid., Kindle Location 998-1001. 
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In this very dissatisfaction, however, Zeki sees the germ of creativity: ‘a permanent 
dissatisfaction is one of the most powerful ingredients driving creativity.’8 Art owes 
its birth to a dissatisfaction, a discrepancy between the concept in the brain and the 
reality perceived by the brain itself. Since both reality and fiction are in the end 
products of the brain this gap proves that the line between fiction and the real can 
become more and more subtle. Creativity seems to germinate from the negativity 
present in this discrepancy in an escalation that brings forward problems of 
transcendence and imaginary realities.  
 
From Experience to Science 
 
We can take this kind of work – from cognitive psychology – in a more 
philosophical direction now; and this is the direction in which I will explore it 
further in the thesis here. A concept that could be of use to get a grip on reality is that 
of experience which refers to concepts acquired by the brain through living life. 
Giorgio Agamben’s Infancy and History: On the Destruction of Experience (1978, 
1993) also deals with the problem of imagination with a focus on knowledge and 
experience. According to Agamben, in antiquity imagination was considered as the 
essential link between the senses and the intellect, psyche and nous, that is, 
knowledge. Modern times, however, with the priority given to science, interpret 
imagination as ‘unreal,’9 ‘the subject of mental alienation, visions and magical 
phenomena – in other words, everything that is excluded by real experience.’10 
                                                          
8 Ibid., Kindle Location 1150-1151. 
9 Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and History: On the Destruction of Experience, trans 
Liz Heron, London: Verso, 1993, p. 27. 
10 Ibid., p. 28. 
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Today more than ever narrative has acquired the sense of fiction: from the Latin 
fingere but taken with the meaning of feigning instead of the main meaning of 
shaping, forming, creating something out of clay or dough (the Indo-European form 
gives *dheigh- as hypothetical origin of the word, the same form that has given 
‘dough’ in English). 
 
Technological tools today take the place of the human brain and the senses in 
translating reality. In the light of Agamben’s analysis, in fact, science mistrusts 
experience and externalizes our senses with microscopes and other tools, which 
make reality measurable.11 
Science has taken the place of our senses and as a consequence, William Gibson’s 
hackers, for example, abandon their bodies in the same way they leave reality 
behind, in a movement similar to the philosophical process followed – at the very 
outset of modern European philosophy, and especially of the relation of modernity 
with the constitution of the subject, the ‘I’ - by Descartes. Descartes in fact starts his 
theory by an eradication of the senses and the body, in order to reach a form of pure 
abstract rationality culminating in his ‘Cogito, ergo sum’, that is, in an abstraction 
                                                          
11 Ibid., pp. 19-20. It is also worth considering however (as I will do in later 
chapters) that the brain still has to interpret the data offered by science. Science 
fiction is the literary genre that paradoxically rebels against science because its 
writers translate science in visions of the future. Stephenson has already invented, in 
his Snow Crash, concepts such as avatar (used in chat lines or online games) and an 
early version of Google Earth. As John Hanke, general manager of Google Earth, 
said in an interview in 2005; ‘L'idée de départ, qui était de combiner les jeux vidéo 
avec les cartes et les photos de la planète, circulait dans l'imagination populaire, 
depuis le roman de Neal Stephenson Snow Crash [Le Samouraï virtuel pour la 
version française] sorti en 1994.’Le Monde, 24/08/2005. 
http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2005/08/24/l-idee-de-depart-etait-de-
combiner-les-jeux-video-avec-les-photos-de-la-planete_682240_3234.html. In 2008, 
however, Mark Aubin, software engineer at Google Earth writes an article in which 
he states the idea came from the flipbook Power of Ten. ‘Google Earth: From Space 
to Your Face…and Beyond’, http://mattiehead.wordpress.com/tag/mark-aubin/. 
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from any referentiality, except thought itself.  
  
There is however a difference in the way Gibson’s characters and Descartes perceive 
this act of abstraction from the body: where the former sees this movement as the 
ultimate end, Descartes instead marks a starting point for a movement that will 
eventually go back to the body and thus to experience. Furthermore, there is an 
ethical difference as well considering that Descartes’ constitution of the subject in a 
thinking ‘I’ is the result  of his research for truth whereas the hackers recognize it as 
an end to any form of leading any form of life. Not surprisingly, in his research for a 
principle as abstract as truth Descartes repudiates any form of experience. Descartes 
starts his research from a need for absolute truth beyond doubt and arrives, 
mistrusting both the senses and the fact that thoughts are not necessarily truer than 
dreams, to the idea that thinking itself constitutes the basis for being:  
But soon after I realized that, while I wanted thus consider that everything 
was false, it followed necessarily that I who was thinking had to be 
something; and realizing this truth, I think, so I am, was so solid and assured 
that the most extravagant supposition of sceptics could not shake it, I decided 
that I could consider it without a doubt as the first principle of the philosophy 
I was looking for.12  
 
The action of thinking that resides in the individual constitutes, according to this, the 
principle of existence beyond doubt. But it is morally alarming that cyberspace 
constitutes an escape from any form of experience when any experience is connected 
to pain and violence. In other words, where Descartes looks for a scientific method 
of analysis the reduction of the hackers to pure subjectivity, a pure ‘I’ moving in a 
                                                          
12 ‘Mais aussitôt après je pris garde que, pendant que je voulois ainsi penser que tout 
étoit faux, il falloit nécessairement que moi qui le pensois fusse quelque chose; et 
remarquant que cette vérité, je pense, donc je suis, étoit si ferme et si assurée, que 
toutes les plus extravagantes suppositions des sceptiques n'étoient pas capables de 
l'ébranler, je jugeai que je pouvois la recevoir sans scrupule pour le premier principe 
de la philosophie que je cherchois.’René Descartes, Discours de la méthode, Kindle 
Locations 1617-1621. I have translated all the extracts from Descartes. 
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narrative space called cyberspace, stems from their desire to escape a life of 
suffering and violence. 
  
Even if it is not a teleology of the end of human life as in the case of the hackers but 
more of an archaeology of the scientific method Descartes has created a philosophy 
that mistrusts the body and its experiences, privileging the mind or the soul as he 
prefers to call it: ‘I knew then that I was a substance whose essence or nature is only 
to think and that in order to be it does not need a place or it does not depend on 
anything material.’13 The entire materiality of being is in a non-described substance 
made of thinking. Reading Descartes’ idea of the immateriality of thought at the light 
of today’s neuroscience reveals the theory not so much dated as imprecise in its 
neglect (due also to the limits of science in his age) of the physicality of the human 
brain. It is worth stressing than that our concept of subjectivity is not radically 
different by the Cartesian subject but it is on the contrary its natural evolution due to 
the discoveries of science. The contemporary subject of fiction, as envisioned in 
cyberpunk, is mostly a thinking ‘I’, before being a ‘human being.à 
  
An immediate consequence of Descartes’ transcendental rationality is the 
justification for the existence of God following the assumption that if man has 
doubts and is thus imperfect in his research for truth, this necessity for truth and the 
concept for perfection has to come from somewhere else, a perfect being: ‘so that it 
followed that [the idea of perfection] had been put in me by a nature more perfect 
than I was, and that had in itself all the perfections I could perceive, that is, to 
                                                          
13 ‘Je connus de là que j'étois une substance dont toute l'essence ou la nature n'est 
que de penser, et qui pour être n'a besoin d'aucun lieu ni ne dépend d'aucune chose 
matérielle.’ Ibid., Kindle Locations 1624-1626. 
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explain in one word, who was God.’14 
 
Following Zeki’s studies, perfection is the consequence of the human brain’s 
tendency towards conceptualization and thus abstraction. What in Descartes may 
seem like a logical and reasoned proposition becomes, at the dawning light of 
modern science, the genetic result of that metaphor machine that is the brain. The 
idea of God is the ultimate rationalization and abstraction in that it has no links to the 
real. 
 
Cyberspace then is the place where metaphor is less a link between mind and reality 
than a broken bridge where the mind does not reach anything. Science has now the 
power to in-form, to shape reality, without providing however any knowledge 
because the tools have taken the place of their original function: reading reality. 
Technology in cyberspace has created an alternative reality, something that we 
properly identify as fantasy. It is a journey that goes from myth as knowledge to 
myth as fantasy replaced by science as knowledge and then, finally, to science as 
fantasy. 
 
 Experience & Authority: from Knowledge to Information 
 
In the light of Agamben’s reading, we need to reconsider the connection between 
imagination and reason, which rules science. Porush’s conception of the brain 
                                                          
14 ‘…de façon qu'il restoit qu'elle [the idea of perfection] eût été mise en moi par une 
nature qui fût véritablement plus parfaite que je n'étois, et même qui eût en soi toutes 
les perfections dont je pouvois avoir quelque idée, c'est à dire, pour m'expliquer en 
un mot, qui fût Dieu.’ Ibid., Kindle Locations 1641-1643.  
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implies that reality itself is irrational (‘an irrational, inchoate reality’) so the 
metaphor machine that is the brain needs to rationalise it. Since however metaphor is 
usually connected to imagination and creativity it is paradoxical to accept that we are 
able to rationalise reality only through imagination. Is not metaphor after all a figure 
of speech that connects different points in different fields of reality or registers of 
language and regimes of discourse? And is not this a definition of intelligence or at 
least of intuition? Is not the ‘stroke of genius’ anything but a sudden connection 
made between two elements which had never been connected before? Whether the 
story of Newton and the apple is true or not is not important, but as a narrative 
example it perfectly illustrates the key point: the imaginative intelligence in Newton 
has been able to find a connection between the apple and the earth and come, after 
reflection and experiments, to the realization of a theory of gravity. Imagination 
helps to develop a rational explanation for a phenomenon, and, indeed, provides a 
narrative for it (Newton sitting under a tree from which an apple falls), which had 
not been explained before and, for this reason, had not been rationalized before.  
 
Porush however pays attention to the mistrust that reason itself generates in 
contemporary writers. He identifies the main problem of contemporary writers in 
their incapacity to accept transcendence. He finds it paradoxical that cyberpunk as a 
branch of postmodernism, with its refusal of master narratives or ‘essentializing 
viewpoints’15 is so open to metaphysics. He recalls, however, the postmodernist 
‘critique of rationalism, and of the scientific/technological project of our culture in 
particular.’16 
 
                                                          
15 Porush, p. 539. 
16 Ibidem. 
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In a tradition that in this sense we can also call post-humanist, if we consider that 
humanism and modernism were characterised by reason and the ego cogitans, the 
postmodernists undermine the power of reason through ‘epistemological methods’ 
that rely on the ‘detotalizing’ powers of language. They try ‘to capture the 
extrarational richness of experience’17 and to show the failure of science in fulfilling 
our need for knowledge, as a consequence of what Lyotard has considered a disbelief 
in meta-narratives, that is, in the existence of a theory that can explain everything. 
Paradoxically, this mistrust is in direct opposition to the tendency of the brain 
towards larger and more abstract concepts. Postmodern writers, in other words, seem 
not to believe in the possibility of conceptualizing reality anymore, favouring instead 
works made of particularities, classification, etcThe work of Rosi Braidotti becomes 
useful here for a theorization of the posthuman. 
 
According to Braidotti, a critique of humanism starts with the historical realisation 
that it is a construct, a fiction that is however the dominating fiction:  
 
Equal only to itself, Europe as universal consciousness transcends its 
specificity, or, rather, posits the power of transcendence as its distinctive 
characteristic and humanistic universalism as its particularity. This makes 
Eurocentrism into more than just a contingent matter of attitude: it is a 
structural element of our cultural practice, which is also embedded in both 
theory and institutional and pedagogical practices.18 
 
Emblem of this humanism is the Vitruvian man, who represents the epitome of this 
monologistic discourse:  
 
                                                          
17 Ibid., p. 539. 
18 Braidotti, Rosi, The Posthuman, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013. Kindle Edition, p. 
15. 
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The Vitruvian ideal of Man as the standard of both perfection and 
perfectibility (as shown in figure 1.1) was literally pulled down from his 
pedestal and deconstructed. This humanistic ideal constituted, in fact, the 
core of a liberal individualistic view of the subject, which defined 
perfectibility in terms of autonomy and self-determination.19 
 
In the extreme individualism of this vision of man, which does not need the Other 
because he is autonomous, is the insistence on sameness and the negative conception 
of the Other:  
 
Central to this universalistic posture and its binary logic is the notion of 
‘difference’ as pejoration. Subjectivity is equated with consciousness, 
universal rationality, and self-regulating ethical behaviour, whereas 
Otherness is defined as its negative and specular counterpart.20 
 
To this dominating narrative Braidotti opposes a monistic materialism in a passage 
that will become the core for my argument on the posthuman: 
 
My monistic philosophy of becomings rests on the idea that matter, including 
the specific slice of matter that is human embodiment, is intelligent and self-
organizing. This means that matter is not dialectically opposed to culture, nor 
to technological mediation, but continuous with them. This produces a 
different scheme of emancipation and a non-dialectical politics of human 
liberation. This position has another important corollary, namely that political 
agency need not be critical in the negative sense of oppositional and thus may 
not be aimed solely or primarily at the production of counter-subjectivities. 
Subjectivity is rather a process of auto-poiesis or self-styling, which involves 
complex and continuous negotiations with dominant norms and values and 
hence also multiple forms of accountability.21 
 
The subject then is a process of auto-poiesis in a continuous dialogue with culture, 
technology and nature. The individual is accountable in the diverse form she deals 
with the law and other dominant narratives but also in her relationship with 
                                                          
19 Ibid., p. 23. 
20 Ibid., p. 15. 
21 Ibid., p. 35. 
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technology and other humans. The individual as a process involves a constant 
rewriting of individual following the creation of new relationships with the outside 
world. 
 
Postmodern writers then refuse master narratives because they feel they have lost 
any sense of authority (reason does not support their narrative anymore) and are thus 
unable to convey any experience through their writing. In this perspective can be 
understood Agamben’s statement that  
experience has its necessary correlation not in knowledge but in authority – 
that is to say, the power of words and narration; and no one now seems to 
wield sufficient authority to guarantee the truth of an experience, and if they 
do, it does not in the least occur to them that their own authority has its roots 
in an experience.’22 
 
If experience does not belong to anyone and these narratives have no author, there is 
no knowledge to be acquired by anybody, only information yielded and ridiculed at 
the same time. The Internet, we could conclude, is exactly the place where 
knowledge appears in the basic form of information, which is available to anyone 
while, at the same time, it does not belong to anybody. In other words, following 
Porush’s definition, transcendence is not based anymore on the correlation between 
knowledge and metaphor but on the correspondence of information and metaphor: 
this is the condition of transcendence in cyberspace.  
 
A Need for Meaning and Order 
 
However, Porush seems not to give enough importance to the very function of 
metaphorical understanding, which is the need for the human brain to give meaning. 
                                                          
22 Agamben, Infancy and History, p. 16. 
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Order is a consequence of the brain’s necessity to absorb the outside world, and that 
understanding is essentially formulated as an order that is given to human 
perceptions. The postmodern acceptance of the failure of master narratives goes 
against the grain then or, reading it from another perspective, it actually expresses 
the desperate need for man to find meaning even in the confusion of meanings.  
 
To summarize up to this point: since ancient times metaphor and narratives in 
general have been the way the brain processes reality and gives it meaning. 
Discoveries in neuroscience have further confirmed that the brain is a metaphor 
machine. Science has, however, nowadays taken the place of the brain in translating 
reality so that everything we receive now is filtered by technology. The evolution of 
science has run parallel to that of rationality: reason has taken the place of 
imagination in giving order to an irrational reality. The belief in reason however 
became so strong that, in a Cartesian way, reason transcended reality itself and 
became the only possible starting point for the construction of the individual. In 
postmodernity however both reason and science have been reappraised and 
scrutinized, and find themselves now at the mercy of language. Language has 
become the tool that undermines all the others and it has also played with narrative 
itself refusing the possibility for any real metanarrative or transcendence. This is 
followed by the failure of any kind of experience, be it through the brain (metaphor), 
science or art. The power of narratives has not however diminished. This, therefore, 
needs further exploration and examination: why is it the case that narrative is still so 
powerful, and how has it changed in order to retain its power in these changed 
circumstances? 
 
21 
 
Following Porush’s suggestion that the brain is a metaphor machine, which gives 
meaning to data acquired from a reality external to the brain itself, we can outline a 
process in action in cyberpunk. The brain translates data into images and, we could 
add, into consciousness. The subject becomes the result of an involuntary narrative 
in which the brain metaphorizes in order to understand. The subject is automatically 
a writer, an author: that is, the individual authorizes and narrates reality in her brain 
in an attempt to translate its irrationality into meaning. The fact that cyberspace is a 
collective creation means that these ‘authors’ do not have any individual 
responsibility. Cyberspace does not belong to anybody, nobody has made it, nobody 
can claim ownership or authority: cyberspace, in other words, is the typical product 
of postmodernism. 
 
The power of narrative consists in replacing reality with metaphor. What if indeed, 
instead of helping the individual to process the world, narrative actually transcends it 
and takes its place? What if a story becomes a myth, that is, as Frank Kermode 
sustains, a fiction that, having ‘forgotten’ that it is fiction, is taken as real?23 
 
Fiction as myth does not need reality anymore, if we take ‘reality’ as a pre-existing 
state of affairs that transcends human perception, or the processing of cognitive 
capacities. In the consequent loss of immanence, the story is undocked from the real:  
its violence however, only ‘mythically fictional’, retains its effects over reality. In 
other words the question I want to posit is whether a transcendental narrative is the 
beginning of a violence, which has free reign because it has dissolved the chains of 
                                                          
23 ‘Fiction can degenerate into myths whenever they are not consciously held to be 
fiction.’ Frank Kermode, The Sense of an Ending, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1973), p. 39. 
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reality, of consequence and of ethics. 
 
Individual Metaphor Machines: From Frustration to Violence 
 
The central claim of this thesis is an appeal for a new ethics of narrative that takes 
into account the dangerous attractions of fiction in order for the individual to 
reconnect to the immanence of life. Being impossible for fiction to become one with 
reality, this ethics will be based on the creation of a balance between immanence and 
transcendence, reality and fiction, rather than a return to realism. Since the glamour 
of fiction is dangerous because narratives allow the individual to control and shape 
reality, a sense of ethics is fundamental for a writer to deal with the power of 
narratives and the possibility for violence it offers.  
 
Before moving forward it is necessary at this point to draw the lines of a theory of 
violence in the light of the concepts of metaphor machine, transcendence and 
immanence. Having Agamben as constant point of reference in the next few pages I 
will examine the theories of violence of Hannah Arendt, Slavoj Žižek and Walter 
Benjamin. My argument is that violence is born of the dissonance between the image 
of the world in our mind and the irremediable immanence of reality. The gap is 
found in the very language meant to order reality. The individual is subjugated by 
the language and the injustice of the Law or, in other words, of a transcendental 
higher power, which is supposed to be the essence of order. The individual is 
affected by a sort of impossibility to act and, as a consequence, ‘re-acts’ with 
violence. The discrepancy between metaphor machine and reality is further increased 
by the difficulty of projecting the metaphor machine into the outside world through 
23 
 
language and narrative.   
 
As previously noticed, Zeki suggests the existence of a ‘dissatisfaction’ in the 
individual caused by the failure of any attempts to conciliate our abstract idea of the 
world in our heads with the real world. In her On Violence (1969), Hannah Arendt 
suggests a similar concept in the ‘severe frustration of the faculty of action in the 
modern world,’24 as the cause of what she calls ‘the present glorification of 
violence.’25 To act is, for Arendt, ‘the human answer to the condition of natality.’26 
The compelling logic of Arendt’s position can be succinctly stated: if the natural 
need for action is frustrated man then ‘re-acts’ violently. 
 
The frustrated man is first of all an individual before being part of a group. The 
metaphor machine itself after all is ultimately individual because it is the means 
through which the individual human body connects the inside with the outside: no 
one is inside me but me. This premise is important to confront the distinction Arendt 
makes between violence and power. Arendt, in fact, posits violence as essentially 
individual against the power of the many: ‘Power corresponds to the human ability 
not just to act but to act in concert.’27 Arendt considers power as human, also in the 
sense of made of many men, its legitimacy coming from the consensus of the many. 
Violence, on the contrary, is inhuman, instrumental, that is, made of ‘men’s 
artefacts.’28 The use of instruments enlarges the strength of the individual so much 
that she can then challenge the power of the many. From this understanding Arendt 
                                                          
24 Hannah Arendt, On Violence, New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1970, p. 
83.  
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., p. 82. 
27 Ibid., p. 44. 
28 Ibid., p. 53. 
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comes to the following conclusion: ‘The extreme form of power is All against One, 
the extreme form of violence is One against All.’29 
 
Arendt seems to specify that it is human not simply to be born in order to act but to 
act with other humans. This clarification is based on the Aristotelean idea that the 
human is a social being and that power is used solely for the collectivity. The 
frustration at the origin of violence, however, is due to the fact that the metaphor 
machine is individual and as such our vision of the world is, in essence, personal. In 
contrast with Arendt’s position above, however, my own argument is that power is 
not only a social construct but also one that is an artefact. It becomes inhuman when 
it operates to call into question and to challenge an individual’s vision or perception 
of the world or of what constitutes her or his reality. Such a vision is what has 
granted the individual a specific ethical stance; and if this is called into question, the 
challenge to the individual is essentially a challenge that provokes an intrinsically 
violent response. This is so because the individual is fighting for the survival of her 
or his vision and ethics. As a consequence, violence might be characterised here as 
the reaction of an individual to a situation in which power contradicts her ethical and 
ideal position. Violence is indeed often individual but not inhuman and it is 
instrumental only because the individual cannot hope to face the many unarmed. 
However, the power of the many is not without violence as the Law simply wants 
the complete control over violence.  
 
According to Walter Benjamin in his ‘Critique of Violence,’ it is in the interests of 
the Law to control the violence of individuals: ‘The possibility that violence, where 
                                                          
29 Ibid., p. 42.  
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it does not lie in the hands of the relevant law, constitutes a threat thereto, not 
because of the ends it may pursue but through its very existence outside the law.’30 It 
follows from this that, for Benjamin, an individual is incipiently characterised as 
violent when – and because - she is outside the Law. Violence, however, is 
constitutive of the Law and is at its origin as ‘All violence, seen as means, is either 
law-establishing or law-upholding.’31 From this it derives that violence is the general 
condition of the state under the Law or everyday reality. Violence is, in other words, 
endemic to a world in which rules the power of the many or Law. In this perspective, 
individual violence is a response to a more generalised condition of violence. 
 
To read Benjamin’s ideas through the words of my thesis, the Law, as the Power of 
the Many, is a transcendental entity which, untouched by the whims of individuality, 
adopts violence to bring order and control over the chaos of individual life. 
Individuality is eminently immanent for its own constitution and, as such, follows 
the directions of the individual metaphor machine, producing a personal vision of 
order which does not necessarily coincide with the Law, the public idea of order. 
This gap between the individual’s personal Weltanschauung and the Law may 
generate frustration and violence when the individual is not allowed to act according 
to her own ethics.  
 
Benjamin defines the violence of the Law, which I have so far referred to as 
transcendental, as mythic violence: ‘Mythic violence in its archetypal form is 
manifestation of the gods, pure and simple. Not means to their ends, scarcely 
                                                          
30 Walter Benjamin, One-Way Street and Other Writings, London: Penguin, 
29/10/2009. Kindle Edition. Kind Locations 253-256. 
31 Ibid., Kindle Locations 364-365 
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manifestations of their will, primarily manifestation of their existence.’32 The 
purpose of violence for a god is simply to prove it is not a fiction, a myth, but that it 
exists and it has a presence in the world. The Law finds a similar affirmation in the 
death penalty: ‘For in practising violence over matters of life and death, law as such 
finds greater reinforcement than in any other legal consummation.’33 Both the Law 
and the Gods materialise their existence threatening the very immanence of man, his 
very life. Transcendence necessitates violence to affirm total control over the 
immanence of individual life. In other words, where the existence of man is self-
evident the existence of the law needs to be materialized, made real through 
violence.  
 
Benjamin distinguishes between mythic violence and divine violence, the former of 
which establishes the law: ‘Where mythic violence is law-establishing, divine 
violence destroys law; where the first sets bounds, the second wreaks boundless 
destruction; where mythic violence apportions blame and calls for expiation 
simultaneously, divine violence expiates; where the former threatens, the latter 
strikes; where one is bloody, the other, albeit lethal, kills without bloodshed.’34 
Divine violence is pure justice and as such it does not need to be defended or 
asserted. It is justice before the law was ever created and, as such, it works more as a 
guideline than a law. Benjamin exemplifies this in the commandment ‘Thou shalt not 
kill’, which does not entail any form of punishment in case of stepping outside what 
it commands, as punishment is endemic only to the Law. 
 
                                                          
32 Ibid., Kindle Locations 477-479. 
33 Ibid., Kindle Locations 340-341. 
34 Ibid., Kindle Locations 520-522. 
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Divine violence is not less transcendental than mythic violence but it offers a 
different kind of ethics. The Law is based on social dominance and the imposition of 
one vision but, being ultimately a social construct, it has to assert itself against the 
individual metaphor machine. Divine violence on the contrary suggests precepts but, 
without direct punishment for transgressions, it adheres better to the ethics of the 
individual. The individual can, in other words, choose freely whether to abide by the 
divine or not and as such, her frustration is avoided. 
 
Whereas the violence of the law needs to be continually asserted through its 
dominance over matters of life and death, divine violence is meant to protect the 
living even when it deals death: ‘Mythic violence is blood violence over bare life for 
its own sake; its divine counterpart is pure violence over all life for the sake of the 
living person. The first calls for sacrifices, the second accepts them.’35 The different 
morality of the Law and of Divine violence is evident in the ends of their actions: the 
former aim at securing its own existence by threatening human life whereas the latter 
aims to help the living and, as such, it is pure, that is, uncontaminated by self-
interest. 
 
To summarise up to this point, both mythic violence and divine violence are forms of 
transcendental violence. The former aims to rule over bare life, but in order to do so 
it needs to constantly reassert its immanence: the violence of the law through the 
death penalty is the form of this assertion. Divine violence, on the contrary, as form 
of justice cherishes its transcendence and as such respects the individual not as bare 
life but as a living being, something more deserving than mere bare life. 
                                                          
35 Ibid., Kindle Locations 529-530. 
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Treating of divine violence, Slavoj Žižek observes how for Divine violence the 
victim is guilty of leading a bare life, that is, of merely existing. Mythic violence and 
the Law, on the contrary, deal with mere existence, whereas divine violence is ‘an 
expression of pure drive, of the undeadness, the excess of life, which strikes at “bare 
life” regulated by law.’36 Benjamin believes that human life is more than just 
breathing and as such, we could add, it does not even constitute an ethical stance. 
Benjamin refuses with palpable disgust and finds it ‘even dishonourable,’37 to limit 
man to his mere existence: ‘It is false and ignoble to say that existence is superior to 
just existence, if existence is simply meant to mean bare life.’38 Divine violence 
elevates and strikes man in his ‘just existence,’ that is an existence that is 
characterised by an ethical position on the part of the individual. Divine violence, 
Žižek continues, is ‘a sign without meaning,’39 ‘the sign of the injustice of the world, 
of the world being ethically “out of joint,”’40 and as such it deals with reality 
ethically. It does not punish humanity because of its mere existence but because of 
the way men and women live their lives under the Law they have created. 
 
In its focus over bare life the Law disregards the essence of the human and human 
ethics. In my own preferred terminology here, what I am calling the uniqueness of 
the metaphor machine, constitutive of the reality of each individual, corresponds to 
what Benjamin thought of as the ‘excess of life’. This uniqueness is characterised by 
two things: first, it is linguistic (for its business is the construction and production of 
                                                          
36 Slavoj Žižek, Violence, London: Profile Books, 2009, p. 168. 
37 Benjamin, Kindle Location 551. 
38 Ibid., Kindle Locations 552-553. 
39 Žižek, p. 169 
40 Ibid., p. 169. 
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metaphors); and, secondly, it is marked by ‘excess’, by something that is at odds 
with necessity, and with the necessity of bare survival. The frustration of the 
individual at the origin of violence stems not only from her impossibility to act due 
to the Law and society but also from her incapacity to express her own vision of the 
world, her metaphor machine, in the world outside her brain. The individual is 
incapable of showing her metaphor machine to the world because of the limits of 
language.  
 
In 2008, the already cited philosopher Slavoj Žižek writes his own take on 
contemporary violence but with a more eminent role given to language. Žižek 
identifies three different kinds of violence: ‘subjective violence,’ ‘performed by a 
clearly identifiable agent’41; ‘symbolic violence,’ ‘embodied in language and its 
forms, what Heidegger would call “our house of being,”’42 which, through language, 
attempts the ‘imposition of a universe of meaning’43; finally, ‘systemic’ violence, 
which is invisible as it is part of ‘the smooth functioning of our economic and 
political systems,’44 as in other words, it represents the status quo or the condition of 
actual and everyday life. This systemic violence is ‘unmarked’ because it is taken for 
granted and not seen to be violence as such.  
 
Symbolic violence is the one of most interesting elements here for our present 
argument because of its focus on language. Entire civilizations can be modelled 
through the power of language, as the power of sacred books like the Bible or the 
Koran has shown. If the function of the metaphor machine is to give meaning to a 
                                                          
41 Ibid., p. 1. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
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chaotic world then the power of language as instrument in imposing meanings and 
metaphors has to be considered in all of its scope. Language, and in particular the 
language of stories, is probably the most powerful of those artefacts Arendt speaks 
about as the tool of the violent, inhuman man. Metaphor is a weapon when the power 
of one’s narrative is able to affect the narrative of another person. The ancient Greek 
Logos, means after all both reason and word, language constituting a direct 
connection to the brain machine. Language then, we could say, is both a tool and the 
base of human reasoning, both inhuman and human. As such, and as every tool, its 
potential for violence is not in itself but in the use one makes of it.  
 
Following Heidegger, Žižek sees the power of language in ‘essencing’, creating 
paths or essences in order to read reality. ‘For Heidegger, “essence” is something 
that depends on the historical context, on the epochal disclosure of being that occurs 
in and through language.’45 Language then historically situates the individual and as 
such, it imposes a specific vision of the world, and establishes that specific vision as 
normative. It is therefore incipiently and silently coercive. Language is where the 
metaphor machine finds external application, where the images in the brain are 
transposed outside the individual. Metaphor, then, is able to ‘essence’ the world, to 
define its nature and as such it is one of the most powerful tools because metaphor 
ultimately creates reality. 
 
Language’s power of creating paths helps, according to Žižek, the substantiation of 
an ethics of blindness in which the individual is willing to accept to not see, because 
what she does not see cannot hurt her. In Lacanian terminology, Žižek re-writes the 
                                                          
45 Ibid., pp. 57-58. 
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problem of the gap between reality and its abstraction: ‘Here we encounter the 
Lacanian difference between reality and the Real: “reality” is the social reality of the 
actual people involved in interaction and in the productive processes, while the Real 
is the inexorable “abstract,” spectral logic of capital that determines what goes on in 
social reality.’46 Žižek underlines how the abstraction of capitalism re-interprets and 
substitutes reality: that is, to show that the systemic logic overwhelms the reality of 
the senses. In his analysis, Žižek recognizes a form of blindness to see the violence 
in reality as the true face of ethics: ‘such a disavowal of reality, such a fetishist 
attitude of “I know very well that things are horrible in the Soviet Union, but I 
believe none the less in Soviet socialism” is the innermost constituent of every 
ethical stance.’47 
 
To believe in a way of living, in an ethics, Žižek seems to imply, one has to abstract 
from reality in favour of its idealistic version. The fact that an idea is ethically 
convincing corresponds to turning a blind eye towards the failure of its application 
on the real world. The gap between the Real and reality is so vast that the former 
eclipses the latter. This ethics of blindness is quite different from the ethics of 
frustration observed in the work of Hannah Arendt. In the latter the individual is 
frustrated by her incapability of action, by the over-powering challenge to her 
attempt to live her own metaphors into the world; and, as a consequence, she re-acts 
with violence. The former instead refuses the existence of systemic violence and 
falls victim to the essencing powers of capitalist narratives. 
 
The violence of frustration seems to fall in what Žižek has termed as subjective 
                                                          
46 Ibid., p. 11. 
47 Ibid., p. 44. Italics in the original. 
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violence and, as such, its presence is more evident: this is the violence another 
individual cannot be blind to because it is not hidden like symbolic violence or 
systemic violence. The narrative of subjective violence is the narrative of the 
scapegoat and of the serial killer, which society as such uses everyday on the media 
to hide systemic violence. The individual’s metaphor machine is either frustrated or 
manipulated by a higher, transcendental order, which Benjamin calls the Law and, 
which we have also called Order, against which the individual is impotent.    
 
To the ethics of blindness and the ethics of frustration I oppose an ethics of 
narratives that do undermine systemic violence showing it for what it is and that, in 
doing so, reveal also the frustration of the individual. Taking inspiration from the 
work of Giorgio Agamben in Il Linguaggio e la morte, I will define it as the ethics of 
the Voice. This ethics will take into account not only the gap between the 
individual’s metaphor machine and the Real – that is, the transcendental metaphor 
machine of society – but also the failure of language to express the individual’s 
metaphor machine, her interior world. Such an ethics will respect immanence as 
more than bare life but as something that is ‘an excess of life,’ something that has a 
Voice that is something more than the voice of reasoning and language. 
 
For an Ethics of the Voice 
 
In the course of this work I will observe novels that in one way or another are 
focused on the actions of suicides, murderers, scalp-hunters, false revolutionaries, 
psychopaths, fighters, godlike AIs, godlike aliens, one and all pursuers of violence 
although moved by apparently diverse reasons. As different as these reasons may be, 
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I will delineate a common thread in these characters’ difficulty to communicate to 
the Other their inner metaphor machine. This impossibility to communicate is due to 
the tension between their transcendent internal life and their immanent presence in 
the world. When this tension reaches a critical state, when the individual realises the 
impossibility to transmit the images of her metaphor machine, violence is the 
outcome and the only way the characters find to transmit their frustration. 
 
Neal in David Foster Wallace’s story ‘Good Old Neon’, best transmits the frustration 
of trying to convey into words the infinite possibilities of the individual metaphor 
machine: 
 
The truth is you already know what it’s like. You already know the difference 
between the size and speed of everything that flashes through you and the 
tiny inadequate bit of it all you can ever let anyone know. As though inside 
you is this enormous room full of what seems like everything in the whole 
universe at one time or another and yet the only parts that get out have to 
somehow squeeze out through one of those tiny key holes you see under the 
knob in older doors. As if we are all trying to see each other through these 
tiny keyholes.48 
 
The tiny keyholes themselves are but a metaphor to represent the distance between 
the transcendental creations of the individual metaphor machine and the immanent 
limits of human communication. To compress the entire universe built by the 
individual metaphor machine into a few words, a few symbols, is nearly impossible 
if one tries to convey it directly. Stories however offer different, indirect solutions. 
 
I will endeavour to find the place of the inexpressible in the gap between the 
metaphor machine and the Other connecting it not only to concepts of transcendence 
                                                          
48 David Foster Wallace, ‘Good Old Neon’, Oblivion, London: Abacus, 2005, p. 178. 
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and immanence but to those of language and death, which appear in Giorgio 
Agamben’s Il linguaggio e la morte (1982) from which I will freely extrapolate a 
few ideas.  
 
Following Heidegger, Agamben posits that our life is a constant ‘anticipation of 
death’ since mortality is our destiny from the moment we are born as an essential 
part of our Dasein, our being-there into the world49 or, our very immanence. Moving 
from Heidegger to Hegel, Agamben recalls that this negativity, this presence of death 
from birth, is present in language itself, in its Meinung, its will-to-say, ‘lo stesso 
voler-dire’50: ‘this unsaid, in itself, is simply a negative and a universal…’51 The 
individual cannot, in other words, say her need to say, her need to use language.  
 
The individual enters language through what Jakobson has referred to as ‘shifters’. 
Words like ‘I’ or ‘there’ do not have any direct referent to reality because their 
referent shifts according to the speaker or the context. The shifter ‘I’ then has fluid, 
temporary immanence and as such, it is both transcendental and immanent, form and 
substance. For Agamben, the shifters represent ‘the pure taking place of language,’52, 
whereas the meaning the context gives them, represents their ontic dimension, their 
referentiality.  
 
The will-to-say of language corresponds to the voice, which is ‘pure intention to 
signify, … pure will-to-say, in which something gives itself for comprehension 
                                                          
49 Giorgio Agamben, Il linguaggio e la morte, Torino: Einaudi, 2008, p. 10. All 
translations from this text are mine. 
50 Ibid., p. 21. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid., p. 37. 
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without the production yet of an event imbued of meaning.’53 The voice is made of 
sound, thus lasting but the moment of the sound, leaving a sort of echo of itself, that 
is, it takes the negative dimension of absence: this Voice is at the same time a not-
anymore (voice) and a not-yet (meaning)54. This Voice is then both the pure being of 
the individual and language and, at the same time, non-being, in its privation, 
fundamental negativity.  
 
In contrast to the pure will-to-say of the Voice, human language has a conscience: 
‘human language is the “voice of the conscience”, in that in it conscience exists and 
is made real, because language is articulated voice.’55 Referring to Hegel, Agamben 
explains how the human language articulates the animal voice, the pure sound, in 
order to create words and meanings. The Voice is pure emotion without articulation, 
and with the beginning of articulation and meaning it disappears, and as such, it is 
the voice of death, which stays as a silent echo in the voice of the conscience.56 The 
voice of language then converts the negativity of the Voice, of the pure event of 
language, into being and meaning, from langue to parole, from transcendence to 
immanence.  
 
Agamben pursues his research on language observing how in Heidegger’s Dasein 
man has no voice at all: ‘Being Da, man is in the place of language without a 
                                                          
53 ’…come pura intenzione di significare, come puro voler-dire, in cui qualcosa si dà 
a comprendere senza che ancora si produca un evento determinato di significato. 
Ibid., p. 45. 
54 ’…non-più (voce) and a not-yet (significato)…’ Ibid., p. 49. Italics in the original. 
55 ‘…il linguaggio umano è “voce della coscienza”, in esso la coscienza esiste e si dà 
realtà, perché il linguaggio è voce articolata. Ibid., p. 57. Emphasis in the original. 
56 Agamben, Il linguaggio e la morte, p. 59. 
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voice.’57 This means that the shifter Da throws the individual into language, and into 
life, without the individual entering it with her own voice, because language always 
anticipates Dasein58. From the very start then man is thrown not only in a life, which 
is a constant anticipation of death, but in language by being there as a shifter, 
something without yet a content or meaning but still a presence.  
 
Agamben however explains that death itself is not the door to the Voice, because the 
Voice is necessary to comprehend death and the Dasein and it makes all the 
difference between dying and deceasing.59 Deceasing is stopping living without ever 
finding the Voice, the principle for human conscience. Achieving the Voice means 
achieving being, existing in an active way and thus the possibility of developing a 
conscience and with that an individual voice. 
 
Human language then is made of two planes: the plane of the Voice, of the event of 
language, of its taking-place; and then the plane of discourse itself, where meaning 
enters the taking-place of language.60 To translate it in the language I have used for 
this work, the Voice lives in the plane of transcendence, but it presents the 
possibility itself for immanence and meaning to take place. Without the negativity of 
transcendence, the void it creates, being would have no presence to fill. 
 
The will-to-say of the Voice has not, for Agamben, a psychological dimension but an 
                                                          
57 ‘Essendo il Da, l’uomo è nel luogo del linguaggio senza avere una voce.’ Ibid., 
p.69. Emphasis in the original. 
58 ‘…il Dasein, si trova nel luogo del linguaggio senza essere portato in esso dalla 
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senza voce nel luogo del linguaggio.’ Ibid., p. 71. 
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ethical dimension, in which the individual accepts her presence in language: ‘The 
Voice is the originary ethical dimension, in which man pronounces his yes to 
language and allows its taking-place.’61 This is a key point for my thesis because 
being the foundation for ethics it also means that the Voice is the cornerstone for an 
ethics of narrative. Dwelling in the place of death at the origin of language, in the 
very risk of death, one chooses to found her individuality and to later tell her story 
through her Voice.  
 
Ethics and logic depend on each other according to Agamben because, without the 
will-to-say, language would not find an opening and the logos, or human thought as 
such, would not even exist. The narrative of our destiny is inside language but cannot 
be known, even if we use the same language. Ethics is the place where the individual 
experiments with ‘what has to necessarily remain unsaid in what one says.’62 I argue 
that stories or narrative fictions allow exactly this: the possibility to say the 
unsayable, to transmit the Voice, even if it is not possible to say it directly.  
 
Agamben does not state this but I would like to suggest, to conclude, that this ethics 
of the Voice, of the opening of language is, first of all, an opening to the Other. The 
ethics of the Voice presupposes not only a will-to-say, but a will-to-listen, the 
possibility of the meeting of two individual voices. The characters of the novels I 
will study are mostly deaf to the voice of the Other because they are too focused on 
trying to say what cannot be said. As a consequence, they have forgotten how to 
listen to the cries of pain of the Other. If this will-to-say is the foundation for human 
                                                          
61 ‘La Voce è la dimensione etica originaria, in cui l’uomo pronuncia il suo sì al 
linguaggio e consente che esso abbia luogo.’ Ibid., p. 108. 
62 ’… ciò che deve necessariamente restare non detto in ciò che si dice.’ Agamben, Il 
linguaggio e la morte, p. 114. 
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language and human thought, it would be interesting to found an ethics based on a 
will-to-listen, on the possibility that language and thought can be shared. I argue for 
the possibility that human beings can meet somehow in the taking-place of language, 
in a place before meaning, where ideologies do not matter and what really matters is 
only the reciprocal will-to-say, the inherent human will-to-communicate. This is 
what the unsayable is after all.  
 
Structure of the Work: Between Philosophy and Rhetoric 
 
Since I will be moving through the philosophical realms of transcendence and 
immanence I will separate the present work in four parts, which more or less 
correspond to domains of philosophy: Philosophy of Language, Desire, 
Epistemology, and Ethics.  
 
In Philosophy of Language I will observe writers whose work is characterized by a 
particular attention to the use of language in their stylistic choices. In the first 
chapter I will scrutinize the narratives of the ‘I’ in a story by David Foster Wallace, 
‘Good Old Neon’ (2004). This story is a confession, the place in which the self 
builds herself through language. This will be followed by an analysis of Zygmunt 
Bauman’s theory of liquid modernity, in which identities are constantly changed in 
the same way as we would buy a new pair of shoes. Identity here is not stable, but 
casual; not a pre-existent ‘I’ but a series of positions of subjectivity. From confession 
to fashion, the narrative of the I will see the struggle between authenticity and the 
need to be loved by the Other: that is, in the gap between the idealized way we think 
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the Other sees us, to which we aspire, and the failure we feel not only in attaining 
that image, but in the realization that, living after a transcendent image, a metaphor, 
our immanence, our ethics, that is, the way we live our life sounds fake. Suicide, or 
the violence on the self, is the outcome of the frustration and guilt for this kind of 
narration the self has undertaken. 
 
In the second chapter of the first part, I will explore the world of Cormac 
McCarthy’s Blood Meridian, and the way his style works by subtraction. I will 
observe his use of epic and above all the dichotomy between judge Holden and the 
kid, characters without origins who as such acquire, especially in the case of the 
former, the status of myth. Holden becomes an impossible transcendental figure 
representing the Law opposed to the almost powerless clemency of the unnamed kid. 
His clemency is the form his Voice takes in the respect for the life of Others. 
 
Part II of the thesis is then dedicated to Desire, which is not exactly a branch of 
philosophy but a subject philosophy has often analysed especially in the last century 
or so with the advent of psychoanalysis. Yet it is a subject that was already faced by 
Plato in his Symposium (385-370 BC). Here I will investigate James Ballard’s Crash 
(1973) and the way the middle class tries to find a way out of the boredom of their 
lives through the creation of new desires. These characters will soon give way to 
violence entrapped as they become in their own psychopathologies, creations of their 
metaphor machines that they apply to their immanent life. The Ballardian man is so 
involved in his fantasies that he thinks other characters are just the product of his 
desires. 
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Moving to Epistemology in Part 3, I will not so much observe the connection 
between philosophy and science as that between philosophy and information. 
Information has today taken the place of experience and as such it has become the 
basis for any form of knowledge. I will also briefly present the question Jean-
François Lyotard asks in L’Inhumain (1988) concerning the end of the universe and 
the ultimate witness. Lyotard in fact asks: when the sun will ultimately explode, who 
will witness such an event since the human body is not fit to last this long? In a 
humanistic take, Lyotard seems to suggest transcending the body in order to create a 
hardware capable of keeping the human mind alive for longer. In the following three 
chapters of this part of the thesis I will look for an answer to this metaphysical 
question. 
 
In the first of these chapters I will study the way his knowledge of clothes and 
etiquette makes Patrick Bateman in Bret Easton Ellis’ American Psycho (1991) 
literally a bi-dimensional man, who tries to communicate his metaphor machine with 
the different Others by violating their bodies. Blinded by the image of the 
Americanness that he strives to achieve, Bateman kills anyone who does not belong 
to that image.  
 
In chapter ii of this section, Chuck Palahniuk suggests in Fight Club (1996) that 
information can instead be used as a form of revolution for the lower class against 
the status quo. Through the fight, in fact, the individual becomes protagonist of the 
narrative of her life. However, the difficulties the unnamed protagonist faces in 
trying to connect to his fellow humans, to be noticed by them, are such that he 
literally splits into two personalities, creating Tyler Durden. As a purely fictional 
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personality, Durden represents the ideal image the narrator has created, in his 
metaphor machine, of who we would like to be. The product of his fantasy has taken 
the place of the narrator. 
 
In chapter iii, Part III, I will return to cyberpunk, which has initiated this entire work, 
by evaluating the role of the character in William Gibson’s Sprawl Trilogy and Neal 
Stephenson’s Snow Crash. From being nothing more than a mere ‘point of view’ in 
Gibson, the character will struggle in order to become, in Maurice G. Dantec’s 
Cosmos Incorporated (2005) the author of his own life. 
 
In most of the chapters I face the recurring problem of the posthuman, that is the 
vision of the human today in the era of the ever evolving technological boom, so that 
I will try to show who is the Ballardian Man, or the posthuman in Ellis and 
Palahniuk and finally in cyberpunk. But it is with Dantec that I suggest the 
posthuman, represented by Plotkine, is actually the fictional man, the man struggling 
in the balance between transcendence and immanence, struck between his 
imagination and the difficulties to apply the dreams of his metaphor machine over 
reality and as such, to take control of his life. Plotkine epitomizes the multiple 
fictional possibilities that technology offers to our reality.  
 
In the Fourth and final part of the thesis, I will deal with ethics and with finding the 
means for a co-existence of the individual with the Other even in the difficulties of 
communicating her metaphor machine. In the first chapter I will analyse China 
Miéville’s Perdido Street Station applying the theories of Wu Ming and their New 
Italian Epic (2008). Crisis is the starting point for violence, according to Wu Ming, 
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because it is the beginning of every conflict, including the one, which operates 
between transcendence and immanence. Ecocentrism is the solution offered both by 
Wu Ming 1 and Miéville: that is, attention no more to the internal struggle to 
communicate, but to the Other, to her voice and suffering. 
 
Ecocentrism is also important in the last chapter of Part IV concerning Miéville’s 
Embassytown (2011) in which humans learn to deal with the Language of an alien 
race, the Ariekei. The concept of what a consciousness is doubles here with the 
apology of lying as the only way to communicate the self. In the extreme immanence 
of the Ariekei’s Language in which every word corresponds to a referential reality 
the aliens offer no real personalities, deprived as they are of a metaphor machine. It 
is the lying of fiction, which ultimately allows us to speak of what cannot be 
otherwise said. 
 
As I have said it is only through literary devices that the individual can express her 
Voice, her own difficulty to communicate. As such, literary tools are the basis 
through which these writers offer solutions. For this reasons I have outlined a 
rhetoric of contemporary fiction:  
 
 irony will characterize the work of Wallace, a ‘serious laugh’ that involves 
the detachment of the philosopher in understanding her limited control over 
immanence; 
 ellipsis will be key to understand the rarefied and poetic writing of McCarthy 
and the silence of the kid against the abstract loquacity of Holden; 
 where Bateman represents Western man, he becomes synecdoche for an 
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entire people and as such he involves us all in his crimes; 
 paradox and oxymoron define Palahniuk’s entire career, always there to 
shock and wake us to the clichés of modern life; 
 the broken metaphor of cyberspace will show what happens when the 
individual escapes reality in order to live in a transcendent world of data, 
which has supplanted reality tout court; 
 finally, hyperbole, the going outside the self of ecocentrism, will seal 
Miéville’s answer to the problem of the unsayable. 
 
This rhetoric will help me to better convey the difficulties the characters have, not 
only to deal with the conflict in their head between the metaphorical images they 
have of life and the life they lead, but also to communicate their internal life and 
metaphors to the Other. Rhetoric will offer a counter-answer to violence, which is 
what the characters ultimately choose in order to overcome their internal struggle. 
Finally, I aim to suggest an ethical way for writers and individuals in general to 
communicate what good old Neon would call our ‘free will.’63 In the different form 
of epics found in these novels but especially in Miéville I hope to find a new ethics 
that goes beyond the violence of the posthuman but that offers an alternative to it, an 
ecocentric ethics that bridges the gap between the metaphor machine that is the brain 
and the world outside. 
 
 
 
                                                          
63 David Foster Wallace, ‘Good Old Neon’, Oblivion, London: Abacus, 2005, p. 179. 
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1.1 Confession and Suicide as Violence on the Self in David Foster Wallace's 
'Good Old Neon' 
 
‘I wanted everyone to think I was sincere.’64 
 
According to Nietzsche, an individual is for the first time aware and conscious of her 
own actions – that is, she becomes self-conscious – when she has to give an account 
of the suffering she has caused to another individual. Identity then comes into being 
when one has to ask oneself: what have I done? Affected by this ethical question the 
individual has to review her conduct operating a recognition of her own actions 
according to a specific context of laws and codes. In such a context the individual is 
forced to reflection in order to defend her self before the authority of the Law, 
representative of justice and as such entitled to condemn her to face a punishment, 
which can take violent forms. This is the premise of the connection Judith Butler 
makes between the creation of the self and violence: ‘Judgement, unbeholden to the 
ethics implied by the structure of address, tends toward violence.’65   
 
Butler continues, quoting Nietzsche’s statement that punishment is “the making of a 
memory,”66 since the self is forced to recollect what she has done in a logic of 
linearity and causality. Identity then becomes the story the self tells in the hope of 
redeeming her self from what we could call a crime, or to use the title of Butler’s 
book, an account of oneself. Butler dismisses Nietzsche's thesis at the beginning of 
her book stating that ‘there may well be a desire to know and understand that is not 
                                                          
64 Wallace, ‘Good Old Neon,’ p. 158. 
65 Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2005, p. 63.  
66 Ibid., p. 10. 
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fuelled by the desire to punish, and a desire to explain and narrate that is not 
prompted by a terror of punishment.’67 
 
Chambers and Carver have already pointed out that Butler takes the passage from 
Nietzsche out of  its proper context.68 The extract is taken in fact from On The 
Genealogy of Morals (1887) where Nietzsche reflects on the transitory character of 
the meaning of punishment.69 Nietzsche makes a list of a few meanings the act of 
punishment takes and, among them, punishment ‘as the making of a memory, 
whether for him who suffers the punishment–so-called “improvement”–or for those 
who witness its execution.’70 Nietzsche here stresses primarily the mark the 
punishment leaves both on the sufferer and the witness more than he focuses on the 
start of a narrative of the self. 
 
Butler’s misrepresentation of Nietzsche’s sentence is however interesting because it 
points at the necessity for the individual to look at her or himself from the point of 
view of the Other. The individual would not have any reasons to think about her 
self,71 as an individual, if not because its actions have consequences for other 
individuals or in the eyes of the Other. Punishment can take many shapes and the 
individual can turn to herself in order not to be excluded by society at large, the 
world of the other selves. The fear of isolation is enough for the individual to 
become her own judge and executioner. These reflections offer us a useful backdrop 
                                                          
67 Ibid., p. 11.  
68 Samuel A. Chambers and Terence Carver, Judith Butler and Political Theory: 
Troubling Politcs, New York: Routledge, 2008, note 13, p. 170.   
69 Friedrich Nietzsche, On The Genealogy of Morals, Trans Walter Kaufmann and 
RJ Hollingdale, New York: Vintage, 1989, p. 80. 
70 Ibidem., pp. 80-81. 
71 Even the myth of Narcissus after all is about finding the Other in the self. 
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against which to read David Foster Wallace; and this will form a central area of 
interest in what follows below, as I advance the argument of this thesis. In this 
section, I will look at confession and suicide as themselves acts of violence against 
the self or against selfhood. In turn, this will lead us to a discussion of the very idea 
of identity, either in the form of a falling or failing identity (and here, Don De Lillo’s 
literary fictions will be important) or in the theoretical terms of Zygmunt Bauman’s 
‘liquid identity’ and Paul de man’s linguistic self. 
 
This is what happens to Neal, the protagonist of David Foster Wallace’s story ‘Good 
Old Neon.’ Neal passes through different stages of confession in an attempt to 
account for the reason why he has committed suicide. The story is not a reading of 
his last message but a confession after the act, from the afterlife in a sense that I will 
later explore, thus ensuing that Neon is not under any threat of punishment. Neon 
feels the need to narrate his story to show to a certain ‘David Wallace’72, that Neal 
was not this guy ‘with the seemingly almost neon aura around him all the time of 
scholastic and athletic excellence and popularity and success with the ladies,'73 but a 
'fraud.'74 Neal’s story suggests that we as individuals may give an account of 
ourselves because we are the first, who need to justify our existence, to give a 
meaning through it as a story: the confession becomes a parable, an example of the 
life of a man like us. But it is first of all a story where the narrated I and the narrating 
I tend to correspond to a certain extent.  
 
The specific extent of this correspondence concerns the question of truth or the 
                                                          
72 Wallace, p. 180. 
73 Ibid., p. 180 
74 Ibid., p. 140 
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manipulation of reality on the part of the confessor. This is of local interest in the 
story; but its theoretical consequences go much further than this actual occasion or 
occurrence suggests. What follows from this correspondence between narrated and 
narrating I is, consequently, the relationship between fiction and reality: a confession 
is the telling of the true story of the confessor’s life but, at the same time, the 
confessor is the only witness of that life and, following from this, the reality of the 
confession cannot be verified. Reinventing the past is a way of transcending reality 
and, for this reason, it questions the concept of truth, since one dominant account of 
truth is that we expect a statement’s adherence to non-linguistic reality. 
Transcendence is not synonymous with lying but they have a few traits in common: 
divergence from reality (upwards for transcendence, sideways we could say or 
downward if we want to take a moralist point of view for lies); both diversions aim 
at salvation from reality itself (the first towards a higher ideal in most cases, the 
latter for fear of punishment, success, win over reality, etc.); both use language in 
one way or another (most religious forms of transcendence depend on a book and 
one tells a lie).  
 
Neal is looking for his true self after a life of telling lies to impress other people. His 
confession is meant to erase the transcendental myth of the successful Neon. His 
diversion from reality in the attempt to gain social success ends up in the loss of his 
individuality and the irremediable failure of language to communicate what he has 
inside. Neal realizes the paradox that he cannot tell his immediate essence, express 
his Voice, because it is unsayable. Through death Neal eventually understands the 
truth, thanks to the writer’s ability to communicate Neal’s individual Voice through 
a narrative. Before that, though, Neal chooses suicide – a mode of extreme and 
48 
 
ultimate violence on the self - after he decides that he cannot communicate his 
Voice, the ultimate truth of who he is inside. We then encounter the dichotomy to 
which Agamben has pointed us, namely that in which death and language are better 
articulated as the space of the anticipation of death and the will-to-say of the 
individual. In the next few pages I will observe how the frustration of his will-to-say 
will lead Neal to look for death itself.  
 
Neal’s story is a confession, both in the religious sense of spiritual confession in the 
hope of redemption and in the legal sense of confession in front of an authority. It 
will be useful then for my discourse to quote largely from Paul De Man's analysis in 
his Allegories of Reading (1979) of Rousseau's Confessions. In these pages, De Man 
gives a definition of confession which concerns truth or, we could add referring to 
Foucault, ‘a regime of truth’:  
 
To confess is to overcome guilt and shame in the name of truth: it is an 
epistemological use of language in which ethical values of good and evil are 
superseded by values of truth and falsehood, one of the implications being 
that vices such as concupiscence, envy, greed, and the like are vices primarily 
because they compel one to lie.75 
  
Neon’s shame at the way David Wallace regards him triggers his narrative of guilt. 
Guilt does not however come to Neal as the result of the fear of punishment as he is 
already dead. He is looking for truth as the only form of redemption from shame and 
in an ultimate attempt at communicating his true self.76   
                                                          
75 Paul De Man, Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, 
Rilke, and Proust, London: Yale University Press, 1979, p. 279. 
76 There are no hints of any belief in the afterlife in the story. However, Neal is 
indeed telling his story from the afterlife, but this afterlife Neal lives in is simply the 
space of his narrative. Or else, we could say that his need-to-say has survived his 
very life. 
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Confessing an act however is not enough, writes De Man, ‘one also has to excuse.’77 
De Man takes as an example of this idea an episode in Rousseau’s Confessions, in 
which Rousseau is guilty of theft. In De Man’s narration: 
 
While employed as a servant in an aristocratic Turin house, Rousseau has 
stolen a “pink and silver colored ribbon.” When the theft is discovered, he 
accuses a young maidservant of having given him the ribbon, the implication 
being that she was trying to seduce him. […] The story ends badly, with both 
characters being dismissed.78 
 
Rousseau’s sense of guilt and need to confess the episode is great since he has 
accused ‘an innocent girl who has never done him the slightest bit of harm.’79 
However, De Man points out, Rousseau’s intention is less to confess than to excuse 
himself in the eyes of the reader. De Man observes that the purpose of the excuse is 
‘not to state but to convince.’80 Rousseau then is not really interested in telling the 
truth but in telling a story in which he can narrate his guilt and, at the same time, 
entice the reader to forgive him or approve his confession: the confession becomes, 
in other words, an exercise in rhetoric. Thus the fact that a confession is a linguistic 
act takes the confession into the realm of what de Man calls ‘linguistic’ as opposed 
to ‘empirical’ selfhood; and it can be analysed precisely as a rhetorical trope. What 
‘actually happened’ now becomes secondary to this trope; and, again, de Man’s 
‘empirical’ reality, especially with regard to the reality of a self, is revealed as 
something constituted through the dialectic of perception, expressed linguistically 
through the identification of an ‘I’ that can be excused. This is obviously of 
                                                          
77 De Man, Allegories of Reading, p. 280. Italicised in the original.  
78 Ibid., p. 279. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid., p. 281. 
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importance in any situation where the implied ‘guilt’ relates to an act of violence. 
Comparing Rousseau’s theft with a similar episode in ‘Good Old Neon’ will help 
better understand the role of this kind of narration in the separation between story 
and reality.  
 
Neal remembers an episode which happened when he ‘was only four,’81 when he 
broke ‘the antique Moser glass bowl that my stepmom had inherited from her 
biological grandmother and totally loved.’82 When his stepfather asks him if he was 
the one responsible the young Neal ‘realized somehow right in the middle of his 
asking me if I’d broken the bowl that if I said I did it but “confessed” it in a sort of 
clumsy, implausible way, then he wouldn’t believe me and would instead believe 
that my sister Fern who’s my stepparents’ biological daughter, was the one.’83 Here 
we have the confession (the old dead Neal's telling of the episode) of a false 
confession of guiltiness (the ‘clumsy’ confession of guiltiness) which hides the truth 
by stating it: there is a new level added to the mechanism, a higher level of 
abstraction and meta-narration.  
 
Rousseau makes of his confession an attempt at excusing himself, thus 
compromising the credibility of his words: ‘Qui s’accuse s’excuse;’ writes De Man, 
‘this sounds convincing and convenient enough, but, in terms of absolute truth, it 
ruins the seriousness of any confessional discourse by making it self-destructive.’84 
According to De Man, the language of confession and the language of excuse belong 
to two different domains: the former is referential, that is, it has to do with truth and 
                                                          
81 Ibid, p. 148. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 De Man, p. 280. 
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reality, whereas the latter is a performative act, an attempt to affect the listener or the 
reader. The result is a split in the very language of confession: ‘confession 
language,’ De Man explains, ‘can be considered under a double epistemological 
perspective: it functions as a verifiable referential cognition, but it also functions as a 
statement whose reliability cannot be verified by empirical means.’85 Confession as 
part knowledge and part fiction is essentially internally split from the start because of 
the unreliability of the narrator. The confessing ‘I’ is unreliable because her main 
purpose is primarily to excuse her guilt instead of reaching an ideal form of truth.  
 
In Neal’s case, the performative act of the excuse is even more evident since he  
‘performs’ his confession in a ‘clumsy, implausible way:’ 
 
I figured out how to create a certain impression by knowing what effect I’d 
produce in my stepdad by implausibly “confessing” that I’d punched Fern in 
the arm and stolen her Hula Hoop and had run all the way downstairs with it 
and started Hula-Hooping in the dining room right by the sideboard with all 
my stepmom’s antique glassware and figurines on it, while Fern, forgetting 
all about her arm and hoop because of her concern over the bowl and other 
glassware, came running downstairs shouting after me, reminding me about 
how important the rule was that we weren’t supposed to play in the dining 
room… 86  
 
Wallace succeeds in creating the image of a child talking fast and for a long time as 
if making up what he is telling by writing a long paragraph without a full stop and 
finishing it with three suspension points. Neal immediately ascertains the power of 
his performance for which he does not feel any guilt, on the contrary: ‘the truth is it 
felt great. I felt powerful, smart.’87 Neal is trapped in his attempt at confession 
because even now that he really wants to confess he still has to struggle with a 
                                                          
85 Ibid., p. 281. 
86 Wallace, p. 148. 
87 Ibid., p. 149. 
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language outside the domain of truth. Neal was very young when he found out about 
the transcendent power of manipulating the perception of reality. 
 
Is Neal’s confession of a false confession more reliable than Rousseau’s? Nobody 
has ever found out about Rousseau’s act but he feels the need to insert the episode in 
his Confessions apparently out of guilt. At the same time, however, he is probably 
only trying to ingratiate himself with his reader, because what he ultimately wants, 
we could say, is to be liked. In Wallace’s text, Neal wants to tell the truth by proving 
he is a fraud through his confession. His need to be liked was exactly what brought 
him to his demise and his posthumous attempt at dismissing his own myth, his own 
story.  
 
Neal’s shame at the episode, also stemming from the admission that he likes his 
sister: his statement that ‘I like her a lot,’88 more or less directly echoes Rousseau’s 
concern for the ‘innocent servant.’ According to De Man, recounting the episode 
Rousseau ‘speculate[s] at length, and with some relish, on the dreadful things that 
are bound to have happened in the subsequent career of the hapless girl.'89 Neal, on 
his part, asks himself what it could mean for a five year old girl to be considered a 
liar: ‘I’m sure it must be doubly horrible when you were actually telling the truth and 
they didn’t believe you.’90  
 
The psychological violence received by Neal’s sister and the troubles of the servant 
in Rousseau are the consequences of narrative acts: narrative acts that are so 
                                                          
88 Ibid, p. 150. 
89 De Man, p. 279. 
90 Wallace, p. 149. 
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removed from reality that the stories they tell become synonymous with lie. This is 
what Agamben means when stating that the works of imagination today, what we 
call fiction, is in the end a pack of lies instead of a way towards knowledge.91 
Rousseau’s and Neal’s speculations as to the effects of their actions do not diminish 
their crime, which is ultimately using fiction as a lie, or of concealing the ethical 
domain of truth-and-lies under the aesthetic and rhetorical domain of fiction.  
 
The shame apparent in the recounting of these two episodes is only an excuse which 
allows the self to feel the pleasure of finally taking the ‘truth’ out of itself: ‘shame 
used as excuse permits repression to function as revelation and thus to make pleasure 
and guilt interchangeable. Guilt is forgiven because it allows for the pleasure of 
revealing its repression. It follows that repression is in fact an excuse, one speech act 
among others.’92 De Man’s words explain the real reasons for a confession: both 
Rousseau and Neal merely want to free themselves of a burden and leave a good 
impression on the reader. The real shame comes at knowing that one actually wants 
to expose one’s own guilt, exhibit it. ‘One is more ashamed of the exposure of the 
desire to expose oneself than of the desire to possess; like Freud’s dreams of 
nakedness, shame is primarily exhibitionistic.’93 Instead of feeling actually guilty 
Rousseau and Neal want to be revealed in their shame and crime, but whereas 
Rousseau wants to be accepted by the reader, Neon seems to conceive a more 
genuine desire to find his true self. His entire confession is a struggle between 
showing himself as evil and being finally understood: it is an ethic-epistemological 
                                                          
91 ’For Antiquity, the imagination, which is now expunged from knowledge as 
“unreal”, was the supreme medium of knowledge.’ Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and 
History, p. 27. 
92 De Man, p. 286. 
93 Ibid., p. 285. 
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battle where truth can lead to redemption.  
 
As De Man notes in fact, the telling of the episode helps to explain the incongruity of 
Rousseau’s act: the confession tries to make sense of why Rousseau has done it: 
 
the action is understood and, consequently, excused for it was primarily its 
incongruity that was unforgivable. Knowledge, morality, possession, 
exposure, affectivity (shame as the synthesis of pleasure and pain), and the 
performative excuse are all ultimately part of one system that is 
epistemologically as well as ethically grounded and therefore available as 
meaning, in the mode of understanding.’94  
 
The purpose of the narrative is not merely to order reality but to order it into an 
intelligible meaning. The metaphor machine stimulating any narrative has always 
had order as its priority but this order has no necessary relation to the reality it tries 
to explain. This transcendental machine in fact has the capacity to overwhelm the 
immanent perceptions of the senses. The epistemological narrative has as its 
protagonist a fictional Rousseau, which is irremediably split from the original the 
moment the writer starts his Confessions.  
 
*** 
A clear mode of analysis of what is at issue here is offered by Butler in her 
consideration of Foucault. According to Foucault, the confession is ‘a 
“manifestation” of the self that does not have to correspond to some putative inner 
truth, and whose constitutive appearance is not to be construed as mere illusion.’95 
No truth, nor illusion, then, but a performative act, where ‘confession becomes the 
                                                          
94 Ibid., p. 287. 
95 Butler, p. 112. Italics in the original. 
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verbal and bodily scene of its self-demonstration.’96 We could say that the 
confession is the way the individual wants to be seen on the outside by solving the 
incongruity of an act committed for which she feels shame and guilt. This becomes 
the ground where the metaphor machines substitutes the immanent world. In telling 
his story, then, Rousseau the confessor narrates a tale of Rousseau the character and 
tries to excuse the action of that character. Pushing De Man’s analysis to its logical 
conclusion, Rousseau the writer can let his character take all the blame and be thus 
forgiven. 
 
The split inherent in manifestation (or exhibition in De Man’s terms) is ultimately a 
form of sacrifice, Butler says, quoting Foucault again: “You will become the subject 
of a manifestation of truth when and only when you disappear or you destroy 
yourself as a real body and a real existence.”97 To succeed with his confession then 
Neal first kills himself and it is only after this death that he tells his story, without a 
real existence needing forgiveness any longer. Neal renounces to his immanent body 
and becomes pure metaphor, a story in other words, in order to express his Voice. Is 
violence really the only option Neal had to find truth and tell the unsayable? Was 
this sacrifice worth it? Who did he make this sacrifice for? 
 
These are the questions to which we can now turn. 
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Truth and the Other 
 
Towards the end of his life Neal is overwhelmed by the need for the Other to 
understand him. By lying, the individual builds a fiction fitting with the expectations 
of society. Society in this case is another name for the Law that Benjamin talks about 
when he talks about violence. As Neal says at the very beginning of his story, in fact, 
‘pretty much all I’ve ever done all the time is try to create a certain impression of me 
in other people.’98 Society has written the rules that bind Neal in his solipsism of lies 
and half-truths transcending any form of inner truth. This binding keeps Neal away 
from any true connection to the Other.  
 
An example of Neal’s relationship with the Other, which helps both to illustrate the 
manipulative power of the excuse and at the same time the way Neal tries to impress 
people, is offered by his relationship with his psychiatrist. Neal gives his psychiatrist 
enough rope to please him even if, ‘the real truth was that my confession of being a 
fraud and of having wasted time sparring with him over the previous weeks in order 
to manipulate him into seeing me as exceptional and insightful had itself been kind 
of manipulative.’99 Neal has trapped himself in a vicious cycle where the Other, in 
this case his psychiatrist, becomes an instrument for Neal’s self to achieve 
recognition. The end of the cycle is its beginning since Neal realizes that what he has 
accomplished is to give his psychiatrist want he wanted from him. He has, in other 
words, perfectly followed the script written by someone else.  
 
The ultimate purpose of Neal’s ability to manipulate the impression he leaves on 
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people is a simple human need to be loved by the Other: he wanted, in fact, ‘mostly 
to be liked or admired. It’s a little more complicated than that, maybe. But when you 
come right down to it it’s to be liked, loved. Admired, approved of, applauded, 
whatever.’100 To be loved and to be applauded are however not the same since the 
former is more connected to a personal relationship with another human whereas 
applause appeal more to a performance in front of an audience. Neal passes from the 
need to be recognized by the people closer to him to the desire to be recognized as a 
member of Society. This may well be the consequence of a thought that has probably 
traversed everyone’s mind at least once: the way I am, am I worth or good enough to 
be loved? 
 
As Rousseau himself says, after all, (and this is also quoted by De Man), in certain 
circumstances lying is not lying: “To lie without intent and without harm to oneself 
or to others is not to lie: it is not a lie but a fiction.”101 Rousseau seems to counter-
argue what has been said to this point by firmly defining his writing as fiction (a 
story, which may and may not be real) instead of a lie. The reader is responsible for 
referencing to reality what she is reading in order to find some truth. According to 
De Man: ‘Not the fiction itself is to blame for the consequences but its falsely 
referential reading.’102 As readers we naturally tend to connect what we read with 
something outside, determined in reality, because we forget that even if narratives 
have always a connection to the reality outside they are however metaphors, forms of 
transcendence. 
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If we read then that Rousseau was quite ashamed of what he did, the reader believes 
instinctively that it is what really happened, instead of realising it is a fiction that 
Rousseau wanted to expose in order to be freed from guilt. De Man admits that it is 
almost impossible, at least at the beginning of the analysis to discern Rousseau’s 
attempt at truth from his performance: ‘It seems to be impossible to isolate the 
moment in which the fiction stands free of any signification; in the very moment at 
which it is posited, as well as in the context that it generates, it gets at once 
misinterpreted into a determination which is, ipso facto, overdetermined.’ As a 
consequence of the impossibility to separate between truth and falsification, reality 
and fiction, every crime can be forgiven: ‘it is always possible to face up any 
experience (to excuse any guilt), because the experience always exists 
simultaneously as fictional discourse and as empirical event and it is never possible 
to decide which one of the two possibilities is the right one.’103   
 
Truth can then have two different aspects as it is at the same time both the ethical 
attempt at being truthful, and also the absolute correspondence to reality, which is 
actually closest to what science tries to do through technology. The tools of science 
find their purpose in reading reality in a more truthful way than the human mind, 
which is fallible and relative.104 
 
This fallibility of the mind to create a correct image of reality is due to the fact that 
the brain is foremost a metaphor machine. It ultimately creates an individual image 
of the world, even of the self, that is not universal and never totally immanent. As 
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such, truth is mostly an ideal or an ethical stance where the individual decides more 
or less consciously if she is adhering to her vision of the truth. Rousseau is by his 
own admission telling a story about the theft, which does not correspond to the 
episode he has experienced. If empirical truth is impossible, then ethical truth is what 
is left to man to confess. Rousseau has failed ethically and to cover his failure he has 
tried to cover his lies with the name of fiction. Following his own definition, he had 
meant to lie about the theft in order to protect himself; and the maidservant had to 
pay the price. 
 
Whereas Rousseau spends time trying to justify his lies, the realization that the 
projection of his self did not correspond to his true self generates an ethical crisis in 
the mind of Neal. He comes then to the conclusion that 'my whole life I’ve been a 
fraud,’105 and that ‘in reality I actually seemed to have no true inner self.'106 This 
realization leads him to the formulation of the fraudulence paradox: ‘the fraudulence 
paradox was that the more time and effort you put into trying to appear impressive or 
attractive to other people, the less impressive or attractive you felt inside – you were 
a fraud.’107 When Neal eventually looks inside himself, he finds an empty space 
covered on the surface by all the different images of himself that he has created in 
his life. He decides on death through suicide, an act of violence (a crash accident 
after taking a lot of pills of various nature)108 against his own self, even if, in the 
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108 It is worth quoting the passage in which Neal explains how he is going to kill 
himself. Wallace, p. 177: ‘The idea was to have the accident and whatever explosion 
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very precise and specific  way that I have described above, he had committed suicide 
all of his life.  
 
Paradoxically, Neal undermines his entire narrative and death at the very beginning 
of the story when he says: 'Not to mention am I maybe full of B.S. about knowing 
what happens - if I really did kill myself, how can you even be hearing this? 
Meaning that I am a fraud.'109 Is Neal really dead? If so, who is really telling us his 
story? Is the real, referential Neal dead and his fictional self still alive? Is this the 
ultimate break up created by the transcendence of the individual, that is, the death of 
the real person in favour of the narrative character?110  
 
In death, Neal realizes that the need for recognition defines us as humans, and that 
this is what we call free will: ‘Of course you’re a fraud, of course what people see is 
never you. And of course you know this, and of course what people see is never you. 
And of course you know this, and of course you try to manage what part they see if 
you know it’s only a part. Who wouldn’t? It’s called free will, Sherlock.’111 The 
stories we create of ourselves are the expression of human freedom; the only limit, as 
we will shortly see, are the restrictions of language.  
 
Free will is also an expression of the individuality of our Voice, our will to say what 
we want to say of the products of our individual metaphor machine. Our imaginary is 
personal and as such difficult to convey to another individual metaphor machine. To 
                                                                                                                                                                    
his very death, Neal fights for a pure, true act, but does he really succeed? 
109 Ibid., p. 152. 
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expand our Voice outside the brain is part of our free will to say based on our need to 
be listened to and loved. For this reason the individual assumes a different identity 
thus becoming a ‘fraud’, that is initiating a separation between the referential self 
and the self as character. In the next paragraphs I will explore this separation as the 
figure of speech of irony.  
 
1.2 Irony and the Doubling of the Philosopher 
 
Through De Man’s analysis of Rousseau’s Confessions we have experienced the 
separation of the fictional self from the empirical self. But the confession is not the 
only case in which the self is split. Again with the De Man, we will now see how 
irony too has a dividing tendency in the mind of the individual. For De Man, irony is 
‘a problem that exists within the self,’112 it ‘[originates] at the cost of the empirical 
self.’113 Starting from this understanding of the concept of irony in De Man, I will 
move to the contemporary situation of liquidity in which we live today according to 
Zygmunt Bauman. It will be through analysing Bauman’s Liquid Modernity (2000) 
that split identity and violence will be slowly connected and new mechanisms of 
power will be shown.  
 
In the essay “The Rhetoric of Temporality”, De Man analyzes Charles Baudelaire’s 
“De l’essence du rire”, where the French poet describes the way irony or ‘le 
comique’ works. De Man transcribes the definition Baudelaire gives of irony through 
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the example of a man falling into the street: ‘“Le comique,” writes Baudelaire, “the 
power of laugh is the one who is laughing and not in the object of the laugh. It’s not 
the falling man the one who laughs at his own fall, unless he is a philosopher, a man 
who has acquired, as a habit, the power to quickly double up and to watch as 
disinterested spectator to the phenomenons of his self.114 First of all, the subject of 
irony is the laughing observer, le 'spectateur désintéressé', whereas the man falling is 
its object. The observer’s detachment from the action is a primary requirement for 
irony. If however the falling man is a philosopher he is able to be both subject and 
object thanks to a doubling, which allows him to see himself falling as if he were 
only another passer-by in the same street. The philosopher according to Baudelaire 
then has the capacity to transcend her self, to make a meta-physical jump beyond and 
in front of her self.   
 
 
This is the dimension of what Baudelaire calls 'le comique absolu' to distinguish it 
from simple comedy that is aimed at making the other laugh, in ‘an intersubjective 
relationship’.115 Absolute irony is not an event between two subjects, but the 
detachment of a self from nature and into the non-human: ‘The dédoublement thus 
designates the activity of a consciousness by which a man differentiates himself from 
the non-human world. The capacity for such duplication is rare, says Baudelaire, but 
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Man in the original French are mine. 
115 Paul De Man, ‘The Rhetoric of Temporality’, p. 212. 
63 
 
belongs specifically to those who, like artists or philosophers, deal in language.’116 
Ironic discourse, ironic statements, are ‘non-human’ but in the precise sense that they 
are non-natural, not referring directly and unproblematically to the world. Laughing 
and talking the philosopher/artist transcends or dies from the world and enters the 
ironic world of language:  
 
The reflective disjunction not only occurs by means of language as a 
privileged category, but it transfers the self out of the empirical world into a 
world constituted out of, and in, language-a language that it finds in the 
world like one entity among other, but that remains unique in being the only 
entity by means of which it can differentiate itself from the world. Language 
thus conceived divides the subject into an empirical self, immersed in the 
world, and a self that becomes like a sign in this attempt at differentiation and 
self-definition.117 
 
The fictional self is a sign, a metaphor; and as such, it has a meaning, a direction, 
which is to explain somehow the fall. What is fictional in the world of language is 
both the man falling and the man laughing because they both live in the world of 
language now. The empirical world is already opaque, not well defined, unreadable 
and it is the purpose of the metaphor machine of language to give it a meaning. 
  
 
What is this meaning then and why does the detached, linguistic, ironic self laugh at 
its own empirical self falling in the street? In De Man’s reading of Baudelaire’s 
essay, the answer is that ‘At the moment that the artistic or philosophical, that is, the 
language-determined, man laughs at himself falling, he is laughing at a mistaken, 
mystified assumption he was making about himself.’118 The mistake consists in the 
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presumption to possess control over nature: 'man comes to believe that he dominates 
nature, just as he can, at times, dominate others or watch others dominate him.'119 In 
the fall he perceives that nature has the power to easily reify him, 'treat him as if he 
were a thing’120, while he has no chance to make nature human, that is, to establish 
any illusory intersubjective relationship with nature. As in the biblical Fall from 
grace, man realizes that his state of privilege amongst all creatures has obvious 
limitations. But whereas the Fall sees man taken away from the transcendental place 
out of time that is the Garden and thrown in the full dominion of nature where he 
will grow old and die, the falling man in the street offers to the philosopher a new 
form of transcendence from nature and the realization of an illusion. The irony is in 
the reduced status of control and power that man realizes in transcendence: laughing 
at his own fall man transcends his own nature while, at the same time, accepting his 
own immanence and fallibility.  
 
A contemporary novel that concedes the fall of man as symbolic of his lack of 
control over the real is Falling Man (2007) by Don DeLillo. The Falling Man, a 
performance artist, reproduces the pose of the Falling Man in the photograph of 
Robert Drew taken during the attacks to the Twin Towers on 9/11. The destruction 
of the Towers represents the failure of the Western man to control reality since the 
United States found out that they were not untouchable and the artist is there as a 
reminder of the fall:  
 
She’d heard of him, a performance artist known as Falling Man. He’d 
appeared several times in the last week, unannounced, in various parts of the 
city, suspended from one or another structure, always upside down, wearing a 
suit, a tie and dress shoes. He brought it back, of course, those stark moments 
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in the burning towers when people fell or were forced to jump.’121 
 
Whereas the philosopher sees the terrible irony of the fall, non-philosophers or 
bystanders take the performance as an offense. ‘There were people shouting up at 
him, outraged at the spectacle, the puppetry of human desperation, a body’s last fleet 
breath and what it held. It held the gaze of the world, she thought. There was the 
awful openness of it, something we’d not seen, the single falling figure that trails a 
collective dread, body come down among us all.’122 
 
The cause for outrage however may lie not only in the display of ‘human 
desperation’, but also in the display of the truth of human fallibility. It  thus works as 
an admonition against arrogance. Human lives have been lost that were felt until then 
untouchable because living (working) in the twin pinnacles of the West.  In the vain 
attempt to touch the heavens these Babel towers have instead reminded man of his 
humanity. 
 
The fall of man is above all the fall of his hubris that is the creation of a concept 
according to which man is superior to other creatures and the world itself. In this 
exaggerated creation of his metaphor machine man believes himself superior both to 
nature and to the chaos of reality. The metaphor machine has mistaken its ability to 
give order to reality with the power to impose this order over reality and thus 
substitute it. This hubris makes man believe he is similar to the pure transcendence 
that is god.  
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DeLillo’s novel in fact also mentions en passant another biblical fall, the fall of 
Lucifer, who challenged god: ‘Headlong, free fall, she thought, and this picture 
burned a hole in her mind and heart, dear God, he was a falling angel and his beauty 
was horrific.’123 Lucifer, the fallen angel, was the Light-Bringer, in other words, the 
bringer of enlightenment. For this reason he can be considered as a mistaken 
philosopher himself and as guilty as man for thinking it was possible to control 
reality or taking the place of God in all of creation.   
 
The revelation of the impossibility of communicating with nature shows that man’s 
existence is at the same time entrapped in human language and inauthentic because it 
has no real reference to nature:  ‘The ironic language,’ explains De Man:  
 
splits the subject into an empirical self that exists in a state of inauthenticity 
and a self that exists only in the form of a language that asserts the 
knowledge of this inauthenticity. This does not, however, make it into an 
authentic language, for to know inauthenticity is not the same as to be 
authentic.’124 
 
The consequence of the revelation brought by absolute irony is that it takes the self 
and breaks it apart, in the etymological sense of absolution from the Latin solvere, to 
loosen. In De Man’s words:  
 
The moment the innocence or authenticity of our sense of being in the world 
is put into question, a far from harmless process gets underway. It may start 
as a casual bit of play with a stray loose end of the fabric, but before long the 
entire texture of the self is unravelled and comes apart. The whole process 
happens at an unsettling speed. Irony possesses an inherent tendency to gain 
momentum and not to stop until it has run its full course; from the small and 
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apparently innocuous exposure of a small self-deception it soon reaches the 
dimensions of the absolute.125 
 
Irony is an impossible force of destruction because it violates every presumption on 
identity, power or the relationship with the world. Setting a dichotomy and becoming 
part of the world of language or, following our point of view, realizing our lives in a 
world of metaphor, the philosopher has either to ride the avalanche or become mad: 
‘Sanity can exist only because we are willing to function within the conventions of 
duplicity and dissimulation, just as social language dissimulates the inherent 
violence of the actual relationships between human beings. Once this mask is shown 
to be a mask, the authentic being underneath appears necessarily as on the verge of 
madness.’126 
 
Sanity, in a way, means to ignore the violence of everyday life under the cover and 
illusion of the social language and conventions. Stretching a little bit what De Man 
says, this means that without the mask of conventions the individual cannot 
communicate with the other and is left alone in the throes of madness. Madness as 
the irrational, the domain where language does not make sense and where the 
metaphor machine has lost control and cannot give meaning and organise reality 
anymore. Paradoxically then the language of the ironist is the language of truth, 
which in this case also means accepting that absolute irony:  
 
is a consciousness of a non-consciousness, a reflection on madness from the 
inside of madness itself. But this reflection is made possible only by the 
double structure of ironic language: the ironist invents a form of himself that 
is “mad” but that does not know its own madness; he then proceeds to reflect 
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on his madness thus objectified.127  
 
 
Before analysing the last quote, I would like to point out the difference between 
‘duplicity and dissimulation’ and the ‘doubling’ of the artistic and ironic self. The 
former dissimulates and hides behind the mask of conventions, but it represents a 
false duplicity since what the mask actually hides is the non-existence of the 
empirical self. All that remains are the conventions on the surface. The doubling, on 
the contrary, stands for a true and conscious splitting where language is able to 
reflect on itself as convention, mystification and illusion, and reveals that there is no 
authentic connection with nature. 
 
If the ironic consciousness is no more authentic than the empirical consciousness 
then, it is the end of consciousness itself and the beginning of madness. The mad 
consciousness reflects on the mad consciousness, as if it were possible to have a self 
thinking over its non-self. But it is indeed possible, thanks to the ironic language, 
which gives the ironist the possibility to create a mad self ‘that does not know its 
own madness’ and that then sits and observes that unconscious mad.  
 
The mad man can become violent or suicidal as in Neon’s case. Ripped apart the 
fraudulent mask of conventions Neon discovers his inauthenticity and, at the same 
time, loses his ability to communicate and relate to the others. The realization that 
his control over his relationship with others was an illusion leads him to a paralysis 
in solitude and, in the end, to his suicide and the creation of an after-life fictional 
self, a philosopher detached from life. 
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Liquid Modernity and the Market of Identities 
 
 Zygmunt Bauman will help me now to deepen my analysis of the 
consequences of the split and the destruction brought about by irony. Midway 
through his Liquid Modernity, Zygmunt Bauman quotes Harvie Ferguson’s 
definition of irony in the postmodern era: ‘in the postmodern world all distinctions 
become fluid, boundaries dissolve, and everything can just as well appear to be its 
opposite; irony becomes the perpetual sense that things could be somewhat different, 
though never fundamentally or radically different.’128 The split hypothesized by De 
Man after Baudelaire becomes in Ferguson not the detachment of the mad 
philosopher but the falling apart of the natural oppositions in things. Black can be 
white, binary oppositions melt in ironical confusion without solution because 
difference is abolished. Postmodern irony has uprooted any other illusions the 
contemporary world still had and melted them in a liquid without recipient or shape.  
 
Ferguson reflects that the consequences for human identity are an evolution of the 
‘age of irony’ into the ‘age of glamour’ where, due to the impossiblity of connecting 
directly to reality, appearance as fiction becomes the new fashion: ‘Modernity thus 
moves through a period of “authentic” selfhood to one of “ironic” selfhood to a 
contemporary culture of what might be termed “associative” selfhood – a continuous 
“loosening” of the tie between “inner” soul and the “outer” form of social relation… 
Identities, thus, are continuous oscillations…’129 
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The self as pendulum then whose very appearance is in its movement and thus, 
movement as identity. Appearance brings full attention to externality, following De 
Man once again, we could say that the mask is even more important now in the 
social context. 
 
The story of society nowadays becomes then the story of the oscillating movement 
of masks perfectly exemplified by Neon, who is not able to exist in society without a 
mask. The passage from ‘authentic’ to ‘ironic’ to ‘associative’ reminds once again of 
De Man’s essay where it is the ironic self that reveals the belief in authenticity as 
illusion and finds itself at the split between ‘inner’ (authentic) soul and the ‘outer’ 
form of the mask of conventions. When it is appearance that takes importance over 
interiority there is no more relation between them, the latter risks to be soon 
forgotten. But as we will soon see, it is not really this the case in the contemporary 
era, where society imposes the need for the research of identity, some kind of inner 
self, in the flux of possibilities society itself offers. Neon is taken in the flow and 
struggles to find his authentic self finally losing to suicide. 
 
According to Zygmunt Bauman, at the early stages of modernity the individuals had 
solid and stable pillars on which to attach themselves in order to stand in life. ‘The 
task confronting free individuals was,’ Bauman explains, ‘to use their new freedom 
to find the appropriate niche and to settle there through conformity: by faithfully 
following the rules and modes of conduct identified as right and proper for the 
location.’130 These were the fixed rules of social conventions, the social mask, with 
conformity as a guide for individuals to find their place. Knowing the rules of the 
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place, individuals knew how to behave, because they knew what identity to wear and 
they knew their place, since that place, we could add, formed their identity. Today, 
though, those fixed pillars have melted during the shift towards “liquid modernity”. 
Indeterminacy of roles, rules and places affect the individual, who does not know 
how to behave anymore, where it is, who it is. In other words, they have lost the 
direction of narratives or those narrative rules have been broken and are continuously 
re-arranged. Every day bears new forms of transcendence in the impossible attempt 
to catch immanence.  
 
In the foreword to his book, Bauman marks the difference between solids and 
liquids. It is worth quoting at length the passage since it gives an idea of what liquid 
modernity is: 
 
liquids, unlike solids, cannot easily hold their shape. Fluids, so to speak, 
neither fix space nor bind time. While solids have clear spatial dimensions 
but neutralize the impact, and thus downgrade the significance, of time 
(effectively resist its flow or render it irrelevant), fluids do not keep to any 
shape for long and are constantly ready (and prone) to change it; and so for 
them it is the flow of time that counts, more than the space they happen to 
occupy: that space, after all, they fill but "for a moment". …Description of 
fluids are all snapshots, and they need a date at the bottom of the picture.131  
 
We can easily compare identities to the snapshots Bauman refers to. After irony or 
the game of the confession have split the identity and proved that there is no 
authentic self, identities have been taken in the flow of time, lost in time, liquefied in 
a constant change of shape. The connection with time once again points to an idea of 
movement and oscillation. This movement is not towards abstraction simply because 
we have already transcended but it is a movement of constant upgrade, the same as 
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when the individual makes upgrades her smartphone.  
 
In the degraded state of the consumer society presented by Bauman in fact shopping 
offers the solution to the problem of identity: ‘Given the intrinsic volatility and 
unfixity of all or most identities,’ writes Bauman, ‘it is the ability to "shop around" 
in the supermarket of identities, the degree of genuine or putative consumer freedom 
to select one's identity and to hold to it as long as desired, that becomes the royal 
road to the fulfilment of identity fantasies.’132 Identity is a commodity and as every 
commodity today, its value is transient, it does not last longer than a desire, a desire 
continually modified by Society. In order to be accepted by this Society Neal 
subjugates himself to this market, chasing new identities in order to be accepted and 
loved.  
 
The freewill Neal speaks about becomes a false freedom for Bauman. According to 
the latter, freedom is reinstated nowadays every day through the freedom of ‘buying’ 
a new identity. ‘In a consumer society, sharing in consumer dependency - in the 
universal dependency on shopping - is the condition sine qua non of all individual 
freedom; above all, of the freedom to be different, to "have identity".’133 In order to 
show the paradox endemic to the problem of identity as commodity, Bauman offers 
the example of a TV commercial where to the image of a variety of women with 
different hair styles and colours relates the slogan ‘"All unique; all individual; all 
choose X".’134 Uniqueness, something that should be totally personal and 
individualized, is nothing but a commodity used by an entire mass of individuals. 
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Neal is an extraordinarily capable buyer on the market and as a consumer he is the 
one to be consumed by the system: anything deep inside is too far away, to be found 
in the abstract life he has. The freewill Neal talks about is the acceptance of this 
market but also, the acceptance that the projections of the metaphor machine are part 
of who we are, even when chosen in an open market. The question is whether or not 
our Voice, our will-to-say, is transmitted. 
 
With the help of a quote from Albert Camus, Bauman describes the tendency of the 
individual to look at other individuals' lives with an impression of unity and 
coherence (and, we could add, authenticity). In Camus' words: 'seen from a distance, 
their [other people's] existence seems to possess a coherence and a unity which they 
cannot have, in reality, but which seems evident to the spectator.”’135 As Bauman 
explains the illusion is created by the ‘distance’ that ‘blurs the details and effaces 
everything that fits ill into the Gestalt.’ In this illusion we believe that other people’s 
lives are works of art, and we start wanting to make work of arts out of our own 
lives. These works of art are what we conventionally call identities. ‘Whenever we 
speak of identity,’ says Bauman, ‘there is at the back of our minds a faint image of 
harmony, logic, consistency: all those things which the flow of our experience seems 
- to our perpetual despair - so grossly and abominably to lack.’136 Unity and 
harmony, logic and meaning are what we often look in stories. Metaphor, it is maybe 
necessary to remind the reader, is the mechanism that allows us to give meaning to 
reality. As a consequence, identities are fiction in the sense that we build stories of 
unity in order to find our self. Identity is one of the concepts Zeki talks about when 
relating the way the brain tends to abstract in order to conceive the different 
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instances of the reality outside. Consequently, the individual brain is only concerned 
with the idea of unity and control identity gives to the self, not to specific identity 
chosen.   
 
Bauman makes use of the image of lava to explain how identities form and dissolve: 
‘identities are more like the spots of crust hardening time and again on the top of 
volcanic lava which melt and dissolve again before they have time to cool and 
set.’137 Because of the need for coherence and order of the brain the individual is 
incapable of living a life in the flow, of swimming in the river without 
acknowledging a solid logic or order to the self. A unique, solid meaning as power of 
control over nature then is the myth that the postmodern irony has revealed as such. 
Ridiculed by irony, the extremely self-conscious man epitomized by Neal is so 
scared because of the lack of solidity and of a permanent identity that it clings 
‘desperately to things solid and tangible and thus promising duration, whether or not 
they fit or belong together and whether or not they give ground for expecting that 
they will stay together once put together.’138 Solidity is about duration in time and 
stability, coherence as Camus writes. Unity makes things stay together because it 
seems that in dispersion we are lost. We will later see with Katheryn Hayles that 
dispersion of intelligence and identity is at the core of what we have learned to call 
the post-human. 
 
For now, I will continue observing that the desperation generated by the fear of 
madness or non-self (which become synonymous) pushes the individual to solid 
things. The paradox is that the individual itself has fought in order to be free from 
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the crust, in order to be individualized and independent, since before Enlightenment 
broke into history. Now it feels dizzy, insecure, inexistent almost, lost in the flow of 
time where its identity (or identities) is lost in insignificance. Post-humanity will 
open the way towards an atomization of identity, kept together by force fields139.    
Neal’s example has shown us that this market of identities has the side effect 
of revealing that the individual has no true inner self, that she is a fraud. Neal’s self-
consciousness has reached the same level of that of the ironist, since both rely on 
language as a means to reflect on the self. Neal is aware of the connection between 
freedom and the flow of identities: ‘Of course, you are a fraud, of course what 
people see is never you. And of course you know this, and of course you try to 
manage what part they see if you know it’s only a part. Who wouldn’t? It's called 
free will, Sherlock.’140 But as for irony, this consciousness does not help to 
overcome the lack of the empirical self and, we could add, the need for a solid 
identity. Neal could not stand the revelation but the question one could ask is 
whether Neal’s true self was not, after all, the changing flow of identities and why he 
could not accept it. 
 
In other words, why cannot the individual forget the question of the true inner self 
and what is the inner self compared to the idea of being? The fiction of being as 
unified and coherent is probably at the bottom of the problem of the self. Neal is 
after all unable to say: I am this person, because he is one, no one and one hundred 
thousand as in Luigi Pirandello’s eponymous novel.141 The concept of Identity as 
unification is as overwhelming as the pretences of control of the Law: it has the same 
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origin as a higher transcendental concept and it is meant to control the individual. 
 
In the extreme freedom to be a thousand different persons freedom itself is 
suffocated by restrictions. According to Bauman, freedom is ‘a balance between the 
wishes, the imagination and the ability to act: one feels free in so far as the 
imagination is not greater than one’s actual desires, while neither of the two reaches 
beyond the ability to act.’142 Imagination of course remains the more hyperbolic 
force in the human brain whereas desire, be it for unity, coherence, etc., is a step 
lower as the final chains come from the actual ability to act, that is the relationship 
between imagination and desire with reality. 
 
Bauman distinguishes between ‘subjective’ freedom and ‘objective’ freedom. 
Subjectively, the individual is frustrated by ‘the pressure of the “reality principle” 
exerted, according to Sigmund Freud, on the human drive to pleasure and 
happiness’143. In other words, the individual is suffocated by the idea that her ability 
to act is relative to her capacity to act reasonably, that is, according to 'reality'. At the 
same time, it could be that its 'objective’ ability to act has never had a chance to find 
a way in the world because of ‘the direct manipulation of the intentions – some sort 
of “brainwashing”’144. This brainwashing, perpetrated by media and other social or 
cultural powers, forces the individual to lower her own conception of ‘objective’ 
freedom, while subjective freedom crashes against the myth of reality.  
 
We face two realities then: one present in the mind of the individual; the other 
                                                          
142 Bauman, p. 17. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid. 
77 
 
created by the media, the ideal concept of Society that affects Neal as well. The first 
is rooted in experience, during time, the second is manipulated daily and needs 
constant adaptation. If what Bauman says is interesting it also lack a further piece of 
understanding. Imagination was born in order to cope and organize reality: reason 
itself is a by-product of the metaphor machine which is the brain. If reality were not 
completely a product of imagination, along with the reality principle, there would be 
no way of manipulating it. All reality is virtual. The implication is that the media 
work directly on the metaphor machine thus melting even the distinction between the 
subjective and the objective. 
 
Freedom, first of all, means freedom of movement and movement forward. 
According to Bauman ‘we move and are bound to keep moving not so much because 
of the “delay of gratification”, as Max Weber suggested, as because of the 
impossibility of ever being gratified’145. Fulfilment is always in front of the 
individual who is unable to reach it, like a carrot in front of a horse, but, even when 
it is achievable the desire has already vanished like a ghost. Consequently, Bauman 
states that 'Being modern means being perpetually ahead of oneself, in a state of 
constant transgression (in Nietzsche's terms, one cannot be Mensch without being, or 
at least struggling to be, Ubermensch)146. This forward movement is somehow 
hyperbolic forcing the individual to constantly transcend her self, as if she shifted 
constantly from her core. Bauman implies that it is a question of desire and 
gratification.  However, I argue – indeed, one central element in the argument of this 
entire thesis is - that we could dig even deeper and suggest that it is actually a strong 
echo of the narrative shifting in the human brain between transcendence and 
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immanence, substantiated in the body which is the border between the mind and 
reality. The individual is in constant movement outside her core and her immanence 
towards an improbable transcendence.  
 
The individual is not free to choose, however, forced as she is to choose 
individualization. As Bauman states, ‘individualization is a fate, not a choice. In the 
land of the individual freedom of choice the option to escape individualization and to 
refuse participation in the individualizing game is emphatically not on the 
agenda.’147 The suggestion seems to be that the self is ‘becoming’, because whenever 
it is somebody, it has lost the freedom to be someone else, many others else. 
 
‘“Individualization”’, summarizes Bauman, ‘consists of transforming human 
“identity” from a “given” into a “task”. Identity as purpose fits with the idea of the 
individual in constant movement. But what is more, moves the idea of the self from 
being (with an idea of solid stability) to becoming: ‘Needing to become what one is 
is the feature of modern living – and of this living alone.’148 Paradoxically then 
becoming is being nowadays with a small ‘b’ due to the incredulity towards the 
narrative of Being. As a consequence being means to constantly move never to 
arrive, it is movement itself, thus it is time and not eternity. Evidently, this can add 
more weight to the fear of death because of the implication that moving fast forward 
the end will come sooner than later.  
 
The result Bauman envisages for the impossible achievement of the narrative of the 
self is mistrust toward the Other, the Stranger. As Bauman writes:  
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The danger presented by the company of strangers is a classic self-fulfilling 
prophecy. It becomes ever easier to blend the sight of the strangers with the 
diffuse fears of insecurity; what has been merely surmised in the beginning 
turns into a truth proved many times over, and in the end self-evident.149  
 
This is the beginning of violence: when the identity of the Other is distorted by fear 
the individual does not actually see the Other. Insecurity makes the individual 
intolerant of the other individuals: ‘Insecure people tend to be irritable; they are also 
intolerant of anything that stands in the way of their desires; and since quite a few of 
the desires are bound to be frustrated, there is seldom a shortage of things and people 
to be intolerant of.’150 The other becomes an obstacle towards the constant 
movement of desire meaning, in a nutshell: I cannot be myself because of you, get 
out of my way, or I will move you away. 
 
As briefly seen above, the body then is the battlefield of a struggle also because it 
lasts longer than anything in the liquid era. As Bauman writes ‘the mortal body is 
now perhaps the longest-living entity around (in fact, the sole entity whose life-
expectation tends to increase over the years).’151 The individual has to protect the 
body from the outside world and the Other. The body becomes a sort of close circuit 
that has not to get in contact with other bodies but that, if necessary, has to get rid of 
the body of the Other. 
 
Time then, becomes the indicator of power because the fastest gets the latest identity 
and can surpass the body of the other. The rulers are those able to overcome time, to 
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almost erase it into the instant. ‘People who move and act faster,’ Bauman explains 
us, ‘who come nearest to the momentariness of movement, are now the people who 
rule.’152  Liquid power has squished space in an instant. In Bauman’s words:  
 
‘Power can move with the speed of the electronic signal - and so the time 
required for the movement of its essential ingredients has been reduced to 
instantaneity. For all practical purposes, power has become truly 
exterritorial, no longer bound, not even slowed down, by the resistance of 
space (the advent of cellular telephones may well serve as a symbolic "last 
blow" delivered to the dependency on space...).'153 
 
From a rhetoric of hyperbole and movement we have passed to a rhetoric of speed154 
The advantage of all this speed is that of escaping responsibility. In contrast with 
Foucault’s description of the Benthamite Panopticon where powers could follow 
everybody’s movements, we now live in a post-Panoptical moment: ‘What matters 
in post-Panoptical power-relations is that the people operating the levers of power on 
which the fate of the less volatile partners in the relationship depends can at any 
moment escape beyond reach – into sheer inaccessibility.’155 
 
The power connected to speed is not only related to velocity or to the power of 
escaping, but is also related to the power to accelerate and to ‘procrastinate’ oneself 
or the other. Again with Bauman: 
 
‘Domination consists in one’s own capacity to escape, to disengage, to “be 
elsewhere”, and the right to decide the speed with which all that is done – 
while simultaneously stripping the people on the dominated side of their 
ability to arrest or constrain their moves or slow them down. The 
contemporary battle of domination is waged between forces armed, 
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respectively, with the weapons of acceleration and procrastination.'156 
 
Power than consists in timing this speed but it cannot change the need for movement. 
Reality looks like ‘skating on thin ice;’ writes Bauman. ‘And “in skating over thin 
ice”, Ralph Waldo Emerson remarked in his essay “Prudence”, “our safety is in our 
speed”.’157 
 
Pushed by the rulers to build solidity through identities and afraid of falling, 
breaking the ice and drowning, the individual re-acts violently in a conditioned 
mechanism for survival. Freedoms have been corrupted by the media and the body 
has grown into an obsession. The other looks more and more as an obstacle, the 
individual feels it has to get rid of the stranger, or of himself as Neal does. 
Overpowered by irony and self-awareness, by the need to always be on top in the 
race over identity, Neal has numbed his body with drugs and jumped over a cliff. 
What we are left with are the remains of his narrative. 
 
* * * 
 
In conclusion, then, we can now say that Neal is the epitome of the individual 
constantly struggling towards a unique identity but always failing. Confessing his 
failure he is split between a confessing self and a fictional self, whose story he tells. 
As an ironist and philosopher he is split between an array of identities available on 
the market and an internal core, his individual metaphor machine, which impossibly 
aims towards an ideal of unity before realising that the metaphor machine is 
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foremost a narrative machine constantly creating images and identities. Only with his 
death and becoming inevitably a piece of his own story, Neal realises that that 
freedom is the acceptance that he is a series of images and identities. It may be as 
Bauman claims, that we have no choice but choose an identity because this is what 
Society, as concept and representation of the Law, expects. But it is also true that the 
very choice of our identities gives a glimpse of our soul, through a keyhole. 
 
To escape the violence against the Other prescribed by Society, the individual has to 
move towards the Other. The will-to-say of Neal is met by his intention to speak to a 
David Wallace, because he may hear his voice. Escaping the transcendental need for 
unity is only possible by opening to the Other, not as a confession but in the 
acceptance of one’s lies and narratives. In a way, it is David Wallace’s will-to-listen 
who has prompted him to write Neal’s story. 
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1.3 Apocalypse of the Human and Ellipsis in Cormac McCarthy 
 
Violence is the predominant trait of Cormac McCarthy’s Blood Meridian (1985), as 
James Dorson points out: ‘The sheer accumulation of atrocities and their matter-of-
fact representation, characteristic of the novel, tend to break down any semblance of 
plot and make it difficult for readers to cognitively process the violence.’158 Violence 
is so devastating that its acts collapse not only the plot but, as we shall see in the next 
few paragraphs, reality as well. The language of signs will come to completely take 
over reality whereas at the same time trying to impose a total control over reality 
following the rules of the mythical (in Benjamin’s sense) Law of War. 
 
In this chapter I will argue that ellipsis is the figure of speech characterizing Blood 
Meridian and all of McCarthy’s work based as it is on omission or, literally, on 
‘leaving out’ (from Greek leipein). Elision assumes a metaphysical dimension 
investing the entirety of McCarthy’s writing, which loses quotation marks, reporting 
verbs, names of the characters etc. Exemplary of this is the start of the novel where 
the first sixteen years of the unnamed kid are described in less than three pages. 
Furthermore, the narrator dismisses those pages stating that ‘Only now is the child 
finally divested of all that he has been,’159 thus making of that origin story an anti-
origin, a sudden elision of given information. This form of erasure in which the 
writer both says and unsays leaves a trace that constitutes the humanity of the 
character, his voice.  
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McCarthy seems to follow Pierre Macherey’s formula: ‘for in order to say anything, 
there are other things which must not be said.’160 This makes him a writer of the 
Voice: McCarthy is able to express, through all those absences and subtractions, the 
almost invisible presence of man, ‘which must not be said,’ because it cannot be 
said: the Voice of man has no words, after all, because it anticipates articulated 
language.  
 
Concepts such as trace and elision or erasure call to mind the work of Derrida, which 
I will briefly examine, alongside his analysis of the metaphysics of presence, in order 
to describe the fundamental figure of the witness in McCarthy. Both Agamben and 
Derrida will help me come to a definition of the witness in the opposition between 
Judge Holden and the kid, the ultimate witness and the last witness. Before that, 
though, I will dwell on the question of disappearance and elision in Cormac 
McCarthy. 
 
Of the Disappearance of Reality into Signs 
 
In Blood Meridian, elision and disappearance, the unsaid and absence, are the main 
themes. To support this thesis and ground the connection between ellipsis and the 
metaphysical dimension in McCarthy I will widely quote a few passages from 
Phillip A. Snyder’s aptly titled essay ‘Disappearance in Cormac McCarthy's Blood 
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Meridian.’161   
 
Snyder argues that the novel narrates not merely a story of the disappearance of the 
Old West but a story of disappearance tout court, that is, it creates a gap between 
signifier and signified, where the signifier is not able to give an immanent meaning 
to the object or event. Disappearance as a mode of writing then is a fundamental 
component of the novel as it is the philosophical and ethical question of extinction of 
life:  
 
This disappearance motif in Blood Meridian figures extinction as something 
beyond the power of memory or history or artifact or narrative to mark or 
mediate conclusively because, as poststructuralism and postmodernism have 
taught us, sign systems tend to mark or mediate the absence rather than the 
presence of things.162  
 
Extinction in the novel has no history and no story because death here is the 
complete erasure of reality, which is substituted for by pure, transcendental 
signifiers. One instance of this metaphysical disappearance is the path the Glanton’s 
gang follow, leaving everything behind them dead as if it had never existed:  
 
In the days to come the frail black rebuses of blood in those sands would 
crack and break and drift away so that in the circuit of few suns all trace of 
the destruction of these people would be erased. The desert wind would salt 
their ruins and there would be nothing, nor ghost nor scribe, to tell to any 
pilgrim in his passing how it was that people had lived in this place and in 
this place died.163  
 
For this capacity of the gang to erase everything, Snyder recognizes the Glanton 
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gang as ‘agents of disappearance,’ whose act of scalphunting is both a signifying 
gesture and an economic one. The scalp is the signifier for what used to be a human 
being and, as such, it can be exchanged for something else:  
 
They conduct an unrelenting quest to turn signifieds into signifiers within the 
strange economy of scalphunting in which a human being—Apache, 
Comanche, Mexican, man, woman, or child—can be rendered into a 
gruesome receipt of equal value. This value system erases individuality and 
sets off a nearly infinite string of signifiers of economic exchange from gold 
to guns to whiskey to women to whatever. Indeed, embodied as texts 
themselves, to be read within and without the novel, along with their horses 
and outfits all festooned with the traces of their narrative pasts, including the 
artifact accessories of their vanishing trade, the Glanton gang may be 
composed of material culture archivists after the totalizing manner of Judge 
Holden. This disappearance agency is first apparent in the novel when 
Glanton tests his huge sidearm in a courtyard, shooting a cat walking along a 
wall: “The cat simply disappeared. There was no blood or cry, it just 
vanished” (82).164 
 
Transcending signified bodies into signifiers, Glanton and his gang make anything 
exchangeable as anything can signify anything else. Everything becomes text or 
symbol, without distinction between the human and the non-human, making of this 
equality not an ethical act but instead an economic act.  
 
The Glanton gang is set into making signs out of reality which, in the terminology of 
these pages, means that they are depriving human lives of their immanence, their 
being-there into the world, and making of them metaphorical objects. For the gang, 
any human life is just a bare life, in Agamben’s sense of that term: a life reduced to 
biological fact. Consequently, their actions define them as agents of mythic violence, 
taking the term ‘mythic violence’ in the sense given to it by Benjamin; that is to say, 
they are affirming the presence of the Law, the Law of the Judge it would be good to 
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insert footnote references here to both Agamben and Benjamin to help give the 
reader a sense of where you have picked up on these terms, and why they are 
appropriate in this context. As typical of such mythical violence the gang are 
depriving existing reality of individual meanings in order to impose a transcendental 
order or logos. Theirs then is not a true form of erasure but a hidden form of re-
writing, and the imposition of one specific and all-encompassing metaphor.  
 
Considering that the annihilating force of the Glanton gang erases everything as if it 
had never existed means that their actions have not only a spatial effect but work on 
a temporal dimension as well, which makes them agents of the present erasing both 
past and future:  
 
Deployed upon that plain they moved in a constant elision, ordained agents of 
the actual dividing out the world which they encountered and leaving what 
had been and what would never be alike extinguished on the ground behind 
them. Spectre horsemen, pale with dust, anonymous in the crenelated heat.165  
 
‘Agents of the actual dividing out,’ the metaphoric power of elision of the gang 
makes them sound more and more like mythical creatures that could be associated 
with the horsemen of the apocalypse as the last sentence seems to suggest. 
Considering that their actions have a metaphysical effect, it is only a natural 
consequence that they themselves become creatures of fiction, stories to be told to 
scare children.  
 
As myth, the gang are extrapolated from normal time and live a different time, the 
time of fiction, that is also a form of eternal, metaphysical present. In Derridean 
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terms, they are agents of presence, which does not leave any trace in the past or the 
future. The present in fact is not the space of immanence, of the here and now, but it 
stretches into infinity, in a no-time at all, in the place of metaphysics and 
transcendence.  
 
This metaphysical present without past or future belongs both to the kid and Judge 
Holden. As already observed, the kid’s past is erased in the first few pages of the 
novel. It is worth now extending the previous quotation:  
 
Only now is the child finally divested of all that he has been. His origins are 
become remote as is his destiny and not again in all the world’s turning will 
there be terrains so wild and barbarous to try whether the stuff of creation 
may be shaped to man’s will or whether his own heart is not another kind of 
clay.166 
 
Living in this eternal now the boy has the potential to change ‘the stuff of creation’, 
that is, to manipulate reality according to his will (I will examine the concept of will 
later on in this chapter). Only the Judge has a similar power in the novel. Both 
characters have the power to give or take meaning from reality, imposing metaphors 
onto a violated reality. What they do with this unlimited power given to their 
metaphorical machine constitutes the essence of the novel and is also what separates 
their different ethics. Theirs is the power of the writer or the artist167, but above all it 
is the power of the witness to relate and thus more or less consciously shape reality 
for those who were not there. 
 
Without a past or a future, a character of the present and a possible agent of elision 
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himself, the kid helps us to answer to the question: what remains to a man when he is 
stripped to the core, stripped of everything? What is kept in the silence and absence 
of this man? What does total elision leave to a man? What kind of ethics is in the 
hand of an individual, who has the power of metaphor to shape reality? The presence 
of the kid however is not the metaphysical pressure of the mythical law. On the 
contrary, the personal ellipsis of the kid means that his presence is his pure being-
there.  
 
In antithesis to the kid stands Judge Holden, real representative of the world of the 
novel and spokesman of the Law of War. It is useful to shortly quote Snyder again in 
his association of the ability of the Judge to turn reality into drawings as the only 
traces of what was before. He writes of:  
 
the judge’s ritual of turning signifieds (artifacts and other traces) into 
signifiers (sketches) so he can then “expunge them from the memory of man” 
(140). In this, the judge aspires to appropriate the role of nature which has the 
power to erase “all trace of the destruction of these people” so that there 
would be “nothing, no ghost nor scribe, to tell to any pilgrim in his passing” 
of either the people or their remnants (174).168 
 
Judge Holden is a mythical force of nature that is able to re-write the rules of 
existence itself through his drawings. By drawing, Holden deletes reality and 
appropriates its meanings and memory, composing a bible, the entire existence of 
which he is the only owner. Transcending reality into signs, Holden makes himself 
the only real presence in the novel. Similar to God he is the Logos, the original sign. 
Citing Derrida, his is ‘the transcendental word assuring the possibility of being-word 
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to all other words.’169 The limit of Snyder’s interpretation of the novel is in treating 
the Judge as simply an eraser when, in reality, the Judge puts himself as the originary 
creator, Being as presence in the philosophical sense. As originary signified, if we 
keep using Derrida’s concepts, Holden is both pure transcendence and originary 
sign, not only first sign but also first immanence, primordial Being.  
 
The Voice of the Witness 
 
With his ability of somehow having the last word on anything, Holden stands for the 
anti-storyteller, more of a philosopher or a scientist, an archaeologist or an 
anthropologist, than a narrator. Holden will never narrate what he has gathered in his 
book because that would mean to give life back to the world through fiction; rather, 
he sketches in order to deprive objects and people of their stories and meanings. 
Power in the novel means the erasure of storytelling itself, as ellipsis becomes the 
figure for the destruction of narrative. The individual metaphor machine of the Judge 
eradicates all the other individualities in the novel. There is only one voice in the 
novel and that is the voice of the Judge in opposition to the silence of the kid.  
 
Comparing Agamben’s concept of the voice with that of Derrida170 will help me 
make a distinction between the voice of the Judge and the non-voice of the kid. The 
voice of the Judge is not the Voice, which for Agamben is pure will-to-say, but the 
articulated voice of the conscience that is already language. To quote Agamben: 
‘human language is the “voice of the conscience”, in that in it conscience exists and 
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is made real, because language is articulated voice.’171  
 
Derrida sees the voice as vocalised word as well, if not as the beginning of 
conscience itself in his critique of the phoné. In his words:  
 
It is not by chance that the thought of being, as the thought of this 
transcendental signified, manifests itself par excellence in the voice [vowel]: 
that is to say in a language of words [articulated by way of vowels]. The 
voice is heard (understood) [s’entend]— that undoubtedly is what is called 
conscience— closest to the self as the absolute effacement of the signifier.172  
 
The Judge is conscience, self-awareness in that he is primarily articulated voice that 
is the only voice heard and understood. He is the only real articulated voice in the 
novel and, as such, he is not only voice of the Law but also the language of the Law: 
the Law speaks through his mouth.  
 
Before delving more deeply in the character of the Judge as representative of the 
Law it is important to spend some time delineating the figure of the witness. The 
figure of the witness is important for our discourse for two reasons. Firstly, as I have 
shown with my brief analysis of the discoveries of neuroscience, the reality outside 
of the body would be a chaotic mass of information without the metaphor machine 
that is the brain to process that information into a more or less meaningful universe, 
that is, in a series of individual metaphors. In other words, the individual is always 
the only witness of reality and, without this witnessing; the reality outside the brain 
would not exist.  
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In second place, witnessing implies a narrative created by an individual’s metaphor 
machine. The narrative of the witness is the only one we can trust in order to 
ascertain the existence of an event. In the same way as the confession, the testimony 
is first of all a speech act. As Giorgio Agamben explains in Quel che resta di 
Auschwitz (Remnants of Auschwitz,1998), ‘The subject of enunciation consists in full 
in the discourse and of the discourse but, for this very reason, in it, she cannot say 
anything, she cannot speak.’173 This means that as soon as the witness enters 
language, saying ‘I’, she has already escaped the reality she wants to witness and 
entered language and as a consequence she cannot speak of the event anymore. 
Whatever she says in fact would be language speaking: ‘This can also be expressed 
by saying that it is not the individual who speaks, but language – but this just means 
that an impossibility to speak has come to – who knows how –  speech itself.’174   
 
Both as individual metaphor machine and as a speech act, the narrative of the 
witness is at the same time unreliable and impossible. However, testimony is the 
only way we have to know the event. Agamben comes to a first conclusion that the 
subject of testimony is the subject of a desubjectification.175 In the terms that 
Agemben uses to describe this structure, in the Nazi concentration camps, the 
witness is the one who survives man, that is, she is in between the person who has 
lived the event - the ‘muselmann’ in the camp who has been de-humanised by the 
camp -and the survivor to the camp, who has kept her humanity and, for this reason, 
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is not completely a witness but has still got a language to tell the event. This original 
structure, describing the aporia around the camps, can then be extended more 
generally. The witness is between the human and the no more human. The paradox is 
that if the real witness is the one who has lost her humanity, to paraphrase Agamben, 
then the line between human and non-human is really thin, it is impossible to 
completely destroy the human, there is a trace that always remains: the witness is 
that remnant.176 
 
The question of testimony as unreliable witnessing of an individual is addressed in 
the long, short story ‘The Man Who Ended History: A Documentary’177, in which 
the science-fiction writer Ken Liu imagines a scientist discovering a machine that 
allows one person to go back in the past to witness in an incorporeal form an event, 
which however, disappears after the witnessing: ‘But the past is consumed even as it 
is seen. The photons enter the lens, and from there they strike an imaging surface, be 
it your retina or a sheet of film or a digital sensor, and then they are gone, stopped 
dead in their paths.’178  Evan Wei, a Chinese-American professor of history uses the 
machine created by his wife Akemi Kirino to send descendants of the victims of Unit 
731 back into the past to witness the atrocities their family members suffered.  
 
Unit 731 was a unit of the Japanese army stationed at Pingfang in China during 
                                                          
176 Ibidem. p. 125. ‘Il testimone è quel resto.’ Italics in the original. Evident here is 
the derivation from Derrida’s ideas of trace and différant. One of Agamben’s 
references for the writing of Remnants of Auschwitz is Derrida’s The Voice and the 
Phenomenon (1967).   
177 First published in 2011 and available on the writer’s website 
http://kenliu.name/binary/liu_the_man_who_ended_history.pdf, the story is now 
collected in Ken Liu, The Paper Menagerie, Head of Zeus. Kindle Edition, from 
which I will quote. 
178 Liu, Kindle Locations 5945-5947. 
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World War II. The Unit has been known through history for experimenting on 
human subjects. Unit 731 is part of a controversy between the Japanese and Chinese 
governments. The story plays on the fact that many in Japan deny its very existence 
and none of the members of Unit 731 has ever been prosecuted. The United States 
have also acquired the data obtained during the experiments. Furthermore, as in 
Agamben’s study of Auschwitz, the real witnesses of the event have not survived. 
 
Liu questions, through different interviews, opinions and testimonies (as the title 
suggests, the novel is built like a documentary), the legitimacy and the importance of 
individual testimony. Dr Wei’s decision to offer the use of the machine to people 
emotively connected to the victims instead of historians undermines the legitimacy 
of their testimony. Is individual testimony irrelevant against History? ‘Like early 
archaeologists who destroyed entire sites as they sought a few precious artifacts, 
thereby consigning valuable information about the past to oblivion, Wei was 
destroying the very history that he was trying to save.’179 History transcends 
individual stories and it is based as much as possible upon facts. It is, in other words, 
a master narrative meant to cover everything and, as such, impossible. History takes 
the place and the dimension of the Law and, for this reason, it forgets the individual. 
Denying the death and violence suffered by the individual can only be done by 
history, never by testimony. Using the Kirino particles one can witness an event in 
the past without being the person actually suffering: human and non-human meet, 
and the conditions of testimony indicated by Agamben are met. ‘We must bear 
witness and speak for those who cannot speak. We have only one chance to get it 
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right.’180 Testimony is the burden (‘to bear witness’) to speak not only for those who 
are dead but also for those who have been dehumanised and have lost the ability to 
humanly speak.  
 
These introductory notes on the witness will allow me now to analyse the figure of 
the witness in Blood Meridian. If Holden is the last one to utter a word or make a 
sign in the world of the novel, this makes of him the ultimate witness, whereas the 
kid is the last witness to actually witness a story. It follows now that we can propose 
that the kid, Holden’s opposite, is the silent witness and the real storyteller in the 
novel. It is not by chance in fact that the kid is the first character the reader meets, 
and not by chance that the real story ends with his death at the hands of the Judge: 
the kid gives us invisible eyes to observe the world of the novel. The kid is the only 
character with an origin even if that origin is in or under erasure: the reader is 
somehow asked to relate to him because of his story of abandon and hard choices, an 
origin that irremediably leaves its traces in the reader. It is the same as telling 
someone: ‘don’t think of an elephant!’181 The kid, in other words, always leaves a 
trace of himself in the mind of the reader. The kid is in a way this text’s version of 
the silent musselmann in Agamben’s account of the camps, the one who does not 
survive but lives a trace of himself in the story. He is Voice whereas Holden is 
language, articulated voice.  
 
The importance of the role of the witness in asserting reality is repeatedly recalled by 
Judge Holden in the course of the novel:  
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The posting of witnesses by a third and other path altogether might also be 
called in evidence as appearing to beggar chance, yet the judge, who had put 
his horse forward until he was abreast of the speculants, said that in this was 
expressed the very nature of the witness and that his proximity was no third 
thing but rather the prime, for what could be said to occur unobserved?’182  
 
It is the old question George Berkeley posits in his A Treatise Concerning the 
Principles of Human Knowledge (1710) about reality and perception: ‘The objects of 
sense exist only when they are perceived; the trees therefore are in the garden, or the 
chairs in the parlour, no longer than while there is somebody by to perceive them.’183 
Holden offers a similar provocation to the kid when the latter tells the judge that he 
has seen and travelled to many places: ‘Did you post witnesses? he said. To report to 
you on the continuing existence of those places once you’d quit them?184 
 
Following Berkeley and Holden then the event occurs only if there is an observer, a 
witness to validate its existence. Objects disappear when we close our eyes, Berkeley 
continues, reality stops existing: ‘Upon SHUTTING MY EYES all the furniture in 
the room is reduced to nothing, and barely upon opening them it is again created.’185 
Following the metaphor machine hypothesis, that is, that the brain conceives reality 
literally through metaphors, we already know that the brain elaborates information 
from outside reality so it is only logical to admit that it is the brain itself that creates 
reality. However, Berkeley’s view is pushed to its extremes when signifiers and 
signified are split and only the first, only the products of the brain and imagination, 
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remain. In other words, if the individual sees a tree falling or a chair in a room with 
her eyes closed, they still exist even if they have ceased to exist in reality.  
 
The words of the witness, her signifiers, acquire a material existence that surpasses 
even the relevance of the witness herself: ‘Words are things. The words he is in 
possession of he cannot be deprived of. Their authority transcends his ignorance of 
their meaning.’186 The authority of the witness’ words is more important than the 
witness’ understanding. Words move beyond whoever has uttered them and will 
stand as witnesses on their own in the same way as novels survive their authors and 
stories survive their tellers. In the same way signs survive their meanings and acquire 
new ones, because metaphors transcend reality.  
 
The Transcendental Suzerain: Knowledge as Control 
 
Whereas the kid may be considered as the last witness in a world moving towards 
annihilation, Holden is the ultimate witness, the holder of reality, as his drawings 
contain reality’s last vestiges. Holden’s ultimate goal is to control reality through the 
complete control over the signs of the world. As the keeper of the world who, 
contrary to the mere witness, has complete knowledge and control over what he 
witnesses and over the words he mouths, Holden is the suzerain, in whom 
knowledge and existence, metaphor machine and reality, correspond: 
 
Whatever exists, he said. Whatever in creation exists without my knowledge 
exists without my consent.  
He looked about at the dark forest in which they were bivouacked. He 
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nodded toward the specimens he’d collected. These anonymous creatures, he 
said, may seem little or nothing in the world. Yet the smallest crumb can 
devour us. Any smallest thing beneath yon rock out of men’s knowing. Only 
nature can enslave man and only when the existence of each last entity is 
routed out and made to stand naked before him will he be properly suzerain 
of the earth. What’s a suzerain?  
A keeper. A keeper or overlord.  
Why not say keeper then?  
Because he is a special kind of keeper. A suzerain rules even where there are 
other rulers. His authority countermands local judgments.  
Toadvine spat.  
The judge placed his hands on the ground. He looked at his inquisitor. This is 
my claim, he said. And yet everywhere upon it are pockets of autonomous 
life. Autonomous. In order for it to be mine nothing must be permitted to 
occur upon it save by my dispensation.  
Toadvine sat with his boots crossed before the fire. No man can acquaint 
himself with everthing on this earth, he said.  
The judge tilted his great head. The man who believes that the secrets of the 
world are forever hidden lives in mystery and fear. Superstition will drag him 
down. The rain will erode the deeds of his life. But that man who sets himself 
the task of singling out the thread of order from the tapestry will by the 
decision alone have taken charge of the world and it is only by such taking 
charge that he will effect a way to dictate the terms of his own fate.187  
 
If with Porush we have seen how the cognitive corresponds to the metaphorical, in 
his definition of transcendence - which also means that knowledge is metaphorical 
and transcendental - then Holden is the Keeper of the Transcendental. Holden holds 
everything that can be known to man in his hands, because knowledge is control 
over reality. For the Judge the equivalence between his knowledge and existence - 
the fact that something is allowed to exist only if he knows about it and allows it to 
exist - implies that immanence comes after Logos, after cognition. It is a direct 
consequence of his conception for the witness according to which reality exists only 
thanks to the witness. This Law, set by the Judge upon the world, makes everything 
that is beyond his comprehension, everything that is beyond his personal metaphor 
machine, unlawful. As such, the presence of clemency in the kid corrupts the 
conception of the world of the Judge. Clemency then becomes the incomprehensible 
                                                          
187 Ibid., p. 195. 
99 
 
presence of immanence in the world, the last vestige of humanity. 
 
Clemency presents the paradox of something that in itself is a concept – clemency 
cannot be touched, visualised, etc. – while, at the same time, it can only manifest 
itself in immanence, in the actions of men. In its transcendentalism - and here is 
another paradox - the suzerain’s knowledge is purely material, because he cannot 
control what he cannot draw. For the Judge, however, the knowledge of reality, its 
transcendental state, is more important than its actual existence because reality is by 
nature autonomous and thus cannot be controlled. If the metaphor machine’s purpose 
is to put the world in order, that is, controlling it, reality in its chaos is anarchic, 
namely, it does not abide  by any rule the brain tries to impose on it. Holden’s 
transcendentalism, exemplified in his act of signifying reality in his drawings, is a 
violent attempt at the total dominion of the metaphor machine over reality.  
The Law of the Judge 
 
In order to move our discourse from that of a linguistic signifiers/signified problem 
to that concerning the ethical struggle between clemency and the Law in the 
Benjamin sense of mythical violence I will engage the arguments in James Dorson’s 
analysis of the novel.  
 
Dorson points out that abstracting objects and living beings into signifiers also 
means that Holden with his sketches makes currency out of the objects he portrays: 
‘This is the kind of currency into which the judge aims to convert the world. He 
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reduces the material world into units that can be scaled and measured.’188 This is 
evidence here, once again, of the incredible capacity of the Judge to rationalize 
reality into a sign, in this case, an economical one. The consequence, from an ethical 
point of view, is that where everything equals everything else everyone is 
expendable and exchangeable so that nothing is of particular value. Life then loses 
any immanent value, violence making of scalps the squalid determinator of a man’s 
wealth. The Judge then is not only the Keeper of Transcendental knowledge, but also 
the Keeper of the Ledger of lives. 
 
From his theory of exchange in the novel Dorson arrives at the conclusion that if 
everything can be measured and calculated in advance then even fate is controllable: 
‘If everything is commensurable, then the scales of the world are fixed. There can be 
no contingency, no ambiguity, no resistance, because everything is already 
accounted for. In such a world nothing is indeterminate because everything is 
predetermined.’189 This passage is revealing in our argument because the world is 
considered as completely collected in the Judge’s book. However, Dorson does not 
take into account the possibility that the book is a by-product of the metaphor 
machine of the Judge. It is impossible to distinguish in the novel between the vision 
of the world the Judge explicates in his many monologues and the world of the novel 
itself. The question then is whether the Judge is a spokesman of the world of the 
novel, or whether the novel is the product of his metaphor machine, making him the 
second half of the ultimate witness duo, alongside the kid. 
  
The Judge in fact seems to fit into the definition of mythical violence as that is 
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theorised by Walter Benjamin in the sense of  law-establishing.190 Holden makes the 
rules of reality like the gods of old myths. As a god of old, Holden controls fate 
because his mythical Law punishes whoever does not accept it. To explain the 
connection between mythical violence and fate, Benjamin offers the example of the 
Niobe legend: 
Granted, the action of Apollo and Artemis might appear to be simply a 
punishment. But their violence sets up a law rather than punishing 
infringement of an existing law. Niobe’s arrogance invites her undoing not 
because it breaks the law but because it challenges fate – to a fight in which 
fate must be victorious and only in victory, possibly, reveals a law.191 
 
 
Fate is the will and presence of the gods made manifest through the Law. Like 
Apollo and Artemis, the Judge oversees fate simply because he makes that Law, and 
in continually evoking his control over fate he actually manifests himself as god.  
 
To increase the mythical status of the Judge, McCarthy takes him outside time and 
space. Holden in fact seems not to age and, even more than the kid, he is a man 
without an origin:  
 
Whoever would seek out his history through what unraveling of loins and 
ledgerbooks must stand at last darkened and dumb at the shore of a void 
without terminus or origin and whatever science he might bring to bear upon 
the dusty primal matter blowing down out of the millennia will discover no 
trace of any ultimate atavistic egg by which to reckon his commencing.192 
  
In the same way as the reality he annihilates with his drawing and the violence of his 
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Law, Holden leaves no trace, nothing that anyone can catch or control, he seems to 
have come out of nowhere and at the same time he seems to have always been there.  
 
Dorson argues that the Judge himself is the only referent of the world he creates:  
 
In dissolving the world into signs, the judge is able to claim sovereign power, 
as there can be no autonomous existence outside of his words to challenge his 
power. At the same time, because he destroys the referents of his words and 
sketches, his speech becomes as self referential as it is self-serving, his 
rhetoric as vacuous as it is forceful.’193 
 
In his total ellipsis of reality, the Judge of course remains the only referent, the only 
real being. The Judge aims to live in a world where he talks only to himself about 
himself and whose only inhabitant is himself: this is the paradox of the ultimate 
witness, the ultimate transcendental, self-referential man, according to which nothing 
exists beyond the metaphors of his brain. The world offered by the Judge however is 
not a postmodernist gimmick on the part of McCarthy but it has to be taken literally 
as the depiction of a world made only of signifiers, made of nothingness and silence: 
if Holden stops talking the world stops existing. This is somehow the speculative 
consequence of Berkeley’s theory of perception and of cognitive science studies seen 
above. 
 
Another consequence is that the event in the end matters less than the witness whose 
narrative dictates the event. This represents another reason why Holden is an anti-
storyteller because a real teller disappears when her story is told. Reading a story we 
often completely forget about the narrator or the writer as involved as we are in the 
plot or the sentences, which invisibly capture our minds. In Holden’s discourse he 
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always comes before reality, being literally larger than life. In Holden’s vision of 
reality, however, everyone is a witness and, in an alternation of being and 
perception, everyone can ‘write’ about everyone else in their own book: ‘The judge 
smiled. Whether in my book or not, every man is tabernacled in every other and he 
in exchange and so on in an endless complexity of being and witness to the uttermost 
edge of the world.’194 Men are witnesses of each other and in this position their 
perception of the other battles with the other’s being. I do not exist if another one has 
not witnessed my existence, the Judge’s theory seems to say, and he, the ultimate 
witness, is the only one to have everything and everyone written in his book.  
 
The Kid as Elliptical Character 
 
In contrast to the almost omniscient and assertive nature of the Judge the kid’s vision 
is limited, his presence almost non-existent, immaterial, as Harold Bloom points out: 
‘The Kid cannot be called the center - his consciousness is too intimate, he fades out 
too often, quite deliberately.’195 Furthermore Bloom argues that the kid does not 
appear to be endowed with a personality until the very last part of the novel, where 
‘He finally shows, in his laconic way, considerable moral force and courage.’196  
 
Bloom, however, appears to be underestimating the fact that McCarthy starts the 
novel with the kid, giving the reader all the information she needs, making of the 
kid’s story a frame in which the Glanton gang’s story sits. Bloom however 
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recognizes the implicit presence and role of the kid in the novel even when he is not 
evidently present:  
 
But the Judge is not able to fully articulate it, though he does say to the Kid: 
“Was it always your idea that if you did not speak you would not be 
recognized?” (328). Which implies that the Judge has recognized him as 
someone who matters, someone who is implicit, although we do not know 
what the burden of that implicitness is.197  
 
I argue that it is the very ability of the kid to ‘fade out’ that makes him the perfect 
witness, the one the reader even forgets is there. He is witness according to 
Agamben, that is, between the human and the inhuman, whose Voice is but a trace 
that never really disappears.  
 
This fading out of the kid makes of him the perfect elliptical character, elusive not 
because cryptic, but because he has a tendency to disappear from the scene. The kid 
is difficult to evaluate because of his nature of anti-character: it is difficult to 
immerse oneself in a character that is not there except in the crucial moments he 
shows his gift for clemency. These moments in which the kid almost unconsciously 
displays his ethics are even more vivid because of the negative, absent presence of 
this character. 
 
The Law of War and the Battle of Wills 
 
The silent figure of the kid is contrasted by the loquacious presence of the judge, 
who invests with his words the entire silent world of the novel. Dorson concludes his 
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essay by suggesting that violence in the novel is due to the need to overcome this 
silence of meaning or, in other words and in my own preferred terms, of the genetic 
need of the metaphor machine to give meaning to the outside:  
 
Blood Meridian’s violence, then, is not the result of a violent strain in 
the human genome, but the product of a chronic yearning for narrative 
meaning to make sense of the world. Once constructed and widely 
accepted, however, such narratives are likely to become rigid and 
oppressive, at once our lodestar and straightjacket, coaxing us toward 
a future telos as inescapable as Judge Holden’s all-encompassing 
embrace. Because this desire for certainty against the everbaffling 
mystery of the world has a strong tendency to preclude critical 
reflection on where our beliefs and self-imposed laws are leading us, 
Blood Meridian leaves us with the uneasy feeling that we are trapped 
within an endless cycle of fear and mythical violence.198 
 
Having sketched the world into transcendental signifiers the Judge leaves all other 
witnesses at a loss for meaning and with it, a loss for signified reality. However, my 
argument contests the suggestion that the Judge is giving us a narrative. On the 
contrary, the Judge is imposing a metaphysics on reality without telling a story. His 
philosophy is indeed ‘rigid and oppressive’ but it is so because he is a god who 
wants to impose himself through mythical violence. Dorson bases his argument on 
Benjamin’s theory but comes short of it not underlining that Holden’s myth has no 
narrative. 
 
According to the Judge war is the human trade, a transcendental entity that awaits 
man in order to find substantiation:  
 
It makes no difference what men think of war, said the judge. War endures. 
As well ask men what they think of stone. War was always here. Before man 
was, war waited for him. The ultimate trade awaiting its ultimate practitioner. 
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That is the way it was and will be. That way and not some other way.199  
 
The myth of the Law of War starts comparing this Law to the ultimate immanence of 
stone. In the words of the Judge war is specific to man, ‘its ultimate practitioner,’ 
and is the only way to be for man. The being-there into the world of man comes to 
mean not simply an inevitable path towards death but a path through war. Being the 
incarnation of War, according to the Law, War is man’s true immanence, what 
makes him human. It is evident here how the individual metaphor machine of the 
Judge imposes its vision through a mechanism that changes transcendence into 
immanence, interpretation of the world into essence of the world.   
 
Evoking the image of the two players of cards playing with their own lives, the 
Judge argues for an ethics of the Other in which the relationship between self and 
Other is the ultimate Darwinian test of one against one, with the annihilation of the 
Other as sole purpose:  
A turn of the card. The whole universe for such a player has labored 
clanking to this moment which will tell if he is to die at that man’s 
hand or that man at his. What more certain validation of a man’s 
worth could there be? This enhancement of the game to its ultimate 
state admits no argument concerning the notion of fate. The selection 
of one man over another is a preference absolute and irrevocable and 
it is a dull man indeed who could reckon so profound a decision 
without agency or significance either one. In such games as have for 
their stake the annihilation of the defeated the decisions are quite 
clear. This man holding this particular arrangement of cards in his 
hand is thereby removed from existence. This is the nature of war, 
whose stake is at once the game and the authority and the justification. 
Seen so, war is the truest form of divination. It is the testing of one’s 
will and the will of another within that larger will which because it 
binds them is therefore forced to select. War is the ultimate game 
because war is at last a forcing of the unity of existence. War is 
god.200 
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The turn of the card evokes the transcendental moment when a man is dealing 
directly with life and death as if his entire life could be summed up in the game. In 
this ‘game’ the relationship with the Other is based on an either/or conflict: the self 
or the Other have to disappear from existence. As if there was only one physical 
space that the self and the Other can occupy in the state of war the presence of one 
entails the absence of the Other without a trace.   
 
Holden’s reiteration of the word ‘ultimate’ curiously defines the metaphysics of the 
entire novel as apocalyptic in the double meaning the word has acquired, signalling 
both a final revelation and also the end of the world. The ‘ultimate witness,’ the 
‘ultimate game’, are both fully part of a philosophy of war in which everything aims 
towards the end and extinction of the world and of the Other. The ultimate witness is 
such because she has eliminated everyone else, playing the same game of cards with 
everyone: the world of the novel is made only for one person, the only presence 
allowed.  
 
The act itself of disposing of the Other, according to Holden, dismisses fate as the 
player’s life is in his own hands and all meaning in his life is at the disposal of his 
will. War is ultimately a battle of wills that are thus reunited in one, unspecified, 
‘ultimate will’, which is war itself: war is god because it unifies the ultimate will of 
men. As it is evident, this is not the will-to-say that we have examined so far but a 
more Nietszchean Will to Power, Wille zur Macht. Winning the game is not so much 
the result of a will-to-live but the result of a drive to overcome the Other, to be her 
master, as Nietzsche writes in his Also Sprach Zarathustra (1896): ‘Only where 
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there is life, is there also will: not, however, Will to Life, but— so teach I thee— 
Will to Power!’201 Life itself then is bent to this will and even the greatest, like the 
Judge, risks everything for this game for death or, in Nietzsche’s words: ‘It is the 
surrender of the greatest to run risk and danger, and play dice for death.’202 The 
game is part of this battle of wills to become the ultimate master. With his Will to 
Power, the Judge is master over signs and over articulated language. He has lost his 
humanity and his Voice, his will-to-say and his will-to-listen. When the Judge 
speaks he does not want to be heard or to communicate to another human being 
because no human beings are allowed to exist without his approval. As seen above, 
the Judge is his only reference into the world and he mostly talks to himself and in 
order to affirm his own presence. 
 
Game, authority and justification characterize war and Holden represents all three in 
the way he plays to death with the kid, in the way he fights to exert his authority over 
nature and in his role as Judge, who justifies himself in long paragraphs like the 
previous. The will of the judge is so strong in the novel that he appears the one to 
create this world of war and the kid is the only one to resist this will in rare moments 
of clemency. 
 
The judge considers the kid as flawed, as if having an elision in his heart called 
clemency, which goes against the grain of the Law of War: ‘No assassin, called the 
judge. And no partisan either. There’s a flawed place in the fabric of your heart. Do 
you think I could not know? You alone were mutinous. You alone reserved in your 
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soul some corner of clemency for the heathen.’203 The kid is the only one not to bend 
to the will of the Judge thus involuntarily offering a testimony different from the one 
of the judge.  
 
According to the Judge however, the kid is an unwilling witness, the only one to 
judge his own actions before history itself:  
 
You came forward, he said, to take part in a work. But you were a witness 
against yourself. You sat in judgment on your own deeds. You put your own 
allowances before the judgments of history and you broke with the body of 
which you were pledged a part and poisoned it in all its enterprise.204  
 
A witness against himself, the kid corrupts with his clemency the natural tendency, 
in the judge’s eyes, of the human body towards violence. This unwillingness makes 
the kid silent, without articulated voice in contrast to the Judge. The kid has no will-
to-say but he seems to have a form of will-to-listen in his attention paid to the deaths 
of the heathens.  
 
Of Order and Clemency 
 
In a comparison between Blood Meridian and the Iliad, which takes inspiration from 
Simone Weil’s essay ‘Iliad, ou le Poème de la Force’ (1939), David Williams 
observes that in both works violence is a necessity of order:  
 
That there are constants in human behaviour such as the attraction to 
violence, and the absolute equity according to which the force of violence 
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respects neither the just or the unjust, does not resign one to the inscrutable 
whims of fate or the actions of unintelligible gods, rather it leads one to a 
search for order and the possibility of regularity in the functioning of the 
universe.205 
 
This ‘force of order’ Williams suggests has the same function as the metaphor 
machine: to give order to a chaotic reality. Violence originates from the need for a 
particular idea of order that an individual, Holden in our case, has of the world.  
 
The kid goes against this logic of might when he does not kill Shelby, a member of 
the gang that has been injured and has to be dispatched because he cannot ride 
anymore. As Williams writes: ‘It is not the kid’s misplaced clemency (Shelby most 
likely had to endure a worse death at the hands of the Sonoran cavalry than by the 
kid), but his failure to adhere to the rules of force that brings him into conflict with 
the Judge.’206 Even though Williams recognises the contradiction in the fact that the 
kid does not seem clement in sparing Shelby, concerned as he is in proving that the 
Judge sees him as an adversary because he goes against the Law of War and Order, 
he does not dwell on the question of the existence of this contradiction. The kid has 
no sadistic intent in letting Shelby live, so where – we should ask - is his clemency?  
 
Etymologically, clemency relates to a state of calmness. By extension it has meant a 
sort of calmness coming from authority. The Judge is frustrated because of the kid’s 
calmness in his ethical decisions even if he had an internal order, which the world 
outside – the world of the Judge – could not attack. In this sense, the Judge’s 
frustration is not a far echo from Arendt’s concept of frustration, according to which 
                                                          
205 David Williams, ‘Blood Meridian and Classical Greek Thought’, Nicholas Monk 
ed., Intertextual and Interdisciplinary Approaches to Cormac McCarthy, p. 8. 
206 Ibid., p. 13. 
111 
 
violence is caused by ‘severe frustration of the faculty of action in the modern 
world.’207 Holden is frustrated by the fact that his individual metaphor machine is 
‘calmly’ rejected by that of the kid: Holden’s words have no agency against the 
impassivity of the kid.  
   
An important point however that Williams raises is the fact that the Judge ‘can never 
transcend force, but is bound to it.’208 For Williams it is the kid who transcends 
whereas Holden is too immanent and restrictive in his vision of existence. I contend 
however that he lives in symbiosis with the transcendent fundamental force whereas 
the kid is bound only to his individual and immanent metaphor machine. The 
paradox seen above is that the Judge’s constant verbosity is aimed at making the 
transcendent Law of War present and, as such, real.  
 
Further demonstration of the Judge’s abstractness is that not only he has no origin 
but he seems to be indescribable, as Michael Madsen points out: ‘But what frightens 
us the most: his murderous and cruel actions, or the simple fact that he exists and 
that we cannot fully understand him? It is ironic that a novel written in such vibrant 
and hauntingly beautiful prose essentially becomes an example of how language fails 
us.’209 Holden escapes the reader’s need for order and clarity, remaining a mythical 
creature beyond human comprehension. In the end, he becomes part of the world of 
chaos that he wants to control.  
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Against the historical Law of War Holden posits the moral law, which he considers 
as unnatural, artificial, in other words, a fiction: 
  
Moral law is an invention of mankind for the disenfranchisement of the 
powerful in favor of the weak. Historical law subverts it at every turn. A 
moral view can never be proven right or wrong by any ultimate test. A man 
falling dead in a duel is not thought thereby to be proven in error as to his 
views.210  
 
In the ultimate game of cards the loser is not proven wrong by his death; his death 
merely states that his will was weaker than the winner’s. In conclusion the Judge is a 
mythical creature that has to constantly affirm his existence and presence through 
words and violence.  
 
Is ethics an acquired trait developed by human culture or an innate act? The Judge 
advocates for the former, and even his cruel attempt at annihilation probably stems 
from a primordial instinct to dominion that opposes ethics. However, the kid has not 
learned clemency in his life; he has not been educated into it but develops it 
naturally, immanently. As the narrator points out in fact in the very first page of the 
novel: ‘He can neither read nor write and in him broods already a taste for mindless 
violence.’211  Experience has taught the kid about violence as an acquired trait so that 
his very existence contradicts every one of the Judge’s statements.  
 
The kid is a different kind of witness, a narrator of that fiction that is ethics, trying to 
apply it in and to his world. The logic of the text suggests that the natural order of 
things is war - a position represented by the ultimate witness that is the Judge - 
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whereas in the figure of the kid the book suggests that an ethical position is possible 
and, even if a fiction or doomed to fail, it is something that can be undertaken. The 
kid has more than a chance to kill the judge, who is the villain of the novel, but he 
does not do so, following his code, maybe unable to kill an unarmed man. According 
to the judge this is the kid’s failure but ethically or morally the kid has to be saved.   
 
The kid’s restrictions in language and his nameless state make more evident his 
connection to his inner Voice, that is, in his silences he hides his language in order to 
express his will-to-say. In contrast to Judge Holden the kid does not try to impose his 
will on reality, he retreats from it instead. His will-to-say expresses the Voice of 
Clemency which opposes the Law of War. The violence of the kid is divine 
compared to the mythic violence of the gang because he is not trying to impose the 
presence of the law, but he is representative of an absence, the absence of the mythic 
law itself that he refuses with his clemency. ‘It is false and ignoble to say that 
existence is superior to just existence, if existence is simply meant to mean bare 
life,’212 to quote Benjamin again. The kid lives a just existence and sees life as more 
than bare life. In this, even if as an agent of absence, he also represents that excess of 
life that Benjamin respected in human beings. 
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2 Desire 
 
This section of the thesis, on desire, is the shortest, and is mostly concerned with the 
work of James Ballard. We have already however treated desire when talking about 
Bauman’s liquid modernity and the desire for identity. The market of identities 
represent a desire for meaning and sense that is immediately connected to the works 
of the metaphor machine: the metaphor machine does not only try to order a reality 
outside but also the one inside. Neon did not survive the search for identity, stuck as 
he was in the laws of Society. Ballard’s characters will have the same problem, and 
will need to shed their identities in order to acquire new ones in order to follow new 
desires.  
 
This desire for order in the individual will be very present in the following chapters 
as well, and it will often be concerned with the role of the Other. The Other will be 
often an obstacle for the development of the individual, will need to learn to share 
his individual metaphor machine and learn to listen to the metaphors of the Other. 
This section is shorter than the previous one and the but it is central in position and 
scope because it will traverse the entire book. 
115 
 
 
 
2.1 ‘People who Find the World Meaningless Find Meaning in Pointless 
Violence’: Boredom, Psychopathology and Violence in the ‘Extreme 
Metaphors’ of J. G. Ballard 
 
In the works of J.G. Ballard violence becomes the expression of contemporary 
professional middle-class boredom. In the present chapter, I will explore how the 
professional middle class represent the world of Ballard and the reasons for their 
outbursts of violence. Oppressed by boredom and isolation as a consequence of a life 
where all of their desires have been fulfilled, the characters will look for new and 
more abstract desires that give sense to their lives.  
 
According to Soren Kierkegaard, ‘Boredom rests upon the nothingness that winds its 
way through existence.’213 Boredom then comes of a vacuum, a hole through 
immanent life, like a bullet of empty transcendence. This nothingness, I will argue in 
the following pages, is caused in the Ballardian middle class by their having all of 
their desires fulfilled. Kierkegaard himself many decades before had seen the 
paradox of what he calls a ‘pantheistic’ form of boredom: ‘Pantheism, in general, 
contains the quality of fullness; with boredom it is the opposite, it is based on 
emptiness, but is for that very reason a pantheistic category.’214 Emptiness and 
fullness trade places so that to the fullness of satisfaction in life corresponds to the 
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emptiness of boredom. Furthermore, Kierkegaard creates the connection between 
boredom and evil in the maxim: ‘Boredom is a root of all evil.’215 
 
I will develop the relationship between boredom, desire and transcendence following 
two paths of inquiry. The first path or road - to use a terminology close to Crash - 
will focus on the concept of stylization and will explore a world dominated by the 
representation of reality in which the reproduction of the camera will be considered 
more real than the event it is filming. The image will not only transcend reality then 
but replace it and will create a new code of desire based on the stylization of gestures 
and behaviours, that is, on a new set of rituals. The work of Jean Baudrillard on 
simulacra will help me develop the ramifications of a world where characters do not 
realise that what they think is their immanent existence has in reality been 
substituted by an abstraction, a simulation. 
 
A second path will be prompted by the figure of ‘the intermediator in desire’ as 
proposed by René Girard in his Mensonge romantique et vérité Romanesque (1961). 
The mediator is an individual that imposes on another individual what to desire, and 
as such he (the mediator is always a ‘he’ in Ballard) recurs in Ballard’s novels at 
least since Crash (1973). The mediator exerts such an attraction especially over other 
male characters that the latter forget their own immanence, their individual presence 
in the world, in order to identify themselves with the mediator. The question is if it is 
worth escaping a middle-class mind conditioning in order to be influenced by 
someone promising freedom, and if so then violence will come to prominence in the 
following pages.  
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Through the analysis of Crash, but also of High-Rise (1975) and Millennium People 
(2003) I will try to define a form of the posthuman that I will call the Ballardian 
Man. Following the lead of the Mediator of Desire, the Ballardian man follows the 
rules of stylisation, constantly editing his life in order to fulfil the mediator’s 
psychopathology. The Ballardian man has no personality, but he is his profession, a 
member of the middle class whom boredom and violence push to act towards sex 
and violence.  
 
The Road to Stylization: a Ritual for Bored People 
 
In his Simulacra and Simulations (1981), Jean Baudrillard defines simulation as ‘the 
generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal.’216, that is, a 
situation in which an abstract model has supplanted the original. Translating 
Baudrillard’s definition through our dichotomy transcendence/immanence means to 
imagine a world where human imagination has produced an alternative reality, which 
is purely transcendental yet is also so complete, so hyperreal, that man does not 
realise that he is not experiencing life because he has lost his immanence, his 
presence into the world. According to Baudrillard, the superposition of simulation 
over reality has closed the gap between the two, between transcendence and 
immanence: ‘Something has disappeared: the sovereign difference, between one and 
the other, that constituted the charm of abstraction.’217 
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In a virtual world man does not realise the immateriality of his existence unless he is 
aware he is in a simulation. In this situation the limitations of human life in fulfilling 
desires are completely supplanted by a world where he can get whatever he wants. 
This world of fulfilled desires is the world presented by Ballard in his introduction to 
Crash:  
 
We have annexed the future into the present, as merely one of those manifold 
alternatives open to us. Options multiply around us, and we live in an almost 
infantile world where any demand, any possibility, whether for life-styles, 
travel, sexual roles and identities, can be satisfied instantly.218  
 
Ballard never refers to boredom in the piece, but it is not going too far to say that 
boredom is the consequence of the world of the middle class that he refers to. In a 
search for new desires the middle class is tempted by prohibited violence, such as 
that which is seen in Millennium People, where the ‘educated professional class’219 
try the taste of revolution.  
 
In a simulated world every gesture is devoid of immanence but belongs to a code of 
behaviours, a stylization to use Ballard’s vocabulary. Every gesture is abstracted 
from its material existence as if it were a sketch of reality where only a few lines 
have been drawn or as if the reality were constituted by gestures coming from a 
script.  This world is the world of television and representation in which every act is 
stylized, that is, a reproduction of something already seen, the completion of a ritual, 
every gesture totally self-conscious.  Only in Crash, the noun ‘stylization’ with its 
declination in the different forms of discourse (adjective, verb, etc.) recurs in plenty 
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of pages.220  
 
Roger Luckhurst argues that the repetition of the model in Ballard is always 
imperfect because it never exactly follows the model or the image in the mind of the 
character. Following Deleuze, Luckhurst suggests that the repetition in Ballard 
introduces a difference, ‘the uncanny double:’ ‘Nothing could be further from the 
similitude of Baudrillard’s “era of simulation”, in which everything is reduced to 
indifferent equivalence, the same story (the story of the Same) told over and over 
again for every cultural event.’221 Referencing Scott Durham, Luckhurst sustains that 
evidence of the failure of the simulacrum and thus of the age of simulation is the 
failure in Vaughan’s attempt to have a car crash with Elizabeth Taylor.222  
 
Luckhurst’s reading is valid when contrasting a Baudrillardian reading of Ballard but 
it is less effective when facing a discourse of stylisation. As we shall see in the next 
few paragraphs stylisation is not so much an attempt to reproduce exactly a model, 
that is, a question of repetition, but more of a movement of abstraction of every 
human action. Vaughan’s failure is only a failure if we strictly follow Baudrillard 
and his idea of reproduction of the Same whereas Vaughan’s action is actually the 
product of his personal psychopathology, a product of his mind: there is a referent 
here in the metaphor machine, which is the brain. This makes Vaughan’s 
psychopathology and the game of stylisation at the same time more immanent and 
more transcendent than Baudrillard’s simulation.  
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In the novel, stylization is almost always connected to sexual acts in which the 
characters try to reproduce car crashes and the shapes of the car, but these acts are 
devoid of traditional sexuality. An example taken from the beginning of Crash will 
allow for an exploration of the various aspects of stylization. The protagonist of the 
novel James Ballard has just had the accident that will change his conception of sex 
and technology. In the crash against Dr Helen Remington’s husband’s car, the man 
dies on Ballard’s windshield while the doctor is extracted alive from the car. Urine 
comes down between Dr Remington’s legs while Ballard observes her, his legs 
blocked in his car: 
 
However, all I could see was the unusual junction of her thighs, opened 
towards me in this deformed way. It was not the sexuality of the posture that 
stayed in my mind, but the stylization of the terrible events that had involved 
us, the extremes of pain and violence ritualized in this gesture of her legs, 
like the exaggerated pirouette of a mentally defective girl I had once seen 
performing in a Christmas play at an institution.223  
 
Comparing the doctor’s position with the ‘exaggerated pirouette’ of the girl 
underlines the unnaturalness of the legs and the resulting feeling is that of a 
mechanical performance. The crash, the violent event, has already destabilized 
Ballard’s vision of life, as if he has been taken away from it, dead in his humanity. 
As he is not, in a way, present anymore in his body the vision does not acquire a 
sexual dimension, at least at this stage of the novel. In a psychological analysis we 
would think that this retreat from the feelings of the body is a coping mechanism 
against the violence of the accident, but Ballard the writer never dwells too much on 
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such considerations in the novel.224  
 
Ballard the character’s vision deforms everything in his life from that accident 
onwards, deforming the entire reality of the novel through his psychopatology. 
‘Reality’ then becomes a simulation created by his unstable mind. In this light can be 
understood for instance his descriptions of the movements of his rescuers:  
 
Even their smallest movements seemed to be formalized, hands reaching 
towards me in a series of coded gestures. If one of them had unbuttoned his 
coarse serge trousers to reveal his genitalia, and pressed his penis into the 
bloody crotch of my armpit, even this bizarre act would have been acceptable 
in terms of the stylization of violence and rescue.225 
 
What Ballard seems to say here is that in the pantomime of violence and rescue, such 
formalized gesture would not have been out of place because it is part of a ritual that 
connects violence and sex, where the excitement of sex is connected to the danger of 
death.  
 
 
Stylization is a design of the mind meant, exactly as the images of the metaphor 
machine, to give a new order to a life upset by violence and, as such, it can be 
assimilated to a sexual fantasy. In another moment in the novel in fact, Ballard’s 
wife, Catherine, believes that her secretary, Karen, is attracted by her. She starts to 
fantasize about their possible lesbian relationship, but these fantasies start to make 
her relationship with Ballard and their relationships with other people ‘more and 
                                                          
224 This transcending beyond the body is a movement that will return in the entirety 
of the cyberpunk movement and especially in the work of William Gibson, as we 
will later see in 3.3, whose hackers continually escape the pains of the flesh. 
225 Ballard, Crash, p. 23. 
122 
 
more abstract.’226 This abstract sexuality allows James and Catherine to shift to a 
new sexuality that is purely transcendental and consequently, can be attached to any 
body: ‘These descriptions seemed to be a language in search of objects, or even, 
perhaps, the beginnings of a new sexuality divorced from any possible physical 
expression.’227  Triggered by the violence of the car crash, the characters in the novel 
live a new sexuality that has no body but lives in the mind and follows its stylised 
designs, thus somehow achieving the ability to reach an orgasm only through 
thought. 
 
The Road Seen Through the Camera 
 
The new sexuality of the transcendental Ballardian man – or what we can call 
Ballard’s personal answer to the question of the Post-Human - is then triggered by a 
state in which every desire is easily fulfilled. In a later novel, Millennium People, 
Ballard explains how this state of the Ballardian man, belonging to the middle class, 
is a state of utter boredom. In the novel a group of people living in a residential area 
called Chelsea Marina, organise a revolution against fulfilment and everything that 
makes them middle class. As Sally, the wife of David Markham, protagonist of the 
novel, explains to him: ‘“We’re all bored, David, desperately bored. We’re like 
children left for too long in a playroom. After a while we have to start breaking up 
the toys, even the ones we like.”’228  
 
‘Breaking up the toys’ is a gentle way to explain the need for violence of the middle 
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class who, in their spoiled existence, know violence only in its simulated form, 
namely, the television screen. At the beginning of the novel David and Sally are 
watching the news of a bomb exploded at the Heathrow airport; and they would 
never have been really affected by this, were it not that David knows one of the 
victims on the screen: his first wife Laura. 
 
The age of simulation is the age of the media, which is  characterized by the 
prioritisation of visuality, thus favouring the eye and the reproduction of images. The 
Ballardian man sees reality through the lenses of the camera because he is unable to 
see immanent reality anymore through the naked eyes. We have already observed 
this detachment from experience in the relationship between imagination and science 
with Giorgio Agamben, according to which science, and thus the eye of the camera, 
has taken the place of the experience of the body.  
 
Vaughan in Crash constantly moves around with camera sets in order to shoot car 
crashes and their mutilated victims. He then tries to reproduce them in complicated 
sexual acts. He also studies crashes involving celebrities, and his dream is to have a 
car crash with the actress Elizabeth Taylor, as someone that has explicitly made of 
representation her life.  
 
Laing, in High-Rise, reflects that: ‘The true light of the high-rise was the metallic 
flash of the Polaroid camera, that intermittent radiation which recorded a moment of 
hoped-for-violence for some later voyeuristic pleasure.’229 The ‘voyeur’ is the 
viewer, the spectator who sits in front of the TV and lets stylised life pass in front of 
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his eyes on the TV screen. Simulated, transcendent violence cannot touch the viewer 
and there lies the pleasure of emotions beyond the body: in front of the TV the body 
becomes immaterial. 
 
Most of Ballard’s characters however are not content with just viewing but instead 
use the camera to improve their social performance, what Bauman has defined as a 
mask, a temporary chosen identity. One of Wilder’s lovers is a producer of 
pornographic films who takes note of every position she assumes during sexual 
intercourse with him. Wilder can only conclude that ‘The limitless professional 
expertise of the high-rise had its unsettling aspects.’230 Her own body for the woman 
becomes an object of study, whose relation to herself is only limited to the power she 
has to control and stylise her movements: she can edit her body through the eye of 
the camera.  
 
The quote above highlights the connection between representation as reproduction of 
reality and professionalism as part of the set of social codes, that is, of the code of 
stylization. The camera makes of the Ballardian man a professional, and 
professionals are people whose individuality is limited to their job, to what they do 
and not to who they are. In novels such as High-Rise and Millennium People, the 
characters are mostly described by their professions. An example from High-Rise 
will shed some more light on this concept: 
 
Almost within arm’s reach, the immaculate figure of a well-to-do art dealer 
was squaring up to Laing, the lapels of his dinner-jacket flexing like an over-
worked bellows. On either side of him were the middle-aged wives of a 
stock-exchange jobber and a society photographer, staring distastefully at 
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Laing’s white sports-clothes and sneakers.231 
 
Laing does not know their names, only their professions, but this piece of 
information is enough to distinguish them for their higher social status, which 
explains their repulsion at Laing’s appearance.  
 
The professional cameraman has realised that an event has to be recorded to have a 
meaning. This is because in reproduction the Ballardian man can control the event 
and eventually edit it. After a session of tape-recording his own belches, Wilder 
records his rape of Charlotte Melville: 
 
The first time he struck her, cuffing her to the bedroom floor, he tried to 
record her gasp, but the reel had jammed. He freed it carefully, bent down 
and slapped her again, only stopping when he had recorded her now 
deliberate cries to his satisfaction. He enjoyed terrorizing her, taping down 
her exaggerated but nonetheless frightened gasps. During their clumsy sexual 
act on the mattress in the child’s bedroom he left the tape-recorder switched 
on beside them on the floor and played back the sounds of this brief rape, 
editing together the noise of her tearing clothes and panting anger.232  
 
Wilder has a double control over the rape: firstly, he is able to rape a woman without 
too much trouble; secondly, he is able to edit and control the recording of the rape. 
This ability to manipulate the event, to keep slapping Charlotte until he is satisfied is 
a ring-a-ring-a-roses where violence, desire, simulation and power keep their hands 
together. The sexual act itself is quite clumsy because the act itself has lost its 
meaning and is not really part of the sexual fantasy. Wilder is trying to reproduce his 
own psychopathology, an image in his mind, and substitute it for the immanent 
physical act. In this search for the better image or metaphor there is no preoccupation 
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for the violent component of the act. Charlotte too willingly becomes part of the 
performance because she recognizes her role is that of the victim in the narrative the 
recorder is producing.233 
 
The example of Wilder constantly editing the event perfectly exemplifies why 
simulation in Ballard works only if considered as a form of psychopathology. It is 
not the repetition that Luckhurst criticizes in Baudrillard’s reading of Ballard that is 
in question here, but rather the control over an event that has already happened 
through the editing (not the repetition) allowed by the media. The power to control 
the event (everyone has the potential to become a McCarthyesque Judge Holden) is 
central in the realisation of whatever psychopathology Wilder has in his mind. 
 
Before starting the revolution at Chelsea Marina, Kay Churchill was a film professor 
who suggests to her students that they should apply their studies to their life, making 
of that life an object of study and, inevitably, an abstraction:  
 
“I thought they needed a day trip to reality… I told them to take their 
cameras into the bedroom and make a porn film. Fucking is what they do in 
their spare time, so why not look at it through a camera lens? They wouldn’t 
learn much about sex, but they learn a lot about film.”234  
 
Kay paradoxically invites her students to look at their sex (real) life through the 
lenses of a camera thus making it more unreal, a simulation. 
 
The control of reality through the camera equates to the overcoming of the reference 
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through the simulation. Where Holden used sketches and words to take control over 
the referent, the camera in Ballard expands this control of the metaphor machine 
over Reality. As in Blood Meridian this oversimplification of the world outside the 
self means that the individual considers, as part of the simulation, even the actual 
suffering caused to the Other. In both McCarthy and Ballard the question is that of 
the control over reality and the Other. Stylization in fact is not so different from 
Holden’s sketching and the eye of the camera is that of the witness, the one who 
decides of the last edited version of the event. 
 
The Solitary Road: Middle Class vs Themselves 
 
It becomes irrelevant to the characters that what they control is not reality anymore 
but its psychopathological simulation because they have already reached a physical 
detachment from reality as a consequence  of violent events. In the same way in fact 
as the car crash awakens in James Ballard the possibilities of violence, the televised 
event of Laura’s death irrupts in David’s tedious life and in the lives of the people at 
Chelsea Marina. The strict relation of causality between violence and boredom is 
later confirmed by the attitude of the police force. ‘But the police seemed bored, 
usually an omen of violent action.’235 Boredom generates an instinctive desire to get 
out of it and violence seems the only way the bourgeoisie find to overthrow such a 
state of immobility.  
 
This immobility is assured by the education the middle class have received and by 
their acceptance of the rules of society. Kay Churchill says that middle class are kept 
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under control: ‘“Not with guns and gulags, but with social codes. The right way to 
have sex, treat your wife, flirt at tennis parties or start an affair. There are unspoken 
rules we all have to learn.”’236 Being educated in the proper way to behave, these 
people are not free to be what they want because they are a picture inscribed in a pre-
existing frame. Boredom is the stricture for the rules that leave no room outside the 
simulated, pre-ordained world. 
 
Since the social codes apply to a Society the revolution of Chelsea Marina can only 
be collective since, in the end, no one wants to be isolated, to be really free of the 
sociality of the constraints. These rules are not so different from those Good Old 
Neon had to withstand in order not to be alone. The Ballardian middle class rages 
against the same rules of a transcendent Society or Law, which led to Neal’s suicide. 
In Ballard however the middle class are not so self-conscious as to literally live in 
their heads, as it happened for Neal/Neon, because they have already exported their 
personal psychopathological metaphors outside into the world. 
 
A few extracts taken from High-Rise offer a more concrete idea of the sense of 
isolation in the Ballardian man. Isolation is the natural side effect of people focused 
on career and individual self-realization. If the myth of the self-made man teaches us 
something, then it is that if this man were really self-made then he would not need 
anyone’s help, leaving him completely isolated and independent from the Society of 
men. Robert Laing’s sister insists that he should live in the high rise for the 
possibility it offers him to be totally alone after his divorce: ‘“You could be alone 
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here, in an empty building – think of that, Robert.”’237 The high-rise itself is a self-
contained environment meant for the isolation of the individual: ‘The high-rise was a 
huge machine designed to serve, not the collective body of tenants, but the individual 
resident in isolation.’238  
 
When the problems start in the high-rise people break their isolation to form groups 
of tenants until they divide the building in three main groups according to their 
income. The problems relate to the maintenance of the building, with lifts not 
working properly or air conditioning malfunctioning. Far from being a real 
annoyance, as Wilder, one of the three narrators of the novel, observes: ‘the residents 
enjoyed this breakdown of its services, and the growing confrontation between 
themselves. All this brought them together, and ended the frigid isolation of the 
previous months.’239 When the situation degenerates to its extremes, the class groups 
and then the smaller clusters of tenants dissolve until the tenants go back to be single 
cells. Royal expresses this return to isolation: ‘Strangely enough, Royal reflected, 
they would soon be back where they had begun, each tenant isolated within his own 
apartment.’240 
 
The Ballardian man then moves from isolation, to collective rebellion to his own 
condition, to final isolation. This kind of closed circle reflects both Baudrillard’s idea 
that in the capitalistic society of simulation there is no real change and also the fact 
that psychopathology may be collective but in the end, being a product of the mind, 
it is ultimately individual, part of the individual brain. The reader in fact crosses 
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Ballard’s psychopathology and Laing’s, because Ballard the writer’s novels have 
always a first person point of view. Even when collective, it is the psychopathology 
of a particular individual that we will call, following Girard, the mediator, that 
invests all other individuals.  
 
The Road of the Intermediator: the Word of the Scientist 
 
Following a violent event then the Ballardian man is pushed to come out of the 
cocoon of a comfortable life thus foregoing the body and accessing a level of 
transcendence in which he can live his sexual fantasies in a simulated hyperreality 
that is nothing but a psychopathology. At this level, the unconscious and the 
simulation are the same and there is nothing that psychoanalysis can do to 
distinguish the subconscious from reality. As Baudrillard writes: ‘What can 
psychoanalysis do with the duplication of the discourse of the unconscious in the 
discourse of simulation that can never again be unmasked, since it is not false 
either?’241 The unconscious is as real as simulation, that is, it has taken the place of 
reality, the only referents left are in the mind of the individual. Psychopathology then 
is the particular simulacrum of a particular individual, a particular map, which has 
taken the place of a particular territory, whereas hyperreality or simulation is the 
place where these transcendental fantasies meet.   
 
Since psychopathology is individual but also able to occlude the collective mind 
because of its extension of the unconscious into the collective imaginary it can be 
concluded that all of Ballard’s stories reflect the particular psychopathology of one 
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character. Be it Ballard or Markham this individual’s unconscious is however 
stimulated and manipulated by a figure that embodies the new kind of desire the 
middle class are looking for. In the tradition of Nietzsche’s Overman or even Christ 
then, the Ballardian man has its prophets as well, namely, Vaughan in Crash and 
Gould in Millennium People. Assimilating the figures of Vaughan and Gould to the 
theories of René Girard, these characters represent the mediators of the desires of the 
narrating characters Ballard and Markham.  
 
To explain the figure of the ‘mediator of desire’242, Girard takes as example Don 
Quichotte and his fascination for the knight Amadis the Gaule, in a time in which 
knights are all but extinguished. Don Quichotte wants to live the life of an erring 
knight just like Amadis and in this, as Girard point out, he loses his individuality: 
‘Don Quichotte has renounced, in Amadis’s favour, to the fundamental prerogative 
of the individual: he does not choose the objects of his desire anymore, it’s Amadis 
who chooses for him.’243 Girard argues that the individual loses any sense of reality 
when his desires are not her own anymore: ‘From the moment the influence of the 
mediator marks his presence, the sense of the real is lost, any judgment is 
paralysed.’244 In the case of the Ballardian man, this explains how Ballard or 
Markham lose touch with their own lives to enter the psychopathology of their 
respective mediators, so that for instance Vaughan’s obsession with car crashes 
becomes Ballard’s.  
                                                          
242 René Girard, Mensonge romantique et vérité romanesque, Paris: Grasset, 1961, 
p.12. 
243 ‘Don Quichotte a renoncé, en favour d’Amadis, à la prérogative fondamentale de 
l’individu: il ne choisit plus les objets de son désir, c’est Amadis qui doit choisir 
pour lui.’ Ibid., pp. 11-12. All the translation from the French for this edition are 
mine.  
244 ‘Dès que l’influence du mèdiateur se fait sentir, le sens du réel est perdu, le 
jugement est paralysé.’ Ibid., p. 13. 
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The role of the mediator as prophet and the power his charisma exercises on the 
middle class is well exemplified by Dr Gould in Millennium People. Gould literally 
seduces David Markham (‘My seduction by Dr Richard Gould…’245), but David is 
not the only one. At the beginning of the novel, when David is getting acquainted 
with the people of Chelsea Marina he has a feeling that their boredom hides a 
religious sense of expectancy:  
 
I sensed that a primitive religion was being born, a faith in search of a god to 
worship. Congregations roamed the streets, hungry for a charismatic figure 
who would emerge sooner or later from the wilderness of a suburban 
shopping mall and scent a promising  wind of passion and credulity.246  
 
Richard Gould assumes the role with a vision of the future for people who think 
there is nothing new ahead: ‘He came into our lives like a figure from one of 
tomorrow’s dreams, a stranger who took for granted that we would become his most 
devoted disciples.’247 Gould filled in a void; he came in the moment in which people 
were more open to the possibility of listening. His charisma is the result of the pre-
existing needs of an entire class that is bored and needs new desires, a new look at 
the future. 
 
The mediator is the one who dictates what to desire not by simply imposing his will 
onto a willing crowd, but by desiring and experimenting himself; and it comes as no 
surprise, therefore, that both Vaughan and Makham are men of science. Even if often 
considered a writer of science-fiction, Ballard is not really a writer of research, a 
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writer of hard fiction. Even though Ballard’s characters are known by their 
professions, Ballard never explores these professions as they are just labels that 
indicate either their social status or their social role. As a consequence, what Ballard 
really means in the figure so important for him of the scientist is not so much the 
scientific dimension, with its descriptions of technologies and their applications to 
reality, as the dimension of the experimenter. The scientist in Ballard is not someone 
that knows everything, but someone instead who does not know anything at all but 
experiments on reality.  
 
In his introduction to Crash added two decades after the publication of the book, 
Ballard states that the writer’s ‘role is that of the scientist, whether on safari or in his 
laboratory, faced with an unknown terrain or subject. All he can do is to devise 
various hypotheses and test them against the facts.’248 Previously, Ballard has stated 
that ‘the writer knows nothing any longer.’249 Not only there is no more omniscient 
author, but the moral authority of the writer has disappeared altogether because he is 
in no superior position compared to the world. He has to experiment just as a 
scientist does, making hypotheses, trying to verify them.  
  
The scientists are the most extreme characters in Ballard’s novels because they 
experiment their fantasies on themselves and in this sense, Ballard writes extreme 
and experimental books: ‘Crash is such a book, an extreme metaphor for an extreme 
situation, a kit of desperate measures only for use in an extreme crisis.’250 As a writer 
who already foresees the end of the world, Ballard works with extreme metaphors, 
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fantasies that are almost difficult to accept. In the same way as Vaughan manages to 
car crash various times in order to study their effects on his desires, Ballard, the 
narrator, experiments through his characters. In other words, Ballard the writer 
creates a psychopathology in the novel Crash in which Vaughan creates a 
psychopathology of the car crash, which fascinates and assimilates Ballard the 
character, who dreams of becoming Vaughan, both mediator and character. In a 
simulated world, the world of the novel is not necessarily less real than the reality we 
live.  
 
This theory of mediated desire runs parallel to liquid desire as observed by 
Baumann. It is not only the media which advertise our new identities, but they also 
have stronger representatives in people like Vaughan. Ballard, the character, loses 
his identity and wears someone else’s desires, his identity completely shifted. The 
accident has melted Ballard’s previous identity and Vaughan is helping him 
preparing a new one. 
 
Ballard, the narrator of the novel, dreams of being Vaughan as when he is in 
Vaughan’s car, a Lincoln, alone, and a policeman comes towards him, thinking that 
he is Vaughan, whom the authorities are investigating: ‘When he saw me behind the 
wheel he moved on, but for a moment I had relished being identified with Vaughan 
and the uncertain images of crime and violence that were forming in the eyes of the 
police.’251 When Vaughan dies, he is driving Ballard’s car, which Ballard had bought 
in the same model as the car he had when he had his accident. With his purchase 
Ballard is already trying to reproduce his own accident but when it is Vaughan who 
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dies, he feels that he himself died:  ‘When we reached the accident site, below the 
flyover I felt that I was visiting, incognito, the place of my own death. Not far from 
here, my own accident had taken place in a car identical to the vehicle in which 
Vaughan had died.’252 With his death through Vaughan’s, Ballard is free from 
immanence now without an origin and without a hand: he is a pure mediator now, a 
shifter of desire.  
 
Earlier on in the novel Ballard had already noticed a sense of loss of immanence 
when Vaughan was around: ‘This sense of disembodiment, of the unreality of my 
own muscles and bones, increased when Vaughan appeared.’253  Or as Girard 
explains it: ‘As the role of the metaphysical grows, in desire, the role of the physical 
diminishes. The more the mediator gets closer, the more the passion intensifies, the 
more the object is drained of any concrete value.’254 The desire Girard talks about in 
his book is purely transcendent, metaphysical.255  
 
This emptying or ellipsis of the individual is very similar to the sketching and 
signifying of Holden, as we have seen in my descriptions and analysis of McCarthy 
earlier in this thesis. This hollowing is generated by the sort of lack that desire 
should fulfil but, being a lack of the material, it transforms itself in something 
beyond the body. The Ballardian man is an empty shell that follows stylised 
protocols and wears different identities. The strongest identity is the mediator who 
moves and shifts desire into a community. Whereas the Judge promoted the Law of 
                                                          
252 Ibid., p. 221. 
253 Ibid., p. 122. 
254 ‘A mesure que le rôle du métaphysique grandit, dans le désir, le rôle du physique 
diminue. Plus le médiateur se rapproche, plus la passion se fait intense et plus l’objet 
se vide de valeur concrète.’ Girard, p. 91. 
255 An antecedent of the hacker’s desire to lose her body. See chapter 3.3. 
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War and Death, that ends with the total annihilation of the Other, in Ballard the 
individual takes the place of the Other, and the only role surviving is that of the 
Mediator. 
 
According to Girard, the subject tends to assimilate himself to the mediator, 
especially in the case of the Dostoievskian hero: ‘The Dostoievskian hero, as the 
Proustian hero, dreams of absorbing, assimilating the being of the mediator. He 
imagines a perfect synthesis between the force of the mediator and his own 
“intelligence.” He wants to become the Other without stopping being himself.’256 In 
the post-subject era described by Bauman, and having already died as a man, Ballard 
can be easily assimilated to Vaughan, his individuality, lost. The ease with which 
Ballard can hypothetically abandon his life is made even more viable for the fact that 
he hates his life. As Girard writes: ‘In order to thus merge into the substance of the 
Other, one must feel an invincible repugnance towards one’s own substance.’257 
Frustration at one’s own self, already observed in Good Old Neon, is the starting 
point for this hollowing. 
 
In a simulated reality, Ballard cannot really distinguish reality from the metaphors of 
his mind. The identification with Vaughan reaches such a level that Ballard 
considers him as a projection of his mind: ‘We had heard nothing of Vaughan since 
he had taken my car from the garage. Increasingly I was convinced that Vaughan 
was a projection of my own fantasies and obsessions, and that in some way I had let 
                                                          
256 ‘Le héros dostoïevskien, comme le héros proustien, rêve d’absorber, d’assimiler 
l’être du médiateur. Il imagine une synthèse parfaite entre la force de ce médiateur et 
sa propre « intelligence ». Il veut devenir l’Autre sans cesser d’être lui-même.’ 
Girard, p. 60. 
257 ‘Pour vouloir se fondre ainsi dans la substance de l’Autre, il faut éprouver pour sa 
propre substance une répugnance invincible.’ Ibid.. 
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him down.’258 Ballard’s fantasies are so vast that they absorb and make disappear 
other characters.  
 
The influence of Gould on Markham is so strong that he abandons all cognition of 
morality and believes in Gould’s innocence when he learns the truth that Gould 
killed his wife: ‘I was shocked and depressed by myself. For months I had been the 
dupe of a small coterie at Chelsea Marina… Surprisingly, I still felt concerned for 
him.’259 David is disappointed by himself, not by Gould, because as a psychologist 
he should have been less susceptible to psychological influences. And he reminds 
himself of his profession only to find an absurd way not to accept what Gould is and 
has done. He thinks that Gould delusionally believes himself a terrorist, taking credit 
for actions he has not really committed.260 Until the end, David feels a debit towards 
Gould: ‘The long search for Laura’s murderer had come to an end and, by claiming 
to have killed her, this demented paediatrician had set me free.”’261 The reader 
cannot but feel that it is David the demented, the self-delusional, thinking to be free 
when actually he goes back to his old, secure, life while not accepting the truth about 
Gould and himself: he will never escape his self. 
 
Ballard’s homosexual attraction for Vaughan has no real sexual component as it is 
transcendental: ‘The placing of my penis in his rectum as we lay together in the rear 
seat of his car would be an event as stylized and abstracted as those recorded in 
Vaughan’s photographs.’262 It is like reproducing one of those poses in the photos of 
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car crashes that Vaughan collects. Since the fact that Vaughan’s body is a male body 
is not relevant, it is more an act of the mind that justifies the act itself:  
 
Vaughan excited some latent homosexual impulse only within the cabin of 
his car or driving along the highway. His attraction lay… in the stylization of 
posture achieved between Vaughan and the car. Detached from his 
automobile, particularly his own emblem-filled highway cruiser, Vaughan 
ceased to hold any interest.263 
 
The powerful charisma of the scientist is directly connected to his mediatic power. 
Vaughan is a TV scientist, who has ‘combined a high degree of personal glamour – 
heavy black hair over a scarred face, an American combat jacket – with an 
aggressive lecture-theatre manner and complete conviction in his subject matter, the 
application of computerized techniques to the control of all international traffic 
systems.’264 In a sense, Vaughan combines knowledge (Vaughan is a ‘computer 
specialist,’ but we do not see any trace of his knowledge), with coolness. His 
expertise in crashes of famous stars - like ‘the Mansfield and the Camus crashes – 
even Kennedy’s – indefinitely,’265 for the Road Research Laboratory - allows 
Vaughan to re-create accidents in order to study their effects and consequences. 
 
Being a TV personality, Vaughan is continuously conscious of the way he looks and 
the effect of his charisma: ‘Watching him from my car, parked alongside his own, I 
could see that even now Vaughan was dramatizing himself for the benefit of these 
anonymous passers-by, holding his position in the spotlight as if waiting for invisible 
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139 
 
television cameras to frame him.’266 Vaughan is pure representation, but it is this that 
makes him so attractive and powerful. As Catherine says, ‘“Vaughan annexes people 
to him. There’s still a strong element of the TV personality about his whole style’267 
TV personality, of course, does not mean that one has a personality at all: Vaughan 
is a pure figure of desire.  
 
In the same way as judge Holden in Blood Meridian, Vaughan does not have a past 
or an origin but represents a pure movement forward: he is pure action. His 
emptiness is captivating because Vaughan is able to adapt himself to the people he 
wants to control, giving them what they want: ‘As he surveyed the scene I had the 
sense that Vaughan was controlling us all, giving each of us what we most wanted 
and most feared.’268 Humouring the desires of the bored middle class, Vaughan 
becomes able to control them in the same way as Holden acts as a mythic, 
unstoppable force. Through theirs actions and words both of them create a void 
through their transcendent presence. They are both prophets at the end of times 
promising violence and new desires. Vaughan however dies and is substituted by 
Ballard, whereas Holden kills the kid, guilty of not succumbing to the Judge’s 
influence. Ballard becomes Vaughan because the mediator does never really die 
since he is a role, not a person or, in a sense of Bauman, a persona, a mask, a 
metaphor and conduit for desire. 
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3 Epistemology 
Introduction: Again, the Question of the Ultimate Witness 
 
Devoting a chapter to epistemology, the theory of knowledge, may appear awkward 
considering that the majority of these pages will mostly be devoted to the proposition 
that information takes the place of knowledge. The difference suggested here 
between knowledge and information stems once again from the distinction between 
immanence and transcendence. Whereas knowledge is acquired in the brain and 
marks our body and our very actions, information derives from a different, more 
transcendental approach in which the very necessity for the body is challenged.  
 
When we learn a new language and we can speak it, it becomes part of our 
knowledge, but when we acquire a new piece of information we do not need to 
memorize it. Nowadays, however, translating tools and programmes supply us with 
the possibility to move from one language to another without learning it (with all of 
the limitations of these tools, limitations that are becoming less and less). We fall 
into the paradox whereby we are able to translate a word from a language we do not 
know anything about, that is, a language that is not ours, as we cannot speak it. We 
can see a pattern, the grammar of the language, but it does not belong to us. As seen 
in our introduction, science and technology have created a gap between man and its 
reception of the world. The distinction between knowledge and information is one 
consequence of such a gap. 
 
It would be useful to start this chapter with an understanding of what information is. 
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The verb to inform comes from the Latin ‘in’ and ‘forma’ meaning to shape, to give 
a form, also to educate. Information could also mean outline, concept, idea, in other 
words, knowledge with a shape, a formed thought with which to shape another 
person. Later on, it will mean the communication of data, as it is used today.  
 
In this latter sense it comes to indicate the communication of something that is 
considered as true, a fact. Being considered as fact information acquires authority 
and thus the power to shape someone’s mind, to educate and, perhaps necessarily, 
also condition and force someone to act in a certain way. Informing has ultimately a 
performative power. Living in the age of information technology it is obvious that 
the incredible increase in the transfer of information favoured by the new 
technologies is a phenomenon that tends to alter the human condition into what 
many call posthumanism.  
 
To this purpose it is interesting to take into examination Jean-Francois Lyotard’s 
essay ‘Si l’on peut penser sans corps’ (‘If one can think without a body’), collected 
in L’Inhumain: Causeries sur le temps (1988)269. In the introduction to the 
collection, Lyotard posits the question of what being human means. In a very 
humanistic perspective, being human means to be educated (to be informed, to be 
shaped): to learn language, enter social life and develop a conscience. At infancy, 
man is still not human since he does not have language yet so that the infant is 
nothing more than a beast or a savage.270 Lyotard’s point is heavily grounded on 
                                                          
269 Jean-François Lyotard, L’Inhumain: Causeries sur le temps, Paris : Galilée, 1988. 
All the translations from this text are mine. 
270 It would be interesting to develop a debate on the question of abortion that such a 
premise entails, but this is not the aim of the present work. It is however important to 
raise the question of what it would mean if being human equalled having language. 
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Western humanism and Enlightenment’s primacy of reason, and it arguably brings 
back the distinction between nature and culture.  
 
Man, in fact, has to overcome his infant state and develop a second nature (culture) 
and enter a community: ‘What do we call human in man, the initial misery of his 
infancy or his capacity to acquire a ‘second’ nature which, thanks to language, 
makes him capable of taking part to a communal life, of adult conscience and 
reasoning.’271 The human condition is exactly the battle of the adult who has arrived 
‘to full humanity, to the effective realisation of the spirit as conscience, knowledge 
and will’272 against ‘the obscure wildness of his infancy.’273 Conscience, knowledge 
and will through the development of language seem to be the mark of man against 
the dark, primordial wildness of infancy. 
 
The primacy of logos and culture over infancy and nature manifests itself here as a 
transcendental approach towards the human. To become human means in fact to 
abandon an immanent state of nature towards a state of reason, a double 
transcendental identity. The human is the result of a process of civilization or, in the 
original meaning of information, of being shaped into adult form through education 
and the transmission of knowledge. Being human, in this sense, does not correspond 
to ‘being humane’ as reason or knowledge ‘per se’ do not imply any ethics.  
 
                                                          
271 ‘Qu’appellera-t-on humain dans l’homme, la misère initiale de son enfance ou sa 
capacité d’acquérir une “seconde” nature qui, grâce au langage, le rend apte au 
partage de la vie commune, à la conscience et à la raison adultes?’ Lyotard, 
L’Inhumain, p. 11. 
272 ‘à la pleine humanité, à la réalisation effective de l’esprit comme conscience, 
connaissance et volonté.’ Ibidem, p. 12. 
273 ‘l’obscure sauvagerie de son enfance.’ Ibid. 
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This premise allows us to better understand both the essay ‘Si l’on peut penser sans 
corps’, and also Lyotard’s tendency to privilege the transcendental over the 
immanent. In the essay Lyotard explains that the human mind is a mechanism for the 
filtration of information:  
 
Any material system, which filters information useful to its survival, stores it 
and treats it, and which induces, from the regulatory instance, channels, that 
is, interventions on its environment, which at the very least assure its 
perpetuation is technical. The human is not so different in nature from such a 
system.274  
 
There is a parallel between the idea of the propagation of information in Lyotard and 
the propagation of genetic information such as we see it in the work of Richard 
Dawkins. According to Dawkins, ‘I prefer to think of the body as a colony of genes, 
and of the cell as a convenient working unit for the chemical industries of the 
genes.’275 The gene is the specific information whose only aim is the propagation of 
itself through the human body as well as in the animal body: ‘Animals became active 
go-getting gene vehicles: gene machines.’276 If the brain is a metaphor machine, then 
the body is a gene machine, meant for the propagation of information.  
 
In Dawkins, genetic information needs the body for its propagation whereas Lyotard, 
on the contrary, believes that science should find something more enduring than the 
human body to preserve our minds. At the end of our galaxy, Lyotard surmises, the 
body will die too so we will need a better body to transmit the human mind beyond 
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the end. Lyotard dreams of information independent of its carrier, going even beyond 
the biological mechanism of genes, which are instead embedded in the body they 
have helped create. 
 
The message then acquires priority over the medium. Is not the individual, however, 
a medium that is able to modify the message it is meant to transmit? After all, it is 
still not possible to predict which part of the individual will be transmitted in the 
DNA to the progeny and how much it will be modified in being constantly separated. 
Can what Lyotard says be true? Can the body be negligible? Does not the way we 
store information change if we have the body of a man or that of a woman, for a 
simple example? 
 
The similarities of these theories should not be underestimated and, above all, it 
should be brought to our attention that they allow for the discharge of the body the 
moment a better surrogate is found. In this sense, even the identification of the 
individual with the body becomes obsolete. The individual is no body and has no 
body; individuality is replaced by the concept of sameness that will resonate in both 
Bret Easton Ellis’ American Psycho and Chuck Palahniuk’s Fight Club (two of the 
novels we are going to examine in this chapter), a sameness very similar to the one 
we have encountered in Ballard’s novels. When individuality is impossible then 
immanence itself is unthinkable as the individual can only be immanent in her 
individuality. Abstraction and transcendence in fact are based on sameness, adding 
up data towards a theory, a concept, such as the concept of individuality in a 
movement from the particular to the general. When one person can be replaced with 
another, then individuality is exchangeable, as Bauman has pointed out, something 
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that can be bought and sold.  
 
The danger endemic to these theories is that they allow for the violation of the 
individual body in favour of something bigger, transcendental, be it information or 
desire277 or identity. Violence, just like information, passes through bodies but it 
leaves its marks, its scars. Information and desire create a source of power that is 
allowed to exert violence in order for them to be transmitted. As we have seen, 
Bauman too states that the body is the only element of stability today and what we 
try most to protect. This also means that it is the place where we hurt the most. 
 
What distinguishes man from the other technical systems of propagation of 
information, according to Lyotard, is his propensity to be ‘omnivore en matière 
d’informations’278, and his capacity for meta-thinking through a symbolic system 
that makes him able to observe information and the way he thinks from the outside:  
 
Above all, he has a symbolic system that is arbitrary both in its semantics and 
its syntax, which makes him more independent from his immediate 
environment, and recursive (Hofstadter), which allows him to use as 
reference, besides information itself, the way he processes it, in other words, 
himself. Consequently of treating his own rules as information and induce 
other ways of processing information.279   
 
Arbitrariness and recursiveness characterize the human system and make it both 
independent from the world around it and able to think about its own thoughts. These 
                                                          
277 As we have seen with Bauman and Ballard. Font size 
278 Ibid. 
279 Surtout, il est doté d’un système symbolique à la fois arbitraire dans sa 
sémantique et sa syntaxe, ce qui le rend plus indépendant de l’environnement 
immédiate, et récursif (Hofstadter), ce qui lui permet de prendre en référence, outré 
les informations elles-mêmes, la manière qu’il a de le traiter, c’est-à-dire lui-même. 
Donc de traiter ses propres règles à leur tour comme des informations et d’induire 
d’autres manières de traiter les informations. Ibid. 
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characteristics certainly facilitate the development of a purely transcendental system, 
independent from any outside reality and, at the same time, able to create a system of 
self-reference that after a while can be able to perpetuate itself, thus losing the need 
for any original input from reality. This purely transcendental system is apt to 
generate concepts and thus fictional entities, which in cyberpunk will take life as 
gods.  
 
The connection to cyberpunk is paradoxically suggested by Lyotard himself when he 
describes the body as hardware: ‘One can consider the body as hardware of the 
technical, complex device, which is thought.’280 Consequently the human mind is a 
software so complex that modern technology has not yet been able to create an 
Artificial Intelligence that could stand a chance to replace it. But we will see the 
consequences of this idea in the chapter on cyberpunk. 
 
With a very humanistic perspective, Lyotard’s ultimate goal for man’s immortality is 
to have a mind that can bear witness to the explosion of the sun and the destruction 
of the body: ‘To think without a body is the condition to think of the death of the 
bodies, solar, earthly, and of thoughts inseparable from the bodies.’281 This would 
also imply that thoughts separated from the body are different, maybe more abstract, 
but we will not know if we do not witness thought without a body.  
 
The ultimate witness is a transcendental being without anchorage to reality but what 
she witnesses. Lyotard’s main concern is then the figure of the ultimate witness as I 
                                                          
280 ‘On peut considérer le corps comme le hardware du dispositif technique 
complexe qu’est la pensée.’ Ibid., pp. 21-22. 
281 ‘Penser sans corps est la condition pour penser la mort des corps, solaires, 
terrestres et des pensées inséparables des corps.’ Ibid., p. 22. 
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have called it based on Judge Holden’s speeches in McCarthy. It is not only then the 
witness, who has the last word, as Holden maintains, but the ultimate witness is also 
the one, who witnesses the last events. Lyotard suggests a last form of transcendence 
where either the last bit of information dies with the last event or in which it survives 
the event. But what is the purpose of a witness without a listener? 
 
The presence of an essay about the immortality of thought in a collection concerned 
with the question of the inhuman is very interesting.  If what is worth saving to bear 
witness for the future is only the mind, then it would seem logical to equate mind 
with the human and to see the body as something superfluous. The mind is, after all, 
the technical device in its educational development that evolves man towards his 
humanity from the state of nature that sees him as an inhuman infant. The question 
also arises: if the brain is a metaphor machine, what is the mind without the brain? If 
it remains a metaphor machine how reliable can it be as a witness? What difference 
is there between the remains of the human mind and a recording machine? 
 
Is this the posthuman (Lyotard never actually uses this term)? But Rosi Braidotti 
does, and in her work the conception is different. As we have seen, Braidotti believes 
in monistic philosophy based on Spinoza, which ‘define[s] matter as vital and self-
organizing, thereby producing the staggering combination of “vitalist materialism”. 
Because this approach rejects all forms of transcendentalism, it is also known as 
“radical immanence”.’282 Braidotti believes in a radical materialism which is in 
direct opposition to Lyotard’s humanistic pre-eminence given to the Logos and the 
                                                          
282 Braidotti, The Posthuman, p. 56.  
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mind. Braidotti rejects such notions of anthropocentrism but does accept the 
introduction of technology in life. Better still:  
 
My monistic philosophy of becomings rests on the idea that matter, including 
the specific slice of matter that is human embodiment, is intelligent and self-
organizing. This means that matter is not dialectically opposed to culture, nor 
to technological mediation, but continuous with them.283 
 
Information should be considered as part of this matter, not above it or in dialectical 
opposition. Technology and the body should live together in the posthuman. Does 
information then really give an answer to what is human? If we follow Braidotti, it 
can indeed, provided we limit the concept of human to the one considered by 
Lyotard and his humanism, but not if we consider the human as humane. 
 
What kind of narrative is symptomatic of the Age of Information then? In what 
relation is this kind of narrative with violence? What if violence goes unpunished 
since the body is no more necessary? Being information without a soul as James 
Wood has stated a few years ago284, does it imply a lack of concern for the medium 
of the communication? In other words, can violence be justified if it permits a flow 
of information? Does information generate violence? In the following chapters I will 
try and find answers to some if not all questions. 
 
Returning to the original meaning of information as the shaping of an idea it is 
                                                          
283 Ibid., p. 35.  
284 James Wood, ‘Tell me how does it feel?’, The Guardian, 6 October 2001 
(http://books.guardian.co.uk/departments/generalfiction/story/0,,563868,00.html). 
The title of the article is telling: Wood argues that postmodernist writers are more 
concerned with showing off their knowledge than to represent what ‘human beings’ 
are, ‘how somebody felt about somebody’, because they are too focused on writing 
novels ‘of immense self-consciousness with no selves in them at all’. 
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noticeable how this does not imply a knowledge or truth but, on the contrary, it is a 
forma, form, not content, or better, content put into a shape. As we will see, in Bret 
Easton Ellis’ American Psycho content and form will merge into each other.  
 
This suggestion brings me to the core of my argument relating to information: if 
language is the means through which a narrative takes form and desire is the purpose 
and the reason for narrative, what we aim for or what other people want us to want, 
information is the form mistaken for the content, science taken for truth. If 
information is a shaping in fact, more than the transmission of knowledge, be it 
truthful or not, the content is flattened into the shape one gives to it. Somehow, not 
even science is strictly related to truth since new discoveries are constantly made that 
add a stronger truth to previous knowledge. An easy example is the theory of gravity 
from Newton, to Einstein, to the Super Strings Theory. If the subsequent theories do 
not falsify Newton’s laws, they create exceptions to them and explain why they 
really work. Finally, a political promise is exactly the kind of information, very 
similar to the one in advertising, in which what is said is meant to convince through 
its effect, not through its level of truth.  
 
Information is where fiction uses reality as a tool to satisfy or stimulate desire. 
Information is one of the strongest rhetorical devices man has ever used, the placebo 
for truth. As Palahniuk’s Lullaby (2002) shows, though, digging in the details is also 
a way to miss the big picture.  
 
In this chapter then, I will examine the power of such a literary tool as information in 
novels that have acquired the status of cult books: Bret Easton Ellis’ American 
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Psycho and Chuck Palahniuk’s Fight Club (1996). 
 
When I say that information in Fight Club, for instance, is a rhetorical device I do 
not mean to say that it is necessarily false. On the contrary, the majority of the 
information in the novel appears to be ‘true’. What makes the book a cult is that the 
book uses information as a form of revolution against the simulated reality we live 
in. 
 
In American Psycho, all the information concerns how to dress, how to be fit, how to 
shave,  in a comical apotheosis of what it means to be a yuppie. The information in 
the novel acquires truthfulness in the consensus about etiquette, which has taken the 
place of ethics. It does not matter if the information in the novel is real, but what is 
important is that it is absolutely useless. As Carla Freccero has noted, the novel is 
outrageous because it does not convey any knowledge at all: it ‘is also obscenely 
nonproductive of knowledge.’285 In a novel where information is empty, form 
becomes content becomes form.  
 
What these two books have in common is their violent, male protagonists. In the 
case of Patrick Bateman, information leads to a total lack of guilt or any sense of 
responsibility where violence is conducted as a search for the self. In the case of 
Tyler Durden, information as truth is more important than everything else, and 
violence becomes essential to reach freedom from conditioning. A message recurring 
in Palahniuk’s novels from Fight Club to Invisible Monsters (1999) to Lullaby is that 
to be free and reach the truth one has to sacrifice what one loves most. Through their 
                                                          
285 Carla Freccero, “Historical Violence, Censorship, and the Serial Killer: The Case 
of American Psycho”, Diacritics, Vol. 27 No. 2 (Summer 2007), p. 45. 
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violence, both characters are looking for something. Durden wants freedom from 
capitalist society while Bateman is looking for his own self in the boredom of 
capitalist realization. For the former, violence is a possibility for change, for the 
latter no change is possible and violence is a means to keep the status quo going. 
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3.1 Synecdoche of Murder, Surface and the Narrative of the Superego: The 
Infernal Irony of American Psycho 
 
To have provoked a publisher to reject a finished manuscript without 
demanding the return of a substantial advance; to have prompted hate mail 
and death threats; to have aroused a women's organization to call for a 
boycott of the book's new publisher -- why, it's as if "American Psycho" had 
returned us to some bygone age when books were still a matter of life and 
death instead of something to distract us on a flight between JFK and 
LAX.286  
 
James Annesley defines Ellis’ novel alongside others published in the same period as 
‘blank fiction,’ because these writers ‘prefer blank, atonal perspectives and fragile, 
glassy visions.’287 We are faced once again with a narrative of emptiness, which 
follows McCarthy and Ballard. Annesley defines a style that is blank, atonal and 
fragile though, which goes against the narrative of Will of judge Holden and places 
Ellis as a closer descendent to the work of Ballard. In the course of the following 
pages I will refer to Annesley’s text to try and see how his analysis can help to 
advance and clarify the arguments of this present thesis. 
 
There are three aspects or problems to follow to understand American Psycho as a 
text that is representative of violence in the age of information, and thus to find an 
adequate explanation for its shape. The first aspect is rhetorical, and it refers to 
synecdoche, according to which Patrick Bateman is a representative of the American 
yuppie of the ‘80s – he is a ‘part’ who is understood to be typical of the ‘whole’ that 
is yuppie life. This narrative of synecdoche also explains why the novel consciously 
                                                          
286 Christopher Lehmann-Haupt, "'Psycho': Whither Death Without Life?” New York 
Times 11 March 1991. 
287 James Annesley, Blank Fictions: Consumerism, Culture And The Contemporary 
American Novel. London: Pluto Press, 1998, p. 2. 
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fails as a thriller or crime novel: if Bateman is only a representative for a certain 
category of man, it is not possible to distinguish him from the next man. At the end 
of this line the question of Bateman’s non-accountability will also be explored, 
through Agamben’s Quel che resta di Auschwitz. 
 
The second aspect is the bi-dimensional surface according to which the world of the 
novel is based on what the characters wear, and on flat characterization and binary 
oppositions of rich vs poor, man vs woman.  
 
The third and last aspect is the Superego or the problem of the sadist, which 
(following Deleuze here) observes how Bateman’s violence is at the same time the 
product of the rationalization of the ego, the pure transcendence of collective society, 
and an attempt at finding a human contact in the body of the Other. 
 
With the interconnections between these aspects we will see the creation of a post-
human hell based on the rules of what we can call infernal irony. In this place a first 
answer to Lyotard’s question about the ultimate witness will be given. 
 
Synecdoche and the Human 
 
While it is clear that there are extensive differences among Ballard, Wallace and 
Ellis, I want to attend here to the thematic overlaps in their work. Such thematic 
overlaps become apparent when they are read in the light of the kind of liquid 
modern world delineated by Bauman. 
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American Psycho is set in the same world delineated by Bauman, Ballard and 
Wallace, that is, in the place where identity is cracking apart in a flow of never 
ending possibilities; of the world after all desires seem to be satisfied; of the failure 
of language. Patrick Bateman is overwhelmed by the consumerist, fluid society he 
lives in: he and the people around him have no real identity but, instead of shopping 
for an identity, they all choose to be the same person, ‘everyone looks familiar, 
everyone looks the same.’288  
 
Patrick’s killing of Paul Owen will be enough as an example of the effects of this 
sameness. When he is on the verge of killing him, Owen, a man Bateman envies, 
mistakes Patrick for one Marcus Halberstam. When Patrick simulates Owen’s voice 
on the answering machine of Owen’s phone saying that he is in London, people start 
seeing him in London,289 so that Owen’s disappearance goes unnoticed for a long 
time. When one looks like everybody else and feels one has lost one’s own identity, 
then one is also anonymous. 
 
This sameness then corresponds to a model of wealth (‘Everybody’s rich.’290), which 
is embodied in the novel, for example, in the figure of Donald Trump, Bateman’s 
personal hero. As Sylvia Söderlind writes:  
 
In postmodern America, ‘‘for the sake of form,’’ the inner and outer, private 
and public, must split into two reflecting surfaces. The rhetorical equivalent 
of this projection of depth on to surface is the literalization of metaphor, 
which accounts for a number of puns in the novel, or its substitution by 
metonymy, both of which strategies are hallmarks of postmodern allegory. 
According to this logic of depthlessness, there can be no differentiation 
                                                          
288 Bret Easton Ellis, American Psycho, London: Picador, 1991, p. 61.  
289 See for instance, Ellis, American Psycho, pp. 272-273 and 388. 
290 Ellis, p. 23. 
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between fantasy—predicated on depth and interiority—and action: hence the 
impossibility of relegating Patrick’s crimes to the realm of the imaginary.291 
 
The reduction of content into form, typical of in-formation is, rhetorically speaking, 
the ‘literalization of metaphor’, that is, the realization of the world of 
psychopathology and simulation, which means, in another paradoxical turn, that the 
novel represents the impossibility of imagination because everything Patrick 
imagines he puts into act or realises. That is, he makes real that which is supposedly 
only imaginary.  
 
Taking my cue from Söderlind, but extending it further I argue here that the 
extensive use in the novel of metonymy (that is the use of a concept in the place of 
another) and synecdoche (that is, the reference to a part to intend the whole), which 
explains why everyone in the novel looks and acts the same. The characters are 
constantly mistaken for someone else because no one is imbued with enough 
immanence to be nothing but abstractions of a human being and thus, at the same 
time, undermining the very essence of what could have been a crime novel: if Patrick 
is at the same time Marcus he is not accountable for his crimes.  
 
Patrick is a synecdoche that stands for the American yuppies of the ‘80s, a specimen 
for an epoch and as such he is a sort of everyman, an abstraction or example, that is, 
a part of the whole which, like a fractal, reflects the whole. According to Annesley, 
what disturbs Ellis’ readers is that Patrick is ‘normal’: 
 
                                                          
291 Sylvia Söderlind, “Branding the Body American: Violence and Self-fashioning 
from The Scarlet Letter to American Psycho”, Canadian Review of American 
Studies, Volume 38, Number 1, 2008, pp. 71-72. 
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Ellis adds to this disturbing vision by presenting Bateman not as some 
horrific aberration, but as a yuppie everyman. He is, as far as his elite 
acquaintances are concerned, essentially normal. It is not just that he 'looks 
pretty much the same' as everybody else, or that he wears the same clothes, 
shops in the same stores and seems to share the same values, it is, more 
alarmingly, that he is 'total GQ' and a complete conformist.’292 
 
As Söderlind points out however, the problem lays not in the fact that Patrick is the 
typical American yuppie but in Patrick’s confusion between American and human: 
‘Patrick’s misreading of ‘‘American’’ as ‘‘human,’’’ writes Söderlind, ‘which has 
infected so much criticism, becomes doubly ironic in light of the novel’s diagnosis 
of the ills of America as resulting from a vision which excludes a large part of 
humanity within its own borders.’293 
 
The homeless do not belong to Patrick’s definition of what is American (the white 
Anglo-Saxon male rich American), and thus human, so they are not humans or 
subhumans - ‘sottouomini’, in Agamben’s terms294 - but simply prey: ‘As Ellis 
stretches the synecdochal logic of American exceptionalism to its absurd extreme, 
what remains of the nation’s identity is the psychotic self.’295 In other words, Ellis 
kills the Other because she is not a synecdoche for what he considers as humanity, 
for what he considers as ‘normal.’ Both metonymy and synecdoche are evidently 
transcendental, rhetorical tools, but in a novel in which metaphor becomes literal, a 
similar abstraction and condemnation of the complexities of immanent life results in 
generalized violence for whoever does not represent Patrick’s idea of Americanness.  
 
                                                          
292 Annesley, 19 
293 Söderlind, p. 74. 
294 Giorgio Agamben, Quel che resta di Auschwitz, Torino: Bollati Boringheri, 1998, 
p. 19. 
295 Söderlind, p. 74. 
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Rosi Braidotti explains this logic of sameness in connection to the idea itself of 
humanism:  
 
The human of Humanism is neither an ideal nor an objective statistical 
average or middle ground. It rather spells out a systematized standard of 
recognizability – of Sameness – by which all others can be assessed, 
regulated and allotted to a designated social location. The human is a 
normative convention, which does not make it inherently negative, just 
highly regulatory and hence instrumental to practices of exclusion and 
discrimination. The human norm stands for normality, normalcy and 
normativity. It functions by transposing a specific mode of being human into 
a generalized standard, which acquires transcendent values as the human: 
from male to masculine and onto human as the universalized format of 
humanity.296 
 
The homeless are not human because they do not belong to the logic of normalcy as 
they do not follow the rules of Society, they are outside it. The homeless’ guilt is that 
they are not the same as Patrick Bateman, they are instead irremediably Other, non-
normal, outside the Law and thus, perfect victims. 
 
An explanation for why characters cannot recognize each other is that they do not 
pay attention to the Other’s face but to her clothes. Clothes stand metonymically for 
the people wearing them. The characters are unable to recognize each other’s face 
because they are too focused on what they are wearing. Their clothing though is not 
used to distinguish them, but only to highlight their taste and their wealth, in the 
same way as professions and job titles stand for the people in Ballard.    
 
According to Berthold Schoene the reason why all characters look the same is that 
they are nothing but doubles of Bateman:  
 
                                                          
296 Braidotti, The Posthuman, p. 26. 
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there are no characters in American Psycho who are not primarily reflections 
or imaginary extensions of Patrick's self. Tim Price, whom we encounter in 
the opening scene, is not Patrick's friend or rival, but the first in a long series 
of doppelgängers. Evelyn and Courtney, the first two women we meet, are as 
identically dressed as the men and, like Patricia—yet another girl dated by 
Patrick and, conspicuously, his female twin by name—blur in and out of his 
story like overexposed emanations from the deepest recesses of his 
hypersensitive, claustrophobically crowded mind.297 
 
As it is the case for Ballard (the character in Crash) thinking Vaughan is a product of 
his psychopatology, Schoene recognizes the characters in the novel as products of 
Bateman’s imagination. However, to read the novel as a projection of Patrick’s mind 
would contradict the intentions of the writer evident from the very title of the novel. 
Ellis is dealing with Americanness in the novel and one of its most typical traits, that 
is, individuality. Schoene stops at the level of pure individuality, where everything is 
a copy of the self, but what the writer is actually showing is that even the self is a 
copy of a copy of a copy. In a pure Baudrillardian simulation of identity there is no 
original: Patrick is a specimen of society, where everybody is the same. Patrick is 
simply the representative of a specific class, in a specific country in a specific era 
(late 80s of the last century).298 In a sort of hyper-individuality, individuality itself is 
lost and Ellis is describing this loss. 
  
Annesley observes how the lack of origin means that Bateman is a product of 
society, just like everyone else and, for this reason, no psychological explanations 
are sufficient to distinguish him from us:  
The failure to supply an existential background is compounded by Ellis's 
                                                          
297 Berthold Schoene, ‘Serial Masculinity: Psychopathology and Oedipal Violence in 
Bret Easton Ellis’s American Psycho’ MFS Modern Fiction Studies, Volume 54 
number 2, Summer 2008, pp. 382-383. 
298‘The New York of the 1980s is a central reference point for the majority of these 
writers,’ writes Annesley referring to the writers of blank fictions. In Annesley, 
Blank Fictions, p. 2. 
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silence on Bateman's family history and personal past. This approach closes 
down the possibility that the reader could explain Bateman's behaviour in 
relation to either his experiences or his relationships. This approach enables 
Ellis to create a text that makes society responsible for Bateman's crimes. He 
is not killing to define himself, or killing because of some childhood trauma, 
but killing purely and simply in terms that respond to the forces of the mass 
media and the free market.299 
 
Furthermore, not only is it the case that Bateman has no original but, in line with 
Ballard’s Vaughan and McCarthy’s Holden, he also has no past and thus, in this 
elision, he does not offer any psychoanalytical explanation. Bateman, however, 
differs from Holden (a mythical figure), and Vaughan (a prophet and mediator), for 
being indeed an abstraction but at the same time an everyday man, a synecdoche for 
an entire category.  
 
The notion of being a character without an origin becomes very important when 
connected to the reading of Bateman as serial killer. According to Carla Freccero, 
the serial killer narratives have always had a concern with individuality:  
 
In serial killer stories the sources of pathology lie in a decontextualized 
family romance separable from the social order. What is somatized in the 
figure of the serial killer, then, is also an ideology of violence that presents 
violence as something originating in the private sphere.300  
 
The serial killer is the individual par excellence because everybody wants to see her 
isolated. Her violence is private and the consequence of her personal experiences, to 
some drama that happened in an earlier phase of her life and, at the same time, her 
violence is also public as the serial killer is the contemporary historical figure that 
                                                          
299 I will come back to this passage in a few paragraphs because it offers interesting 
hints for understanding the relationship between Bateman and Society and also for 
his relationship with his own identity. 
300 Carla Freccero, p. 48. 
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we use as a scapegoat to expiate the sins of our entire society: ‘The serial killer,’ 
Freccero explains:  
 
is a popular American figure of dementia, universally regarded as 
unthreatening precisely because of his singularity, the nonrationality of his 
pathology, and the individualized and eccentric nature of his violence. A 
serial killer is not the oppressed masses, and although his murders are usually 
lurid, his reach is limited. In this sense, the serial killer serves the function of 
a fetish in public culture: he is the means of the disavowal of institutionalized 
violence, while the "seriality" of his acts of violence marks the place of 
recognition in this disavowal. Through the serial killer, then, we recognize 
and simultaneously refuse the violence-saturated quality of the culture, by 
situating its source in an individual with a psychosexual dysfunction.’301 
  
Isolating the violence that surrounds us in the figure of the killer, this kind of 
narrative exempts us from having anything to do with it thus claiming the serial 
killer as an extraordinary figure. American Psycho, on the contrary, ‘does not offer 
its readers the serial killer as consoling fantasy’302, since Bateman is every American 
individual of the late 80s. Without an origin or an original it is difficult to accept the 
idea that Patrick Bateman very probably had a happy childhood: this would mean the 
impossibility of identifying the reasons and motives for his crimes.  
 
It is useful now to go back to the work of Agamben on the witness in the camp in 
order to better understand this sense of Patrick’s unaccountability. When Agamben 
speaks of the inhumanity that the muselmann had to suffer he notices how the 
perpetrators of this violence were not touched by this inhumanity, so they remained 
men, ‘honest men.’303 Agamben explains how the men of the SS did not experience 
the power of suffering the inhuman as they could not, as they followed the orders of 
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the Law: this made of them ‘normal,’ ‘honest’ men. This is the reason why, 
according to Agamben, they are incapable of testifying to the atrocities they have 
committed: they were not capable of witnessing the inhumanity of the camp.304  
  
As already observed, Bateman considers his victims are sub-humans or not humans 
so that, not only does he not feel responsible for their deaths but, on the contrary, he 
seems to perpetuate the status quo. He is not responsible because he does follow the 
rules of Society and, accordingly, he is never arrested. According to Agamben, 
taking responsibility has to do with the law, not with ethics: ‘The gesture of taking 
responsibility is then purely juridical and not ethical.’305 The Law is the mythical 
Law of Society, which does not touch the normal like Patrick.  
 
For this reason, the homeless’ body is available for experimenting upon, as if 
Bateman were another of Ballard’s scientists.’306 Analysing Primo Levi’s words on 
the muselmann, the victim who has lost any humanity in the camp, Agamben 
recognizes such a figure not as a person but as ‘a place for experimenting,’ in which 
‘every ethical limit loses its meaning.’307 The homeless represents a border, a line 
where the limits of ethics are stretched to new lengths and in which Bateman can 
experience his own untouchability, his own playing with the limits of morality. 
Patrick Bateman is never going to be punished because being non-American and 
non-human, the body of the homeless or the woman is beyond the limits of the Law. 
 
                                                          
304 Ibid.  
305 ‘Il gesto dell’assumere responsabilità è, dunque, genuinamente giuridico e non 
etico.’ My translation. Giorgio Agamben, Quel che resta di Auschwitz, p. 20.  
306 Söderlind, p. 75. This concern for ‘meat’ will be later developed in the discussion 
over cyberpunk. See Part III, chapter iii. 
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Following the line of synecdoche then Patrick Bateman is a representative, a part of 
the whole that is the white, middle or upper class American which, for him equals to 
being human. Patrick is too abstract to be punished; his face is the same as the next 
fellow, and for this reason he has no face of his own and no origin. He cannot be the 
scapegoat for Society because without an immanent life he has no real body that can 
suffer punishment. Anything outside of the human category of the White American 
Male is considered as non-human and non-immanent, not-there, and on the bodies, 
the meat, of the homeless the American Psycho can experiment, unpunished and 
unpunishable because a crime is a crime only when perpetrated against a human.  
 
From Bi-Dimensionality to One-Dimensional Thought 
 
‘Surface, surface, surface was all that anyone found meaning in...’308, says Patrick in 
a rare moment of epiphany towards the end of the novel. Surface is the result of the 
flattening of content into form, corresponding to the definition of information and, 
where clothes metonymically represent the human, surface is also the dimension of 
Ellis’ transcendental man. 
 
In a review that appeared in the New York Times Christopher Lehmann-Haupt 
underlines the abstract, bi-dimensional quality of the character ‘Patrick Bateman’:  
 
For all the viscera and gore he spills, this Wall Street monster is not a flesh-
and-blood character, nor is it a realistic world that his demented narrative 
creates. There are too many devices that transform it into a lifeless 
abstraction. There are the relentless fashion notes that identify the designer of 
every stitch of clothing nearly every character wears.309  
                                                          
308 Ellis, American Psycho, p. 375. 
309 Lehmann-Haupt. 
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As is the case with many critics of the novel, Lehmann-Haupt still posits the 
question of realism where we have already observed, with Söderlind, that the 
distinction between what is real and what is imagination is superfluous in the novel. 
The distinction between reality and imagination must be replaced by one between 
transcendence and immanence to determine the real impact of the novel. 
 
In an answer to his critics, Ellis argues that he was representing the society he saw 
around him: 'I was writing about a society in which the surface became the only 
thing. Everything was surface - food, clothes - that is what defined people. So I 
wrote a book that is all surface action; no narrative, no characters to latch onto, flat, 
endlessly repetitive.’310 If Lehmann-Haupt reduces the novel to bi-dimensionality, 
Ellis claims that the situation is even worse, in a story without narrative. Information 
as repetition and abstraction, in other words, makes of the novel an anti-narrative. 
 
The abstraction seen in Ballard depicts a world that is our own brought to its 
extremes of rationality, similar to the world in Ellis’ narrative. If the Ballardian 
world is made of the psychopathology of the characters, Ellis’ is made of characters 
that are actually clothes. They wear their personality on their skin as their personality 
is made of body fitness and wealth, in a society in which what one is under the skin 
of one’s clothes has no meaning. As we have seen with Baumann in fact, 
personalities are mere crusts on lava that last just the time to shop for another 
identity. Ellis accuses the world of being a story without narrative and that is what 
the readers of the novel cannot accept. 
                                                          
310 Roger Cohen, ‘Bret Easton Ellis Answers Critics of American Psycho.’ New York 
Times 6 March 1991. 
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Lehmann-Haupt argues that the bi-dimensionality of the novel renders the violence 
of the novel cartoon-like:  
 
Since the people involved are unreal and the physiology of what is done to 
them impossible, it is not so difficult to conceive of their scenes as a Tom 
and Jerry cartoon with human body parts. An authorial mind that can build a 
construction out of a rat, a Habitrail and a female torso has gone far beyond 
the casual degradation of women into an expression of sadistic rage as an 
abstract end in itself.311  
 
The critic sharply depicts the cartoon-like sadistic tone of the novel but, once again, 
he seems to accuse the writer’s narrative instead of seeing it as the work of a critic of 
the negativity of society. Ellis’ post-human is a man more and more abstract, whose 
violence becomes experimentation, exaggerated, ridiculous, caricatural, but not less 
real. The body has become a cartoon because it is a bare body without rights, which 
can consequently be dissected and manipulated, the only limit being imagination. As 
in Ballard, the fact that violence becomes abstract does not make sufferance less real. 
The caricatural tone of the novel should not be a tool to understate the violence in the 
novel but, on the contrary, it should warn us of the violence in the world.312 As 
Annesley notices in fact violence as described in literature is always symbolic: 
 
Violence in literature serves a complex symbolic and communicative 
function. Any analysis of violent imagery in contemporary American 
narrative must try to consider the implications raised by this reliance on the 
                                                          
311 Christopher Lehmann-Haupt. 
312 What Ellis does for contemporary society, though, is nothing new if compared to 
the perspective of aristocracy of centuries past as it is illustrated for instance in an 
episode in Il Giorno (1763-1765), by Giuseppe Parini in which an aristocratic 
woman treats humanly her dog and as objects her servants. Ellis makes use of the 
same irony of the Italian poet but with a violent twist to adapt it to his vision of 
contemporaneity. 
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expressive possibilities offered by the language of violence.313 
 
And, as such, we can consider the caricature of violence to be an actual caricature of 
the violence in society.  
 
Lehmann-Haupt concludes his review in a purely humanistic and logocentric way 
basing the failure of the novel on its lack of meaning: ‘The trouble with American 
Psycho is, of course, that you can't create a meaningless world out of 
meaninglessness. Surface, surface, surface can not serve to define substance. For 
meaninglessness to cohere, it needs a context of meaning.’314 The purely 
transcendental world of surface cannot have a meaning because the metaphor 
machine that is the brain does not need to interpret a reality outside there: everything 
is metaphor, an image in the simulation.  
 
In a way very similar to the novels of Ballard, Annesley connects the abstractions 
and ‘superficialities’ (my term) in the novel to the flattening caused by looking at the 
world as through a flat TV screen: ‘This screening, in classically Baudrillardian 
fashion, appears to restrict his ability to distinguish between reality and illusion to 
the extent that his violent acts become, in his imagination, indistinguishable from the 
unreal images he sees around him.’315  
This very detachment is what makes him unable to see his victims as cartoons, not 
real people: ‘He is unable to see the misery created by his behaviour because he lives 
his life in a world that has become as unreal to him as TV.’316 
                                                          
313 Annesley, Blank Fictions, p. 12. 
314 Christopher Lehmann-Haupt. 
315 Annesley, Blank Fictions, p. 18  
316 Ibid. p. 18. 
166 
 
 
Annesley’s main argument is that Bateman is a product of the level of 
commodification in American society, where everything can be bought and sold:  
In American Psycho Ellis offers violence as a metaphor for the processes of 
commodification that are infiltrating, objectifying and cutting up the social 
body of late twentieth century America. The proliferation of media 
simulations throughout contemporary society is seen to encourage these 
violent acts, with the novel's implication being that commercial culture, in all 
its manifestations, is dangerous and destructive.317  
 
This is a process very similar to the one encountered in McCarthy where the Glanton 
gang transforms bodies into scalps and, as such, into currency. In Ellis, the bodies 
are already clothes, their faces indistinguishable.  
 
The question of bi-dimensionality acquires more meaning when we read it through 
the work of thinkers such as Bauman and Butler. If the former demonstrates that 
identity is a moment of condensation in the liquidity of contemporary society, the 
latter explains that the self or the story of the self sees the individual start thinking 
about herself in a tri-dimensional way in order to give an account of her actions. This 
does not happen in American Psycho, in which Bateman does not ever need to justify 
his actions, give an account of himself, and for this reason - his flatness 
notwithstanding - his abstraction never reaches levels of self-awareness. Bateman is, 
in other words, imprisoned in the flatness of his mind, in a limbo between the 
immanence of the body and the possibilities of self-awareness that true 
transcendence could offer. 
 
If, following Bauman, speed is essential today, the fact that the characters in the 
                                                          
317 Ibid., p. 22. 
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novel are their actions more than ever implies that their personalities can be coded in 
binary dimensions and thus faster transmitted. This is a first answer to Lyotard’s 
predicament about the survival of the mind, that, in other words, the mind can 
survive if it loses dimensions. One of these dimensions is necessarily responsibility, 
that is, the need to give an account of oneself. 
 
At this point, however, we may also suggest, through the work of Marcuse, that 
considering the oneness - of sameness of individuals presented in the novel that 
connects the discussion about synecdoche and the one about surface - we could also 
argue that the dimensions in the novel are not two, but simply one, making of Patrick 
Bateman a one-dimensional man.  
 
Herbert Marcuse describes a society in which the individual is completely absorbed 
into society and as such, all thoughts are one thought: ‘an immediate identification of 
the individual with his society and, through it, with the society as a whole.’318 
Bateman then is both individual and Society, no difference can be made, no real 
individuality can be recorded otherwise he would lose his ‘normalcy.’ 
 
In this imposition not only of the mythical Law but of mythical one-dimensional 
thought, the individual is ‘mutilated, “abstract,”’ and as such ‘experiences (and 
expresses) only that which is given to him (given in a literal sense), who has only the 
facts and not the factors, whose behavior is one-dimensional and manipulated.’319 
Already in our discussion of the serial killer we have observed with Freccero that 
                                                          
318 Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced 
Industrial Society, New York: Routledge, Kindle Edition, p.12. 
319 Ibid., p. 187.  
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Patrick fails in representing the exceptional serial killer and with Annesley and 
Bauman we have seen that commodification influences and takes the place of the 
individual. Annesley is then correct in his hypothesis that Bateman is the one 
dimensional product of a commodified and mass mediated society.  
 
Finally, the blank, one-dimensional language of the novel and of Bateman can be 
attributed to the fact mentioned above that he is incapable of real abstraction and 
self-awareness, of giving an account of himself. As Bateman too says in  another 
moment of epiphany: ‘it did not occur to me, ever, that people were good or that a 
man was capable of change or that the world could be a better place ... Reflection is 
useless, the world is senseless. Evil is its only permanence. God is not alive. Love 
cannot be trusted.’320 As Marcuse explains, metalanguage is impossible when there 
is only one language:  
 
But if this metalanguage is really to break through the totalitarian scope of 
the established universe of discourse, in which the different dimensions of 
language are integrated and assimilated, it must be capable of denoting the 
societal processes which have determined and “closed” the established 
universe of discourse.321 
 
Whereas Neal seems to be too self-conscious, aware of the language of Society and 
of his use of it, Bateman is completely assimilated in this one-dimensional language. 
So Bateman is not merely part of a screened-out and cartoon-like Society but of a 
Society in which everyone not only looks the same but thinks the same. Once again, 
there is no way for Bateman out of his spiral of violence imposed from above.  
 
                                                          
320 Ellis, American Psycho, p. 375. 
321 Ibid., pp. 199-200.  
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The Mythical Law and the Superego 
 
Bateman’s explosions of violence are as repetitive (serial, a series) as any description 
of clothing in the novel. Gilles Deleuze identifies repetition as a defining character of 
sadism, through which the sadist tries to realize the ‘crime absolu’322 in the iteration 
of partial, impersonal crimes. This mythical crime is made of a conception of pure 
reason as ultimate negativity323. The absolute crime is, in other words, a 
transcendental act of pure reason that can happen only because repetition slowly 
cancels the immanence indicative of the single, individual act. A crime becomes 
impersonal in its seriality, which means the abstraction of its singularity. 
  
Deleuze connects this reiteration of violence with the ‘famous apathy of the 
libertine,’324 that is the detachment from the world of an entire society bored to 
death, which is at the same time the one both Ballard and Ellis describe. The 
question one has to pose however is whether the sadist uses violence as an 
alternative to the repetition of society or if, on the contrary, the repetition of violence 
does nothing but perpetuate the status quo.  
 
Freccero borrows from Deleuze’s Coldness and Cruelty the idea that the sadist wants 
to demonstrate something with his actions: ‘Deleuze notes that the sadist's intention 
is not to persuade or convince his reader, but to demonstrate: to demonstrate that 
reason itself is violence through the cold impersonality and singularity of its 
                                                          
322 Gilles Deleuze, Présentation de Sacher-Masoch. Le froid et le cruel, Paris: Les 
Editions de Minuit, 1967, p. 23. 
323 Ibid., p. 26. 
324 ‘fameuse apathie du libertin.’ Ibid. Emphasis in the original. All translations from 
this text are mine.  
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demonstration.’325 While this theory is interesting it is however difficult to imagine 
that Bateman is trying to demonstrate anything. On the contrary, I would suggest that 
Bateman is slowly escaping the cold intellectual demonstrations of the sadist along 
the course of the novel.326 Bateman is not an epitome for reason since he considers 
reflection useless. The paradox of reason and meta-reasoning is that reflection, the 
thinking about the self, is, in a very postmodern fashion, an empty exercise that has 
no use. 
 
This is why I argue that the mode of the novel is not demonstrative - as in the case of 
the sadist according to Deleuze - but purely descriptive. Bateman does not have any 
overall theory he wants to demonstrate through his actions since he does not even 
have an opinion unless it concerns fashion design or general etiquette in society. 
Bateman’s violence is matter-of-fact, mirroring the way things are and the way 
things will be. Every description of violence is the same as the description of a new 
suit or a new stereo: it has no logic but it is pure information without reflection on 
itself. After a while the novel generates a level of expectation for the next moment of 
violence that the reader knows will soon come: violence becomes a routine without a 
purpose, which is exactly the scary power the narrative of the novel exercises.  
 
Freccero continues by explaining how ‘the sadist identifies so exclusively with the 
superego that his ego no longer exists except as it is externalized onto the other.’327 
Patrick’s self has disappeared and has melted in something that completely adheres 
                                                          
325 Freccero, p. 53. 
326 Especially in the first part of the novel Bateman is a master of etiquette and 
enjoys to explain how better to be dressed. But his is a telling, not a showing or 
demonstrating. 
327 Ibid. 
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to the expectations of Society. The one-dimensionality and sameness of Bateman is 
the result then of the complete disappearance of his ego into his superego: ego and 
superego in other words are one and the same dimension. 
 
To expand Freccero’s statement, we could say that the superego ruling over Patrick 
is that of a transcendental society based on the way one appears, a typical, patriarchal 
society as Bertold Schoene points out:  ‘Patrick epitomizes modernity’s residual 
male self…’328 For this reason, the faces of the ego that the sadistic superego has to 
punish are the poor homeless, the non-WASP, the non-men (women and gay), the 
non-human (animals), etc. Again with Schoene, we could say that ‘To win 
recognition as a man, Oedipal boys must radically cut themselves off from the 
feminine329, which is accomplished through repression and which results in neurotic 
self-division. Effectively, they must split the world, as well as themselves, into a 
heroic manly "me" on the one hand and a despicable effeminate "not-me" on the 
other.’330 
 
Schoene’s general theory in his essay is that Bateman represents the contemporary 
man that cannot accept the loss of his ego in favour of the superego and that for this 
reason has become more and more autistic whereas women have been more open in 
realizing the situation:  
 
In terms of their lack of autonomy vis-à-vis the omnipotent control of the 
superego, there is no difference between men and women; only men have 
managed to disavow their powerlessness by projecting it onto women and 
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successfully repressing all knowledge of this projection.331 
  
Bateman is then a one-dimensional character that moves in space but not really in 
time, considering that his actions are repetitions of the same act: murder. The 
repetition of such an act transcends him in the negativity (in the sense of a negation 
of life or immanence) of pure reason, which is also the dominion of the Superego. As 
a representative of the Law of the Superego, Bateman behaves and looks like 
everyone else and this creates the alibi for the perfect crime because this also means 
that Bateman does not need to justify himself and thus does not need to give an 
account of himself. This however does not mean that he does not feel the need for 
immanence, to find individuality for himself. 
 
Bateman is indeed part of the Superego like the hackers are part of cyberspace, but 
he seems in the course of the novel to show a resurfacing of the ego in an attempt to 
be recognized among the liquidity and the fuzziness of the narrative of the Superego. 
Instead of theorizing the realization of an ideal already actualized in his world, 
Patrick is often unsatisfied by his own violent exploits, which he feels ultimately 
pointless. Instead of taking advantage of his unaccountability, Bateman appears, 
through his acts, to be in need of being recognized as the killer, as the one who did it, 
someone special, the serial killer that society needs as a scapegoat: an individual 
with an individual Voice. 
  
In such a context, however, the confession of the killer, typical of the crime 
narrative, is bound to fail whereas it is still possible in the work of David Foster 
Wallace. Neon’s story in fact is a long confession of all the lies the protagonist has 
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said in his life. The story is his final attempt to communicate the truth and give an 
account of himself and the reason why he has committed suicide.  
 
American Psycho on the contrary represents the bankruptcy of communication and 
thus of confession because people do not care who their addressees are (they often 
mistake them for someone else). They communicate emptiness, or, in other words, 
they do not communicate any knowledge; the sender, as well as Old Good Neon, 
only wants to make an impression.  
 
The argument here demonstrates that Patrick Bateman manifests his Voice, his will-
to-say in the confession of his acts and of his loneliness332, while living in a Society 
in which he cannot express an individual articulated voice and create a real 
relationship. The effect is often comical or worthy of a comedy gag, as the following 
examples will show.  
 
When Evelyn, his girlfriend, asks him why he does not come over to her suite (she is 
scared after her neighbour has disappeared), Patrick answers: ‘“Because your 
neighbor’s head was in my freezer.” I yawn, stretching. “Listen. Dinner? Where? 
Can you hear me?”’333 In another situation, his friends hear him but they think 
Patrick is making a sexual joke: ‘“You know, guys, it’s not beyond my capacity to 
drive a lead pipe repeatedly into a girl’s vagina,” I tell Van Patten and McDermott, 
then add, after a silence I mistake for shock, finally on their parts an acute perception 
of my cruelty, “but compassionately.” “We all know about your lead pipe, 
Bateman,” McDermott says. “Stop bragging.” “Is he like trying to tell us he has a big 
                                                          
332 See for instance, Ellis, American Psycho, p. 257. 
333 Ibid., p.118. 
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dick?” Van Patten asks Craig.’334 Bateman though does not listen in his turn to their 
replies.  
 
In a world of one-dimensional language, no individuality is transmitted but only pure 
information, meaningless facts. There is nothing one can say to anybody else that is 
of any use or novelty: if we all think the same there is no point in communication as 
everything would come out as platitude. Paradoxically, Bateman behaves as if 
violence may anchor him to reality but he is unaware that he is simply perpetuating 
the pointless performances of a sadist. 
  
Killing becomes a way for Bateman to have at least the attention of his victims and 
their acknowledgment that it is he who is killing them, and no one else. A similar 
situation is represented in the American serial Dexter335, where the serial murderer 
and homonym protagonist confesses to his victims before killing and cutting them to 
pieces. After all, people who are going to die are necessarily focused on their 
murderer thus satisfying the killer’s need for power and for individuality. 
  
Every murder represents an example of what Jameson has called ‘intensity’, a 
consequence of the postmodern ‘waning of affect,’336 that is a moment particularly 
‘charged of affect.’337 In other words, in a world where his voice cannot express his 
emotions, Patrick lives intense moments of humanity, of contact with other humans 
beings, in the same moment in which he is killing them. These moments of intensity 
                                                          
334 Ibid., p. 325. 
335 Based on the Dexter series of novels by Jeff Lindsay published between 2004 and 
2013. The TV series ran from 2006 to 2013. 
336 Fredric Jameson. Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, 
Durham: Duke UP, 1991, p. 10 
337 Ibid., p. 28. 
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metonymically represent what is left of the human,  as outbursts of lights through the 
unsayable. Murder facilitates the re-establishment of a basic form of communication 
where the killer is the sender and the victim the receiver. It is a one way 
communication, because Bateman has no will-to-listen: it is all about him after all. 
Murder is the form of communication of the sadist that is bound to fail since its 
result is the death of the receiver and with it, the loss of the message. As his ego 
struggles into existence only in the moment of killing, Patrick needs to constantly re-
establish the contact with the Other, and consequently perpetrate serial murders. 
 
In the most revealing episode of miscommunication Patrick is confessing to one of 
his colleagues about his murderous activity on his answering machine. After a few 
weeks Patrick finally meets that person, who does not even recognize him as 
Bateman but as one Donaldson and thinks he was making a prank at the expenses of 
Bateman:  
 
“No!” I shout. “Now, Carnes. Listen to me. Listen very, very carefully. I –
killed-Paul-Owen-and-I-liked-it. I can’t make myself any clearer.” My stress 
causes me to choke on the words. 
“But that’s simply not possible,” he says, brushing me off. “And I’m not 
finding this amusing anymore.” 
“It never was supposed to be!” I bellow, and then “Why isn’t it possible?” 
“It’s just not,” he says, eyeing me worriedly. 
“Why not?” I shout again over the music, though there’s really no need to, 
adding, “You stupid bastard.” 
He stares at me as if we are both underwater and shouts back, very clearly 
over the din of the club, “Because... I had... dinner ... with Paul Owen... 
twice... in London... just ten days ago.”338 
 
As we have seen in the first part of the present work, confession consists in a split 
between the confessing self and the confessed self. In American Psycho, this split 
                                                          
338 Ellis, American Psycho, p. 388. 
176 
 
has increased so much that there only exists a confessed self which, being a part of 
the Superego and as such a simulation, cannot be held accountable according to 
Butler’s theory. The confessing self or original self is not present in telling the story 
and if a story is told it has no author and as such no one to take any ethical 
responsibility.  
 
Patrick Bateman represents our own negativity and hate because, as Freccero 
realizes, we all are Patrick Bateman:  
 
The story American Psycho tells is the story of the superego, the father, the 
law. The sadism and violence of the law are enacted upon the bodily ego of 
the self (this is how we and he are victims), a self now externalized as other: 
a dog, a beggar, a child, some prostitutes, a gay man, some women, and a 
colleague-all of them are him, all of them are us, and we are him.339  
 
The narrative of the Superego is a narrative beyond the ego, beyond any distinction 
between the characters. As the narrative without ego is non-dialogic it can only 
communicate information, no real personalities, no real ideas of change. The 
superego has lost any real moral function because it does not have anything or 
anyone to punish. Post-humanity or inhumanity is pure biopolitics where life itself is 
ultimately at stake and reduced to the transmission of information (the DNA) and 
thus controllable, modifiable. ‘Modifiable’ here does not mean to bring change, and 
the repetitive violence of the sadist is there to perpetuate the status quo.  
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Infernal Irony 
 
Carla Freccero points out how the non-transmission of knowledge is the greatest 
charge against the novel. In her opinion, critics miss the first words of the novel, 
working as a sort of key to its reading: ‘ABANDON ALL HOPE YE WHO ENTER 
HERE is scrawled in blood red lettering on the side of the Chemical Bank. . .’340 
According to Freccero, Ellis cites ‘what is perhaps the most famous and time-worn 
literary deployment of mimetic violence, known to Dante scholars as "infernal 
irony."341 Expanding Freccero’s statement, it could be said that the novel is an 
infernal reversal of the idea we have of the ‘80s: if the yuppies went to hell, the 
novel would be their hell circle and their punishment would be an eternity of 
repetition, boredom and flatness. 
 
This narrative of hell well sums up the image of the novel that I have tried to convey 
up until now.  Hell is the result of the psychopathology of the collective mind of the 
Superego or, to simplify, it is the meta-narrative reflecting on the erasure of the ego 
and the final victory of society as a unified mind. As if this Hell were painted by a 
Pre-Raphaelite, it represents a return to a bi-dimensionality or even a one-
dimensionality in which content and form conflate and the ultimate punishment is 
the expiration of story in the accumulation of episodes that do not really add up to 
anything. Hell is where we are when violence becomes a cartoon, like a drawing that 
can bleed. Infernal irony is this caricature of the suffering body in an age in which 
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the United States thought they were living a moment of Heaven.  
 
I would like to further develop Freccero’s idea of ‘infernal irony’ here by 
recuperating Baudelaire’s and De Man’s theories on irony. Ellis brings the literary 
device of irony to the point in which not only the writing self is separated from the 
written self (the writer from its main character) but the latter is also split from his 
own immanent self, that is, his own humanity. Dante has brought his humanity in 
hell whereas Ellis, maybe too enraged, as Lehmann-Haupt points out342, has 
distanced his own in outrage and has created an empty vessel, an ‘honest’ man. 
 
The world of American Psycho is the ironic counterpart to the heaven imagined by 
the American individual, that is, ‘heaven is what you want it to be,’ found recently in 
a novel such as The Lovely Bones (2002) and the conclusion of the TV serial Lost 
(2004-2010). If one really gets into one’s self-made paradise, everything is blurred, 
boring and flat, the heaven on earth of the desire immediately fulfilled present in 
Baumann and Ballard. 
 
Synecdoche, one-dimensionality and superego are one and the same aspect of the 
infernal irony. This hell offers, in conclusion, a first answer to Lyotard’s question of 
the ultimate witness. American Psycho does not have anything to send into the 
future, nothing reasonable if not the infantile violence of the superficial, 
superegotistical mind. But, paradoxically, Patrick Bateman’s one-dimensional mind 
is the easiest to treat in binary terms. 
                                                          
342 ‘You get the feeling that Mr. Ellis began writing his novel with a single huge 
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Lyotard’s dream of exporting thoughts as software finds here however many 
negative implications. On the one hand, Patrick is a simplification of the software 
itself. On the other, it implicates that giving importance to the software means that 
the hardware can be discarded, tortured, and made to melt into acid. Lyotard seems 
to bring back to life the Christian dichotomy mind/body and it is paradoxical in an 
age where the way the body looks is so important. The problem though is that the 
body is actually a victim for the image the mind has of it, the image created by the 
Superego and thus by Society itself. The body is ultimately malleable to violence, 
plastic surgery or biomedical prosthesis.  
 
Another question is that of the lack of personality substituted by simplified 
information. The information age means a loss of humanity in the sense of 
communication with the other, feeling the other. Ballard has already posited the 
question whether it is not reason itself that is the main problem of man, what renders 
him less human while still distinguishing man from animal. In Ballard, man becomes 
too abstract to care for its own suffering and actually the mutilation of the body 
becomes a moment of discovery of new possibilities whereas in Ellis, Patrick tries 
new possibilities for communication in the body of the Other.  
 
If ‘American’ in the novel is a synecdoche for ‘human’ it means that the Superego of 
the American culture can also be intended as the Western world superego. Clothes 
and information stand metonymically for man so that man becomes something 
different from human.  
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The world of American Psycho then is characterised by the nonexistence of ethics 
where ethics is replaced by etiquette. The narrative powerfully represents such a 
world in a bending of form and content together where one cannot go without the 
other. As a crime fiction it challenges the genre itself by frustrating the reader 
through repetitions that do not aim to solve any mystery; there is no witness because 
everybody looks the same and society itself is Patrick’s alibi; communication is 
almost at a degree zero so that even if Patrick actually confesses his murders, nobody 
believes him or even listens to him. Irony is so powerful that the idea itself of murder 
sounds ridiculous.  
 
As a work of literature the novel challenges not only the conception of what a work 
of art should be, but it also challenges Society tout court in its liquid form. The 
violence in the novel is endemic to the world it depicts and the style is voluntarily 
descriptive, leaving violence room to express itself without any authorial distance 
and, at the same time, without a real Voice.  
 
If we are reduced to useless information, without even a story to tell, a narrative to 
express ourselves and be accountable for, then it is doubtful whether we have really 
anything worth transmitting to the future. Patrick Bateman cannot be a witness 
because he is incapable of being subject to suffering and has no will-to-listen to the 
suffering of the Other. 
 
 
 
 
181 
 
3.2 Oxymoron, Snowflakes and Lack: The Infernal Irony of Chuck Palahniuk 
 
Fight Club is full of information on how to make a silencer343, nitro-glycerine344 and 
napalm 345. As Tyler says, ‘This how-to stuff isn’t in any history books,’346 as if he 
wanted to reveal the hidden history of the world and thus bring the end of history 
itself. There is no conspiracy theory in Palahniuk, no men behind the curtains, but 
information and objects and capital behind everything, as if they were living entities. 
As violent as its use may be, for this American writer, information allows for 
individual empowerment. Far from being nihilistic or pessimistic, Palahniuk’s use of 
information is very different from the zero (nihil) level that information acquires in 
Ellis’ American Psycho. On the contrary, his work suggests that information is a 
means to reach independence and freedom from capitalistic culture even if it is a 
‘hopeless freedom’. 
 
In the following sections I will analyse the novel under the headings of similar 
problems to those that I observed in the previous chapter: a) rhetoric, where I will 
individuate oxymoron as main rhetorical tool in Palahniuk’s writing based as it is on 
paradoxes and opposition to the point that his main character has a split personality, 
a real oxymoronic man; b) individuality, where I will try to delineate Palahniuk’s 
vision of the individual as a snowflake; and c) in the last section I will deal with the 
problem of the relationships with the Other and I will indicate a lack of human 
relationships the narrator suffers and how this is due to the lack of a father-figure, a 
God-like figure to tell him what to do.  
                                                          
343 Chuck Palahniuk, Fight Club, London: Vintage, 2010, p. 11. 
344 Ibid., p. 12. 
345 Ibid., p. 13. 
346 Ibid 
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The study of these main problems will help me depict Palahniuk’s infernal irony, in 
parallel with that of American Psycho, in which freedom comes only through pain 
and death. This depiction of hell will pave the way to the main question of the Voice 
in Palahniuk that comes from the lack in human relations and the difficulty for the 
characters to express their need for the Other. 
 
Eduardo Mendieta argues that, even if it is not possible to write the ‘great American 
novel’, Palahniuk is writing the next best thing: writing a series of novels observing 
different aspects of contemporary America:  
 
He has taken on a culture that has become so gargantuan, fragmented, and 
differentiated but at the same time so rich, so self-reflexive, so historicized 
and also so mimicked that one novel cannot tell its story in one narrative with 
one dramatic thread. Many novels, many short cuts, many vignettes, are 
necessary: one polyphonic, asynchronous, temporally bi-directional, hyper-
textual, and cyber-encyclopedic novel made up of individual novels, where 
each novel is the Bildungsroman of an American hero but told in reverse.347 
 
Mendieta’s encyclopaedic reading of Palahniuk insightfully suggests a form of 
induction, where in logic we mean an abstraction or general conclusion or theory 
derived from particular cases or facts. Induction as a form of abstraction or 
transcendence is important if we wish to understand how Palahniuk’s satire tries to 
grasp a portrait (as such, inevitably abstract) of contemporary American. 
 
As Mendieta says in fact, Palahniuk ‘is a writer with a mission, a vision, and a very 
                                                          
347 Eduardo Mendieta, ‘Surviving American Culture: On Chuck Palahniuk’, 
Philosophy and Literature, Volume 29, Number 2, October 2005, pp., pp. 394-395.  
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distinctive style.’348 His definition is a useful guide for this chapter. In the first part I 
will observe Palahniuk’s mission to portray snapshots or splits of contemporary life, 
or ‘postcards from the future’349, in order to create a larger picture or photo-album of 
American contemporary culture.  
 
The Oxymoronic Man 
 
If Bret Easton Ellis’s infernal irony was based on metonymy and synecdoche, in 
Palahniuk hell is very oxymoronic and paradoxical. Palahniuk’s sentence is built on 
the effect of contrasts between two parts that only apparently contradict one another 
while actually creating a distinct logic of rebellion and violence.  
 
To offer an example: ‘the first step to eternal life is you have to die.’350 The apparent 
paradox of finding life in death is easily explained by the fact that one can indeed 
reach eternal, transcendent life only with the death of the immanent body. Another 
example: ‘Everyone smiles with that invisible gun to their head.’351 In this case, the 
gun undermines what the idea of smile could imply since the sentence refers to the 
smile of the dying, of the people in the cancer or brain parasites groups, who know 
that they are dying. The paradox can also reach a level of twisted poetry: ‘Marla said 
she wanted to have Tyler’s abortion’.352 
 
                                                          
348 Ibid., p. 395. 
349 Quote taken from the 1999 novel Invisible Monsters and used as title for the 2003 
documentary Postcards From the Future: The Chuck Palahniuk Documentary. 
350 Palahniuk, p. 11. 
351 Ibid., p. 19. 
352 Ibid., p. 59. 
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In these examples Palahniuk builds a philosophy of contradiction whose purpose 
seems to be to shake the status quo with anarchy. If anarchy is a state without a ruler, 
then the ruler for Palahniuk is society itself and the way it breeds us everywhere. The 
only way the writer seems to find to wake us out of it is through paradox, reaching 
the transcendental ideal of individual freedom through the immanent suffering of the 
body.  
 
But to remain within the context of rhetorical tropes, we can say that if analogy is a 
sort of flash version of metaphor, then we can consider oxymoron as somehow a 
flash version of paradox, both aiming at creating an apparent self-contradicting 
effect. Oxymoron is a compressed paradox such as: ‘Losing all hope was 
freedom,’353 that can also be rewritten as hopeless freedom.  
 
These sentences bring to mind the oxymoric propaganda in George Orwell’s 
Nineteen Eighty-Four: ‘War is Peace. Freedom is Slavery. Ignorance is Strength.’354 
In Orwell’s dystopian novel such slogans are used as propaganda to control people 
by telling them that peace can be obtained only through war (whereas peace is 
supposed to be the opposite of war); that only being a slave one can be free; and that 
ignorance is not only a blessing but strength, a source of power.  
 
In Palahniuk the intention is quite the opposite since freedom, while hopeless, is not 
aimed at slavery. On the contrary, Tyler wants to attack culture itself and its one-
dimensional thought. The logic of capitalism is much subtler than the too obvious 
propaganda of Big Brother. 
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As Andrew Hewitt explains in his reading of David Fincher’s 1999 movie based on 
the novel, the film shows that capitalism in itself is not totalitarian because it does 
not entail a need to believe in the system or for propaganda because one simply lives 
in capitalism. As the ideology of the day, it is this belief ‘by acting’ that constitutes 
the ‘totalitarian aspect of capitalism,’ ‘even if we do not wittingly act out of an 
explicit belief.’355 Capitalism is, in other words, immanent, an invisible enemy that 
needs to be eradicated by transcendent anarchy, a form of abstraction from the 
culture we live in. 
 
George Lakoff suggests that among the metaphors that condition our lives there are 
orientational metaphors: ‘These spatial orientations arise from the fact that we have 
bodies of the sort we have and that they function as they do in our physical 
environment.356 Since we are animals that stand on their two legs, up has a positive 
connotation in contrast to down. Examples Lakoff offers are: ‘I’m feeling up. That 
boosted my spirits. My spirits rose. You’re in high spirits … I’m feeling down. I’m 
depressed. He’s really low these days. I fell into a depression. My spirits sank.’357  
 
Comprehensibly then Tyler Durden invites the narrator of Fight Club to reach the 
bottom because only when he has lost everything will man be free of any 
conditioning. Objects, the family, the past are all hindrances towards the expression 
of the individual: ‘“It’s only after you’ve lost everything,” Tyler says, “that you’re 
                                                          
355 Andrew Hewitt, ‘Fight Club and the Violence of Neo-Fascist Ressentiment’, 
Telos, issue 136 (Fall 2006), p. 108. 
356 George Lakoff, Metaphors We Live By, University of Chigago, 2008, p. 14. 
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free to do anything.”’358 Steven Gold comments on this sentence saying that it 
represents the moment in which Tyler shows his real intention to dominate the 
narrator: ‘Tyler contends that he is trying to help the Narrator “evolve.” In reality, he 
is inducing him to submit.’359 While this can be an interesting reading of the novel, 
especially when Tyler becomes the undisputed leader of Project Mayhem, its literal 
meaning should not be undermined. Losing means for Palahniuk to lose oneself, and, 
with it, all the cultural background that identity is built upon, in order to reach 
freedom.  
 
The individual in the novel is represented by the narrator, who has no name: he is 
just an example, one of the many, a sort of synecdoche for the lower class. He 
spends his life looking at IKEA brochures and ordering from their catalogues. After 
meeting Tyler he realizes that a life spent accumulating objects is a life which one 
has lost control of: ‘Then you’re trapped in your lovely nest, and the things you used 
to own, now they own you.’360 Entrapped in his capitalistic existence and unable to 
rationally escape his existence, the narrator gives birth to another personality, which 
may set him free. 
   
The narrator himself can be considered as oxymoronic in the equation that makes 
him share the same body with Tyler. The oxymoronic subject is half transcendental 
and half immanent, Tyler and the Narrator, an individual split into opposite 
personalities. The narrator and Tyler are in fact completely different, the former a 
loser, unable to take ownership of his own life and reduced to go to 12-step groups in 
                                                          
358 Palahniuk, p. 70. 
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Dissociogenic', Journal of Trauma & Dissociation, 5: 2 (2004), p. 28. 
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order to build human relationships whereas the latter is strong-willed, anarchic and a 
natural leader. According to Gold, Tyler was somehow born out of the narrator’s 
unconscious attraction for the independent Marla:  
 
The Narrator is too oblivious to his own feelings to realize he is attracted to 
Marla, and even if he did know this, he would be too timid and inhibited to 
approach her. Tyler has the assertiveness to engage with Marla. As the 
Narrator’s alter ego, he possesses the confidence bordering on macho 
cockiness that the Narrator lacks and admires.361  
 
Tyler then was born out of desire both for freedom but also a desire to establish a 
relationship with another human being. 
 
Omar Lizardo instead offers a different explanation to the oxymoronic character 
based on bulimia according to which ‘unbridled consumption is represented by 
overeating, and Puritan self-control by anorexia.’362 Tyler brings back self-control 
and order through Project Mayhem where discipline is very important thus behaving 
as a New Puritan (transcendent) whereas the narrator’s dependency on IKEA 
catalogues is symptomatic of overeating (exaggerated materiality or immanence). 
The result is a ‘split subject’363 or an oxymoronic subject. 
 
Tyler is evidently the fiction, the split personality emerged from the original narrator, 
but in the course of the novel, he becomes immanent, taking over the body of the 
protagonist while the narrator becomes a mere witness to his body in action. Tyler 
communicates facts, information, whereas the narrator, as witness, tells a story, 
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Tyler’s story, that is secretly (even to him) his own story. In other words, Fight Club 
is the story of an anonymous individual telling the story of the rise and fall of his 
own dissociated personality.  
 
Tyler represents in the most literal sense Kermode’s definition of myth, which is, a 
fiction that is forgetting that it is only a fiction: ‘We have to distinguish between 
myths and fictions. Fiction can degenerate into myths whenever they are not 
consciously held to be fiction.’364 Tyler is a necessary myth in the narrator’s attempt 
at freedom from his own life. The narrator splits himself and creates a personality, 
which echoes the figure of the intermediator or prophet that we have already 
encountered in Ballard. The intermediator becomes the thing itself he should 
mediate.365  
 
Tyler is information spread by word of mouth, everybody knows him and, what is 
worse, he is becoming a legend: ‘“Everybody knows about the birthmark,” the 
bartender says. “It’s part of the legend. You’re turning into a fucking legend, 
man.”’366 A legend is a story repeated from mouth to mouth that people start to 
believe as true, just like myth in Kermode. In other words, all the information 
coalesces in myth and Tyler himself suggests - in a reversal of what happens in 
Crash where Ballard thinks he has created Vaughan out of his desire - that maybe 
the Narrator is the actual fiction:  
 
‘Oh, this is bullshit. This is a dream. Tyler is a projection. He’s a dissociative 
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personality disorder. A psychogenic fugue state. Tyler Durden is my 
hallucination. 
“Fuck that shit,” Tyler says. “Maybe you’re my schizophrenic 
hallucination.”’367  
 
Tyler is the perfect epitome of simulation but in the shape of a man, who starts to 
believe that he is the real thing. Tyler is a psychopathology (to use Ballard’s 
terminology), that becomes a person and takes the place of the original, since the 
narrator does not even have a name. As Gold says:  
 
It is certainly no accident that it is Tyler, the supposed alter, who has a name, 
while the Narrator, the ostensible “host” personality, does not. The Narrator 
is essentially a cipher, a non-entity. In many respects, Tyler has more 
“substance,” and certainly more backbone, than the Narrator does.368 
  
The fact that the narrator does not have a name and is a ‘cipher, a non-entity,’ not 
immanent enough, while his split personality does have a name is important for the 
political role of the novel. Without a name and a real personality, the narrator is the 
perfect everyman that by synecdoche represents the contemporary American way in 
the same way as Patrick Bateman represented the American yuppies of the Eighties.  
 
Being a Snowflake or the Problem of Individuality 
 
The narrator represents both the concept of the everyman, a pure abstraction from 
reality and the individual, the actuality from which the everyman should be 
abstracted. The question then is: how can the individual be an everyman, someone 
without real individuality?  
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We have already found the answer to these questions in the reading of Zygmunt 
Bauman’s Liquid Society. According to Bauman nowadays we are free to ‘buy’ a 
new identity whenever we want, just as Neon does in Wallace’s story. Buying itself 
is the symbol of capitalist society as proved by the narrator’s obsession with IKEA: 
individuality is just another object of consumption: ‘In a consumer society,’ writes 
Bauman, ‘sharing in consumer dependency - in the universal dependency on 
shopping - is the condition sine qua non of all individual freedom; above all, of the 
freedom to be different, to "have identity".’369 In order to show the paradox endemic 
to the problem of identity as commodity, Bauman offers the example of a TV 
commercial where to the image of a variety of women with different hair styles and 
colours relates the slogan ‘"All unique; all individual; all choose X".’370 Individuality 
today is both unique and shared, all choosing between the same products, the same 
identities. 
 
In order to illustrate the question of individuality Palahniuk makes use of the 
metaphor of the snowflake, following the myth of the individual as unique as a 
snowflake. One of Tyler’s space monkeys reads some of Tyler’s scripts:  
 
“You are not a beautiful and unique snowflake. You are the same decaying 
organic matter as everyone else, and we are all part of the same compost 
pile.” 
The space monkey continues, “Our culture has made us all the same. No one 
is truly white or black or rich, anymore. We all want the same. Individually, 
we are nothing.”371  
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If, following Bauman, everybody can shop for identity, then all identities have the 
same value or, in other words, they are the same. It does not matter which identity 
one chooses because they are not what one is. It is because of this lack of substance 
of the individual that a fiction like Tyler can take a place, because Tyler does not 
take the place of another person, he simply fills a vacant space. 
 
Following almost directly from American Psycho, this void in human substance 
seems created by consumerism since what is consumed is nothing but the human. 
According to Mendieta, consuming is typically American: ‘to consume is American, 
and through consumption we enact our civil religion, our duty for country and 
motherland.’372 The problem is that consuming is another factor that increases our 
sameness:  
 
the more there is to consume, the more products there are on the shelf, the 
more we consume the same. Massive quantities translate into uncertainty, 
even angst. Where there is so much, and each choice is a leap of faith, the 
common and familiar becomes a respite from uncertainty and intractable 
massiveness. Sameness becomes the solace of the overwhelmed. But where 
everyone can have the same, each must distinguish him or herself by being 
unique. Uniqueness itself must turn into a commodity.373 
 
This familiarity that counterpoints the vastness of choice is everything the fight club 
is against but, paradoxically, everybody in the fight club and in project mayhem 
would like to be Tyler Durden, and to have his personality. They would all choose to 
wear his face thus surrendering his anti-capitalistic revolution to the black hole of 
capitalism. The unconscious need for a fictional alternative to life plays a major role 
in understanding the contemporary appeal for fiction. Tyler is not consumed by 
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capitalism, on the contrary, he is inventing a maybe improbable but captivating form 
of anarchy. He is telling everyone that no one is a snowflake and, in his intentions, 
maybe he did invite his fighters to abandon all hope of personality. Unfortunately, 
Tyler offers himself as an alternative personality, which all the monkeys want to 
emulate.  
 
In the same way as Ellis’ Bateman, the purpose of Palahniuk’s narrator is to make of 
his character a specimen for humankind, an example of what a ‘real’ human being is, 
so that his past does not exactly mark him as an individual but as an example, that is, 
to quote Agamben: ‘one singularity among others, which, however, stands for each 
of them and serves for all. On one hand, every example is treated in effect as a real 
particular case; but on the other, it remains understood that it cannot serve in its 
particularity.’374 As an example, the narrator cannot be considered in his 
particularity: he is a synecdoche that works both as individual and as the whole of 
individuality in contemporary America. 
 
According to Lizardo, Tyler has a Calvinistic attitude towards individuality. He 
argues that Tyler tries to ‘re-program’ the members of Project Mayhem in order to 
delete ‘the dominant neo-Romantic and hedonistic ideology that emphasizes their 
“intrinsic” worth and special status as a person.’375 Lizardo sees here a reminiscence 
of ‘the radical rationalization of Lutheranism by John Calvin, in which God’s 
transcendental majesty and absolute omniscience and omnipotence dwarfed and 
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rendered despicable the lonely human’s mortal flesh.’376 Lizardo comments further 
that Durden’s version of Calvinism though, ‘represents a Nihilistic, post-Nietzschean 
version of this cosmology, in which all that remains is the decaying human flesh 
without the possibility of redemption.’377 The better argument instead, however, is 
that for Durden this is only a starting point towards what he considers freedom and 
not an end in itself. It is easy to agree that Tyler’s (metaphorical) gun is always 
aimed at the end, but this end represents the annihilation of the individual as 
cultivated by contemporary culture, not the end of man himself. 
 
In his way, Tyler finds an answer to a simple question: if uniqueness is just a 
commodity and its authenticity is thus undermined, what is the point of choosing? 
According to Bauman, the individual is not really free to choose since she is forced 
to make the choice for individualization: she is forced to be someone. As Bauman 
writes, ‘individualization is a fate, not a choice. In the land of the individual freedom 
of choice the option to escape individualization and to refuse participation in the 
individualizing game is emphatically not on the agenda.’378 Tyler tries to eliminate 
the problem of choice itself, accepting that any choice is pointless and that this is the 
only possible starting point for a new life. 
 
From the one-dimensionality of Patrick Bateman we have moved to the oxymoronic 
and ironic split of the nameless narrator of Fight Club. In order to find his Voice and 
individuality, the narrator has given birth to a personality, which represents the myth 
and legend of individuality against the mythical law of Society. Tyler Durden is the 
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product of the metaphor machine of the narrator, whose functions appears to be to 
give the narrator an individual Voice to finally speak to the Other and thus respond 
to that lack or void of human relationships. 
 
Of Lack or in the Name of the Father 
 
Fight Club tries to explore how such a fictional personality has come to be through 
the story of the narrator. Compared to Bateman the narrator of Fight Club has a past, 
as vague as it may be, hinted by different references to his father and soon 
generalized in all the men that take part into the fight club, men who have been 
raised by their mothers379, and that, for this reason, are in search of their male 
identity. 
  
From what the narrator says, we know that Tyler did not have a father380, but he 
does. His father left his family when he was only six years old: ‘Me’, the narrator 
says, ‘I knew my dad for about six years, but I don’t remember anything. My dad, he 
starts a new family in a new town about every six years, this isn’t so much like a 
family as it’s like he sets up a franchise.’381 The idea of family as franchise in the 
hands of the father reflects the belief in the Father as representative of capital. The 
narrator does not remember anything about his father. The father is hence perceived 
more as a lack (Tyler does not have a father either, of course) than as an influence, 
thus reflecting the emptiness of the narrator. The need to fill in the void left by the 
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father is so great that the presence of the woman/mother is almost obliterated in the 
novel, with the single exception of Marla. 
 
Lizardo brings the question of the father as lack to its Lacanian consequences: ‘This 
is Lacan’s (Frankfurt school-inspired) insight when stating that the absence of the 
“law-of-father” in modern society is in fact an even greater prison than its presence: 
when everything is permitted then enjoyment is truly evacuated from the social field, 
insofar as this latter requires the minimal presence of a formal prohibition in order to 
sustain its (performative) essence.’382 Without a father, the individual is under no 
restrictions and is permitted to do and desire whatever he wants, a situation already 
portrayed in American Psycho and narrated in various works by Ballard.  
 
The most transcendental level of the Father corresponds to God, who is the template 
for the former or, in Tyler’s words: ‘“What you have to understand is your father 
was your model for God.”’383 God is invisible but omnipresent and for this reason 
well represents the Lack or Void - that is, something we do not have, cannot see, but 
strongly believe in. This lack can only have such a power if it is transcendental or 
fictional, in other words, a myth. Only someone who does not have a father can 
fantasize of his existence. As absence the Father cannot be more godlike and it is in 
this instance that every cue that the society of information gives is priceless and 
worth imitating. The transcendental nature of god is matched by Durden’s fictional 
nature explaining the profound attraction the monkeys have for him.  
 
In order to free the people in the fight club from the Father however, Tyler falls into 
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another of his paradoxes. The narrator surmises that Tyler’s violence (which is the 
narrator’s violence) is meant to attract God’s attention because the lack for the father 
is mostly a fear of being ignored by the Other, being abandoned by him: ‘How Tyler 
saw it was that getting God’s attention for being bad was better than getting no 
attention at all. Maybe because God’s hate is better than His indifference.’384 Being 
noticed means being punished, which is still better than the nothingness and solitude: 
‘Which is worse, hell or nothing? Only if we’re caught and punished can we be 
saved.’385 Tyler and the fatherless misbehave for a childish but human need for 
attention.   
 
Before entering the fight club the narrator has tried to solve his insomnia problems 
by taking part in twelve-step groups where he can start human relations and get the 
attention he needs:  
 
‘This is why I loved the support groups so much, if people thought you were 
dying, they gave you their full attention. 
If this might be the last time they saw you, they really saw you.’386  
 
Whereas Patrick Bateman tries to escape the Superego by killing, the narrator builds 
lies, in a way similar to Old Neon but pushed to the extremes of death. The various 
Fight Clubs are nothing but an arena for people in search of attention. In the middle 
of the fighting ground, the fighters are the absolute protagonists, after having spent a 
life as loser.   
 
Mendieta sustains the argument that lack is more metaphysical in the American 
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individual: ‘a void of meaning, a lack of direction,’387 of which consumerism takes 
advantage. To be worthy of the gratification that buying and consuming produces:  
 
they must be remade in the image of the true men. The male image is 
continuously unmade and remade in the image of the perfect male, an image 
that is asymptotically elusive. But these dreams of unchallenged power, of 
always-to-be-achieved full masculinity are belied by the reality of 
unemployment, powerlessness, meaninglessness, lack of connection, of 
responsibility. The ideal and the real are so irreconcilable, so distant, that 
men can but only be rendered schizophrenic. Men must create community so 
as to find meaning, even if this community is based on futility. The Fight 
Club, which gives its name to the novel, becomes the desperate means to 
incite solidarity among strangers by means of a community of secrecy.388 
 
Tyler wants his monkeys to accept that they are nothing, meaningless, powerless. 
This incredible dimension of lack that requires to be filled in by a fiction is generated 
by this need for being-there in the world, and for being noticed for one’s individual 
presence and having one’s Voice heard. This lack of immanence corresponds to a 
lacuna in human relationships. The fighters do not know how to say this lack, which 
is both too abstract, because it is the lack of the Other as expressed metaphorically 
by the absence of God and too immanent, because this inability to relate to the other 
is replaced by knowing the Other violently, connected to him literally by punching 
him. The frustration caused by this inability to say is replaced by the language of the 
fist. This inability to say is caused by the existence of only a one-dimensional 
language or, on the other side, by the language of information. The amount of 
information present in the novel is there to hide, with its overwhelming presence, 
this void, which is left unsaid.  
 
This space of the unsaid lives between the ‘fiction’ of the fight club and the ‘reality’ 
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the fighters live in their regular lives: ‘Who guys are in fight club is not who they are 
in the real world.’389 The club functions as a suspension of reality in which the social 
roles can be turned upside down and a perfect loser can become a formidable fighter. 
Paradoxically though, the reality they live is a capitalist simulation. To this 
simulation the fighters prefer the fiction of the fight club where they can explore 
themselves, the limits of their bodies and accept who they are. The immanence of the 
fight ultimately feels more real than the abstract Law of Society.   
 
Another Visit to the Hell of Infernal Irony 
 
Fight Club presents many of the characteristics of the infernal irony Freccero reads 
in American Psycho390. In this hell, ironically what you buy controls you, only one of 
many contradictions, paradoxes and oxymorons. If allegory can be considered as an 
extended metaphor, satire works as extended oxymoron, and it thus becomes a genre 
well suited to showing the contradictions of contemporary life. Only reaching the 
bottom of this hell leads to freedom, like Dante moving from Limbo down towards 
Lucifer. Only losing every hope can man reach infernal freedom. We should not 
forget the beginning of the Third Canto of Dante’s Inferno, already quoted at the 
beginning of American Psycho: ‘Lasciate ogni speranza, voi ch’entrate.’391 Tyler’s 
hopeless freedom satirizes reality from the bottom but he never presents us with a 
way out of hell. Marla has no transcendental dimension like Beatrice but, on the 
contrary, is the one to cause the split of personalities in the narrator.  
                                                          
389 Palahniuk, p. 49. 
390 It is not by chance then that one of his latest novels, Damned (2011), is set in hell. 
391 Later in the novel Palahniuk will also write: ‘“You are not your hopes.”’ 
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This split of satire however is very different from the ironic split we have observed 
with De Man and Baudelaire. If both Baudelaire and Palahniuk see the detachment 
as a means to understand the impossibility of any control over reality, the laugh 
proposed by Palahniuk is harsher, more cynical even. Tyler does not acquire 
knowledge from the revelation but instead he acquires mere information, which 
means that he does not learn anything, he does not reach the detachment of the 
philosopher, he does not stop and think, but instead he starts a propaganda based on 
an accumulation of information in order to fight against that vast amount of acquired 
knowledge that is culture. 
 
The philosopher in Baudelaire is aware of the split in the same way as Neon is aware 
he is a fraud. The narrator of Fight Club, on the contrary, is not aware of his split 
until the very end of the novel. He is dissociated by the person he is observing and 
does not realize he is talking about a character he himself has created: in other 
words, the narrator does not see the split and does not acquire knowledge because he 
has not even fallen yet: 
 
Tyler says I’m nowhere near hitting the bottom, yet. And if I don’t fall all the 
way, I can’t be saved. Jesus did it with his crucifixion thing. I shouldn’t just 
abandon money and property and knowledge. This isn’t just a weekend 
retreat. I should run from self-improvement, and I should be running toward 
disaster. I can’t just play it safe anymore.392 
 
Improvement is immediately connected to knowledge: the more I learn to play an 
instrument the more I will improve in it. Knowledge represents a progression in 
opposition to the zero level of information. Whereas in Dante sinners commiserate 
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their fate, Tyler Durden invites us to embrace it and reach the bottom since only out 
of destruction and the loss of every hope, of everything we consider dear, freedom 
can be reached393. 
 
A fundamental part of the infernal satire of capitalism is the way Tyler accumulates 
monetary resources for his apocalypse by taking advantage of inverting the 
obsessions of the rich. Tyler in fact produces soap for the rich through a process of 
re-elaboration of the fat they have dismissed through liposuction. In a way, as Tyler 
says, this is ‘a kind of Robin Hood thing,’394 Out of something the rich have 
discarded as reprehensible waste, out mostly of vanity, Tyler creates richness but 
also something to clean the body.  
 
This description of life as hell makes of Palahniuk an apocalyptic writer in the same 
league with Ballard certainly, but also with Lyotard. For Palahniuk, however, the 
end, in the same way as reaching the bottom, is the only way to start: ‘“Someday,” 
Tyler says, “you will die, and until you know that, you’re useless to me”’395. Or: 
‘“Disaster is a natural part of my evolution,” Tyler whispered, “toward tragedy and 
dissolution.”’396 
 
The works of Ballard, Palahniuk and Ellis all point in the direction of an end for their 
present of simulation. They differ in the temporal perspective they take towards the 
end. In works such as High-Rise and Crash, Ballard shows the evolution towards the 
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end of civilization (in the former) and an attempt to re-create desire after the end (in 
the latter). Ballard shows how the end of reality and the advent of simulation pave 
the way for the destruction of man. Ellis’s characters instead have surrendered to the 
end of reality except for a few moments of search for the self through violence. 
While in Ballard violence represents the possibility of new desires, in Ellis it just 
keeps the status quo going. Finally in Chuck Palahniuk violence is a means towards 
a form of self-destruction that is not aimed at desire, but at the end of everything, 
desire and stories included in what we have defined as hopeless freedom. 
 
The Search for the Voice in Palahniuk 
 
The fighters believe that their fight goes beyond the limitations of words to speak the 
unsayable: ‘What happens at fight club doesn’t happen in words.’397 This is another 
recurrence of that instance that we have initiated with the analysis of Wallace’s 
‘Good Old Neon’ or, in other words, of the constant discovery of the inadequacy of 
words in expressing the individual’s feelings and most internal mind up to the 
dimension between transcendence and immanence where we have placed the human 
will-to-say, the Voice of the Witness. The ethical question we need to find an answer 
to is whether violence is an adequate substitute for this inadequacy.  
 
What the characters cannot describe is the feeling of being alive, of being-there, that 
a fight conveys: ‘You aren’t alive anywhere like you’re alive at fight club. When it’s 
you and one other guy under that one light in the middle of all those watching. Fight 
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club isn’t about winning or losing fights. Fight club isn’t about words.’398 Fight club 
is not about telling stories of the self, about justifying one’s presence in society or 
giving an account of oneself, but about feeling one’s own presence into the world, 
one’s immanence. The fight represents the possibility to break through the 
dissociative field that surrounds the individual and that according to Gold ‘dulls’ the 
individual’s relationship with the world: ‘Briefly stated, dissociation as it is 
construed in Fight Club can be defined as constriction of the ability to access 
immediate experience of the self, connection to other people, or the here and 
now.’399 
 
Gold’s main thesis is that the narrator is dissociated from reality and the Other 
because of the way contemporary culture educates him. According to this thesis, the 
individual’s capacity to relate with the reality outside her and with her own feelings 
is dulled, made opaque as if, we could say, her mind was living in a bubble.  
 
As a psychologist Gold reports the case of dissociative clients: ‘Just as many 
dissociative clients report that self-injury “cuts” through the oppressive numbness 
they experience, fight club shatters the men’s dissociation, allowing them to wake up 
to their feelings and helping them feel connected to each other.’400 Pain signals the 
body’s presence and with it, the presence of life, of being there simply and without 
having to explain it in words. 
 
The power of stories, however, is given more prominence in the novel when the 
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narrator tells of his experience as part of twelve-step groups. The narrator feels that 
through those stories, fictional or ‘real’, individual Voices are ultimately transmitted 
between human beings: ‘And when they spoke, they weren’t telling you a story. 
When the two of you talked, you were building something, and afterward you were 
both different than before.’401  
 
However, as Gold points out, this humanity the narrator is trying to relate is lost 
because he is lying: ‘It is all, however, ultimately illusory because it is based on the 
perception that the Narrator, like the other members of the group, has a life-
threatening disease.’402 Gold does not consider that it is the fictionality of his own 
stories that make the narrator so human, his need to tell a lie in order to interact with 
other human beings, as we have observed with Neon. 
 
Andrew Hewitt examines the masochism in the novel considering pain as a form of 
authenticity, which the individual lacks today: ‘Pain is the experience of authenticity 
reworked not as a discredited—and potentially aggressive—expression, but as a 
radically physical and aestheticized ethics of bodily impression.’403 The ethics 
suggested by Hewitt is immanent and lived in the body, literally impressed in it, thus 
making such impression a physical, literal mark, a scar, of the individual’s authentic 
identity. The sharpness of pain awakens through the fog of dullness and, at least for a 
moment, the individual is there, unique in her pain. 
 
Once again the paradox is that such an immanent form of recognition of presence, of 
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being there, comes from the doctrine of the fictional and split personality of an 
individual so numb that he has lost any contact not only with the Other but with his 
own self. The narrator has ultimately lost control of his metaphor machine and in 
order to deal with his inadequacy to outside reality, the metaphor takes on a 
personality that tries to physically put an order to the world through destruction in 
Project Mayhem: ‘This was the goal of Project Mayhem, Tyler said, the complete 
and right-away destruction of civilization.’404 
  
Suicide and self-immolation is the last step required by an ethics based on the 
marking of pain because in the moment of violent death, both immanence (extreme 
pain) and transcendence (the body is lost) meet and the individual acquires a name: 
‘Only in death will we have our own names since only in death are we no longer part 
of the effort. In death we become heroes.’405 Individuality is a conquest that arrives 
with death, when one is remembered for the way one has died but also when, once 
all immanence has disappeared, what remains is the word, the name, the piece of 
language left to the narrator.  
 
Following Hegel observing how in violent death an animal has a voice, Agamben 
observes that the voice is ‘expression and memory of the death of the animal.’406 The 
death cry of the animal is not yet the articulated voice of language, but it is the voice 
of death, which still remembers the living being.407 This is the Voice that says of a 
presence that is not there anymore and, for Agamben, it is the place where language 
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406 ‘espressione e memoria della morte dell’animale.’ Agamben, Il Linguaggio e la 
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407 Ibid., p. 59.  
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takes place. It is this death that Tyler evokes as the ultimate testament and testimony 
of the individual. This is the only possible Voice of the witness. 
 
From the very beginning the narrator tries to take on the Name of the Father by 
expanding the metaphor machine, the image the brain creates through the 
impressions of society (the Superego) to deal with reality, into a fictional personality. 
This personality is a hero and as such it has a name, Tyler Durden, which he, the 
narrator, can only ultimately acquire through his sacrifice. His sacrifice however 
fails because the narrator prepares a defective bomb: if he had died he would have 
lost his real, unknown name and become forever Tyler Durden. 
 
In the last pages of the novel, the narrator looks for a solution to the conundrum of 
individuality and he finds it in oxymoron, that is, in the space between one face and 
the other, in the neither/nor: 
 
We are not special. 
We are not crap or trash, either. 
We just are. 
We just are, and what happens just happens. 
And God says, “No, that’s not right.” 
Yeah. Well. Whatever. You can’t teach God anything.408  
 
In the end, God is not the figure the individual should imitate but the one that should 
learn. The individual is neither unique nor ‘crap’ and its essence is in its just being, 
in just being-there in the world with her Voice, letting it happen. 
 
To conclude, how does Fight Club answer to the question of humanity Lyotard 
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poses? The posthuman in the work of Chuck Palahniuk is a split subject who has lost 
his subjectivity, a living oxymoron split between consumption and restriction. 
  
Information increases the level of violence where there is no ethics anymore, only 
this need for extinction and self-destruction. The narrator is not a reliable witness 
because he generates fictions he is not aware of. He lies in order to connect with the 
Other; he creates fictional relationships with people who are dying (thus simulating 
his own death many times for each group he attends to); afterwards, his subconscious 
creates a fictional persona that believes itself more immanent than the narrator. How 
can a man whose metaphor machine has lost any connection to immanence be a 
reliable witness of the end? He is witness to his own creation, just like Doctor 
Frankenstein witnessing the monster. From the perspective of the witness such as we 
see it described in Agamben, though, we could say that the narrator has come close 
to finding a Voice, but also that this voice belongs to him only oxymoronically, in 
his split personality. The witness in Agamben is split between subjectification and 
de-subjectification, as we have seen, and the narrator of Fight Club lives this 
condition of fluctuation, without ever however finding a balance, a way to express 
his will-to-say. As it was the case for Neon, Ballard and Patrick Bateman, he has no 
interest for the Other and her suffering, he never sees the Other as another subject 
caught in the same search. He created the Other with his metaphor machine but 
realised too late that Tyler Durden was no Other.  
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3.3 Body and the Character: Authority and the Role of the Witness in 
Cyberpunk and Postcyberpunk 
 
‘Vie artificielle? Mais existe-t-il encore en ce monde une vie qui ne le soit pas ?’409 
 
N. Katherine Hayles argues that the usage of the point of view in Gibson is his most 
effective technique in envisioning cyberspace and also the vehicle to engender the 
transcendental core of the writer’s narrative.  From the question of the point of view, 
I will develop a brief theory of the character in cyberpunk in parallel with the 
conception of the individual in posthumanism. The connecting node will be the 
concept of ‘pattern’ analysed by Hayles as the main characteristic of the cybernetic 
revolution. I will recognize pattern as synonymous with the idea of cliché and the 
predictability of people. 
 
A theory of the character in cyberpunk is necessary in order to understand properly 
the relation between the character and the individual in contemporary fiction. In the 
last few chapters I have studied three types of the posthuman: the Ballardian man, 
Patrick Bateman, and the narrator/Tyler Durden. I have observed these characters as 
representative of contemporary man’s search for individuality. Until now I have left 
silent the relationship between character itself and the individual. In this chapter I 
will more closely relate my argument to this particular connection and to how it 
evolves in the posthuman. Tyler Durden is already a product of the metaphor 
machine of the narrator to have a grasp over reality. With the work of Maurice 
Dantec I will arrive at the conclusion that the posthuman is a fictional individual, and 
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as such, lives in a constant fluctuation between character and ‘real’ individual. This 
theory is not far removed from Bauman’s idea of identity as interchangeable, 
because what this idea implies is that identity is indeed a fictional construction. The 
account of oneself that Butler talks about is the creation on the part of the individual 
of a fictional character with which to face society. 
 
The Character and the Individual 
 
Before moving forward it is useful to trace a brief history of the character. I will use 
as a reference text the work of Arrigo Stara L’avventura del personaggio410 (2004, 
The Adventure of the Character) while at the same time focusing on the connection 
between character and individual. One of the techniques Stara attempts to define the 
character is observing the etymology of the Italian word for character, ‘personaggio.’ 
The Latin word persona derives from the Etruscan word phersu, which means 
‘theatrical mask.’411 Bauman’s idea of identity as mask is already present at the 
origin of the idea of the character. Furthermore, persona used to be ‘used to indicate 
the individual in general.’412 From its etymology Stara comes to the conclusion that:  
 
Even la persona is in conclusion at the beginning a character (personaggio), 
the essential character; a sort of  indispensable fiction, which man uses in his 
contact with the world and the others, a fiction that allows him to represent 
himself as unity, be it as a body, psychic, linguistic, spiritual, juridical, in the 
most important circumstances of his existence.413 
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412 Ibid. 
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In his journey through the history of the character Stara individuates two principles 
or forms of criticism to analyse the character: the first is an ‘opaque criticism’414 
according to which the character is first and foremost made of signs and 
consequently irremediably non-referential, opaque or immanent: their immanence as 
a sign makes any referentiality to the outside world impossible. The second form, 
‘transparent criticism,’ accepts the possibility that the reader may fall into the 
illusion that the character is an individual and not a mere construct of words, that, in 
other words, the character is not completely arbitrary. Between opacity and 
transparency, non-referentiality and non-arbitrariness Stara seems to resolve the 
problem of the character in a balance between, on the one hand, an excess of the sign 
but, on the other hand and at the same time, as a fiction, an illusion.   
 
The connection between the character and the ‘real person’ was already known in 
ancient times to be based on violence. Aristotle suggests that the identification with 
the character allows the reader to purify herself from any violence that she can brood 
upon inside through what he called catharsis. In other words, living the passionate 
actions of the characters through their points of view, the reader will be less prone to 
act violently in real life. 
 
Plato, on the contrary, worries in his Ion about the powerful effect of narratives in 
driving poets and viewers or readers out of their minds, to see them dispossessed of 
their identities. There is no purification but a loss of the self in the technique of the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
rappresentarsi come un’unità corporea, psichica, linguistica, spiritual, giuridica, nelle 
circostanze fondamentali della sua esistenza.’ 
414 Ibid., p. 25. 
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point of view. 
 
E.M. Forster establishes an interesting difference between the character and the 
individual: ‘We know each other approximately, by external signs, and these serve 
well enough as a basis for society and even for intimacy. But people in a novel can 
be understood completely by the reader, if the novelist wishes; their inner as well as 
their outer life can be exposed.’415 The character is someone we can know from the 
inside as well, not only from external sign like individuals.  
 
According to Forster a character is real ‘when the novelist knows everything about 
it.416 Interestingly, Forster sees the principle of reality in a character in how 
transparent it is for its writer: of individuals on the contrary we have very limited 
knowledge, they are opaque. A real character then is the complete opposite of a real 
individual.  
 
In his distinction between flat characters and round characters Forster deepens his 
theory. Flat characters ‘are constructed round a single idea or quality; when there is 
more than one factor in them, we get the beginning of the curve towards the 
round.’417 Flat characters are easy to recognise and remember, and easy to predict 
and, above all, permanent: ‘All of us, even the sophisticated, yearn for permanence, 
and to the unsophisticated permanence is the chief excuse for a work of art.’418 Flat 
characters are transcendent basic metaphors, ideas easy to remember and recognise 
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because they are always something already seen before. Round characters, on the 
contrary, acquire the dimension of unpredictability: ‘The test of a round character is 
whether it is capable of surprising in a convincing way. If it never surprises, it is flat. 
If it does not convince, it is flat pretending to be round.’419 The idea of arbitrariness 
and of opacity of the character returns: the writer may well know everything about a 
character but this is not necessarily true of the reader, who may hit against the 
immanence of that construct of signs. 
 
In more recent years, Hèléne Cixous advocates against the assimilation between 
character and reader. Comparing the character and the individual, Cixous observes 
that the subject is made of a ‘mass of Egos,’ all finding their origin in the 
unconscious, that are excluded in the character, which furnishes a very specific Ego:  
 
Actually, if "character" is the product of a repression of subjectivity, and if 
the handling of literary scenes is done under the aegis of masterdom, of the 
conscious, which conventionalizes, evaluates, and codes so as to conform to 
set types, according to cultural demand, then the imperishable text can be 
recognized by its ability to evade the prevailing attempts at re-appropriating 
meaning and at establishing mastery, with which the myth (for it is a myth) 
of "character" collaborates insofar as it is a sign, a cog in the literary 
machinery.420 
 
The character then it is a crystallization of the individual in a way that ‘masters’ her 
and thus controls her. The writer in this sense is the actual master of the individual as 
signified on the page. Where Forster argued that the character is the more real the 
more the writer knows him Cixous seems to imply that the more the writer knows 
her character the less real it is. 
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With a hint to what the simulation theorized by Baudrillard will be, Cixous rejects 
the illusion of the character, because of the danger of remaining trapped in ‘the 
treadmill of reproduction’421 and ‘the syndrome of role-playing.’422 We have already 
observed the role of reproduction of the same personalities and of role-playing in the 
game of professions and the exchangeable role of the mediator in Ballard, but also in 
the entirely exchangeable characters of American Psycho. With Cixous we can say 
that every character in these novels is a marionette playing a conventional role:  
 
So long as we take to be the representation of a true subject that which is only 
a mask, so long as we ignore the fact that the "subject" is an effect of the 
unconscious and that it never stops producing the unconscious--which is 
unanalyzable, uncharacterizable, we will remain prisoners of monotonous 
machination that turns every "character" into a marionette.423 
 
With a concern that echoes Plato, Cixous warns against the power the poet has to 
master his audience, control it with illusions: ‘he deprives it of the real world and 
plunges it into a place of violence, where he moves it, tortures it, impassions it - in 
short, makes it dance to the tune of his pipe.’424 This space of violence is that of the 
writer’s own imaginary, we would say the product of her metaphor machine or, with 
Ballard, of her psychopathology. The main danger of the false and simulated 
identification of character and individual is that ‘fiction that would insinuate itself as 
the true reality.’425 
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The consequence is that not only that the individual is replaced by a specific, 
fictional mask instead of the multitudes of Egos offered by her unconscious, but that 
the writer becomes the master in a similar way to that of the intermediator in Ballard. 
The control that the mediator or the superego in Ellis exercise is done through the 
metaphor machine, through the creations of masks and simulations. 
 
The question of the character also brings us back to the text with which I have started 
my analysis of the connection between information and violence in contemporary 
fiction: that is, Lyotard’s ‘Si l’on peut penser sans corps,’ where Lyotard asks the 
question of the ultimate narrator and witness at the end of the Earth, when the sun 
itself will die.  
 
Raising once again the Lyotard problem will lead me to an analysis of the question 
of the witness and the point of view, which are narratively speaking very often the 
same. In the same way as the witness is the only narrator we have of an event we 
have not witnessed ourselves, the character offers us the only point of view of a 
reality, cyberspace in our case, which would not even exist without it. From Plato to 
Cixous we have seen the devastating effect the character can have on the individual.  
 
Taking the cue from Agamben’s analysis of the witness in Quel che resta di 
Auschwitz, I will go deeper into the question of the character as agent or as passive 
existent of events. The duality active/passive in the Gibsonian character will be 
mirrored by that between transcendence and immanence. 
 
At this point, we will be finally able to approach the question of the violence on the 
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body evident in such transcendental narratives. When characters are reduced to 
points of view without developing a real personality, they become ghosts of humans: 
this is the posthuman for William Gibson.426 In opposition to the Braidotti 
posthuman as monistic matter the body is abandoned as pure meat and as such it can 
be manipulated or escaped at will. The posthuman becomes a narrative being in 
cyberpunk and postcyberpunk and we will need to observe the ramifications of this 
transcendental leap. 
 
The Question of the Point of View in the Broken Metaphor of 
Cyberspace 
 
Hayles argues that one of the prevalent techniques William Gibson makes use of to 
express the novelty of cyberspace is the point of view or ‘pov’ (as she abbreviates it) 
in the novel. The innovation concerns the revelation, in a very postmodern way, that 
it is the point of view that creates the reality the reader experiences when reading: 
 
In cyberspace, point of view does not emanate from the character; rather, the 
pov literally is the character. If a pov is annihilated, the character disappears 
with it, ceasing to exist as a consciousness in and out of cyberspace. The 
realistic fiction of a narrator who observes but does not create is thus 
unmasked in cyberspace. The effect is not primarily metafictional, however, 
but it is in a literal sense metaphysical, above and beyond physicality.’427  
 
Paradoxically, it is not cyberspace which disappears but the character tout court. The 
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character has neither an internal nor an external world, but its existence is limited to 
its offering a vision of cyberspace. The character is the same as someone who is 
sleeping, and for this reason, her consciousness is inexistent until she does not open 
her eyes onto the world and comes to a stop when she closes her eyes: it is the same 
mechanism of the hacker flipping in and out of cyberspace.  
 
Hackers are nothing more than eyes offering the same perspective we find in a video 
game in which the player does not see the character she is moving but only his hands 
or weapons, as in a first person shooter games such as Halo or Doom. Like a camera, 
they direct us to where the action is going to pass, in the same way as a camera tells 
us where the story is going in a film. We know only what the camera has recorded, 
all the rest does not exist and can only be guessed. 
 
This is exactly the problem raised by Lyotard: what happens if nobody is able to 
witness an event because no observer exists anymore? Lyotard can maybe be 
accused of using logocentric arguments to sustain the importance of man in the 
universe, as if the universe would not continue without man. However, it is also true 
that reality does not matter anymore to man if there is no man to tell it. Scientists can 
only make hypothesis on how the end of the world will be, as writers have done at 
least since ancient times.428  
 
The Lyotard problem can be simply turned into a re-proposition of the Berkeleyan 
statement that ‘to be is to be perceived’ or ‘if a tree falls in a forest…’, which 
questions the relationship between perception and reality. However old the concept 
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may be it is far from trite and it is important for our discourse to pay attention to it. 
Being a point of view, witnessing an event and opening a door to its very existence, 
means to give great predominance over the senses of the human body and especially 
the optical nerve. Through the body and only through the body data are received in 
the brain to render the world metaphorically, the brain being part of the body too.  
 
If Gibson posits the problem of the pov as creator to an attentive critical eye, as 
Hayles maintains, I contend, however, that he fails to reveal it as a narrative 
technique to a less shrewd reader. The role of the character as maker of worlds is 
better understood and developed in post-cyberpunk works such as Snow Crash by 
Neal Stephenson and Cosmos Incorporated by Maurice G. Dantec, which actually 
reflect not only on the work of Gibson, but on postmodernism in general.  
 
The very name of one of its two main points of view in Snow Crash, Hiro 
Protagonist429, makes clear Stephenson’s attempt at showing that cyberspace (what 
he calls Metaverse430) is a narrative invention, a fiction. As such, it has to follow 
narrative rules and avoid incoherence at all costs. 
 
Stephenson treats his Metaverse for the metaphor it is: ‘You can’t just materialize 
anywhere in the Metaverse, like Captain Kirk beaming down from on high. This 
would be confusing and irritating to the people around you. It would break the 
metaphor.’431 The Metaverse is a metaphor that stands for reality and as such it has 
narrative power up to the moment it follows narrative rules, which have to keep a 
                                                          
429 Neal Stephenson, Snow Crash, London: Penguin, 1993, p. 17. 
430 A name very apt to indicate not only the meta-fictional level of his invention, but 
also its meta-physical level. 
431 Stephenson, p. 34. My italics. 
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certain level of referentiality and coherence, where people do not appear from 
nowhere.  
 
When Hiro kills an avatar in the Metaverse with his sword one can see through the 
maimed avatar, since its body is not made of flesh: ‘It breaks the metaphor. The 
avatar is not acting like a real body. It reminds all The Black Sun’s patrons that they 
are living in a fantasy world. People hate to be reminded of this.’432  
 
Curiously an act of violence reveals the truth of the fictional world, literally cutting 
through the fiction. Since Hiro does not really kill anybody, the killing works as a 
form of catharsis, where he uses violence only in a fictional context while at the 
same time fulfilling Hiro’s self-image as a swordsman. Aristotle considered 
suffering as part of tragic and epic: ‘A third part [of the plot after Peripety and 
Discovery] is Suffering; which we may define as an action of a destructive or painful 
nature, such as murders on the stage, tortures, woundings, and the like.’433 Hiro’s 
violence has indeed a cathartic effect in purifying the reader and the user of 
Metaverse of the illusion that the Metaverse is nothing but a fiction. 
 
Hayles describes cyberspace as a pure narrative space given life by the hackers. Even 
when Necromancer and Wintermute become one, in fact, they do not become the 
authors of cyberspace: they become the matrix itself, the ‘whole show.’434  Hayles 
describes cyberspace as the extension into narrative space of a mathematical concept. 
‘Cyberspace is created by transforming a data matrix into a landscape in which 
                                                          
432 Ibid., p. 95. 
433 Aristotle, Poetics. 
434 William Gibson, Neuromancer, London: HarperCollins, 1995, p. 316. 
218 
 
narratives can happen. In mathematics, “matrix” is a technical term denoting data 
that have been arranged into an n-dimensional array.’435 
 
The matrix becomes a narrative, however, only when we move inside it, that is, only 
when we are being characters in a more or less fictional setting. Only when there is a 
movement in time too: ‘Narrative becomes possible when this spatiality is given a 
temporal dimension by the pov’s movement through it. The pov is located in space, 
but it exists in time.’436 Cyberspace needs the temporal dimension of the hacker, her 
experience. As if we were staring at a point in an impressionist painting and we see 
only a stain of colour, but then moving back of a few steps we can see the entire 
picture. Or else, we could imagine staring at the same frame forever without ever 
being able to watch the film.  
 
Not by chance the reader stops experiencing cyberspace in Gibson’s Sprawl Trilogy 
when Bobby, Angie and the Finn become ghosts: they have lost the dimension of 
time typical of humans and become part of the space of information. Since they 
become ‘virtually’ immortal they are actually outside the human body.  
 
Since movement corresponds to action - as opposed to immobile contemplation - the 
observer in cyberpunk can only be mobile. The character in Gibson never stops to 
think about her world, in glaring contrast to Stephenson’s lengthy explanations about 
Enki and the Metavirus in Snow Crash. Being a humanist and a rationalist, 
Stephenson believes in the moment of contemplation and reflection over reality. But 
                                                          
435 Hayles, p. 38. 
436 Ibid., p. 38. Aristotle says that the verb ‘is a composite significant sound 
involving the idea of time’ Aristotle, Poetics. The character is the subject of a verb 
and for this very reason, she lives in time.  
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besides these moments of rationalization, even Snow Crash is packed with action.  
 
Aristotle had after all already considered the character as synonymous with action:   
 
Tragedy is essentially an imitation not of persons but of action and life, of 
happiness and misery. All human happiness or misery takes the form of 
action; the end for which we live is a certain kind of activity, not a quality. 
Character gives us qualities, but it is in our actions – what we do – that we 
are happy or the reverse. In a play accordingly they do not act in order to 
portray the Characters; they include the Characters for the sake of the action. 
So that it is action in it, i.e. its Fable or Plot, that is the end and purpose of the 
tragedy; and the end is everywhere the chief thing.’437  
 
This seems a good description not only of tragedy but of the cyberpunk narrative as 
well, where the plots (varying according to the number of povs) need agents more 
than characters.438 The effect of catharsis relies not only on the identification with 
the characters but also with the characters doing something tragic or violent.  
 
In the point of view à la Gibson, however, the space of the eyes is quite thick: for the 
hacker cyberspace means first of all detachment. Watching with one’s eyes does not 
mean to be really involved: it means just to be a pair of eyes. Consequent to this 
attitude is the distinction between information and knowledge that we have already 
observed: the hacker wants to know but not experience in the physical sense, thus 
not building knowledge but acquiring data. 
 
In Gibson cyberspace is reality, so much so that his characters can lose their bodies 
and live in it. As a narrative space, the individual reader is lost in the illusion and 
simulation of the character, not even aware of the loss of referentiality that Stara 
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talks about. The illusion of the art of writing disappears and takes the place of 
reality. The Metaverse, on the contrary, is more rational, it shows the cogs and it is 
closer to what our present reality has proven cyberspace would be. Naming his 
character Hiro Protagonist, Stephenson reveals Hiro is more a narrative function than 
an accomplished individual, thus unmasking the fictional dimension of cyberspace. 
His characters are revealed as flat (Forster), just made of pure actions, they are never 
reality, always referential. They may be arbitrary in their ‘real’ world and act and fail 
accordingly, but when they are in the Metaverse they are non-arbitrary and follow 
strict narrative rules. 
 
Stephenson’s characters in fact do not become ghosts but have avatars, fictional 
selves/personalities to display in the Metaverse. In complete opposition to the 
narrator in Fight Club, they are aware of this split and, following Cixous, they are 
aware they are wearing a mask in a fictional world. The avatar is a symbolic 
representation, which allows the user to represent herself the way she wants to be 
seen. Through the avatar, the user enters a narrative and it is conscious of it in the 
same way as the reader realizes it. The user already knows she is a character in a 
narrative fiction.  
 
The metavirus that invades both reality and the Metaverse, which at first glance 
could make one think that indeed reality and the Metaverse are both real, is actually 
evidence of the danger of the narrative of cyberspace. Stephenson tries to give a 
pseudo-scientific reason for the effect the virus has on the hackers while in the 
Metaverse. Spending a lot of time looking at binary codes, Hiro and the others have 
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formed neurolinguistic pathways in their brains439, which make them vulnerable to a 
virus appearing in bitmap format. The technical reality of the Metaverse allows the 
virus to have an effect both in reality and in the Metaverse. Attacking the deep 
structures of the brain, the virus dismantles the logos of the individual making of her 
a zombie or robot that can be easily controlled: in other words, the virus strips man 
of his individuality and makes of it an empty mask, a void persona. 
 
The virus works like a meme, that is, ‘a unit of cultural transmission, or a unit of 
imitation.’440 This unit is essentially a piece of information that moves from brain to 
brain like a virus. In the tradition of Dawkins, the virus is strictly connected to 
religion, in this case by L. Bob Rife:  
 
All people have religions. It’s like we have religion receptors built into our 
brain cells, or something, and we’ll latch onto anything that’ll fill that niche 
for us. Now, religion used to be essentially viral – a piece of information that 
replicated inside the human mind, jumping from one person to the next. 
That’s the way it used to be, and unfortunately, that’s the way it’s headed 
right now.441  
 
Religion simply relates to some deep structure in the human brain, very similar, it 
could be suggested, to the space where desire lies and where a mediator is needed.  
 
The virus destroys the individual metaphor machines and turns individuals into flat 
characters following simple orders. It is transcendental because it deprives the 
individual of the mechanism (the metaphor machine in the brain) thanks to which 
she is aware and can make sense of the world around her. The virus destroys this 
                                                          
439 Stephenson, p. 117. 
440 Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, first 
edition 1976, p. 191. 
441 Neal Stephenson, pp. 187-188. 
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need for immanence, of one’s conscious presence into the world. 
 
The transcendental dimension of the virus then legitimizes its connection to religion. 
In Snow Crash, the metavirus is presented in the novel as ‘an informational entity’442 
or disease as the representation of evil443, which is evil only insofar as it attacks 
humans at a level beyond that of their consciousness or individuality. Ideas of 
religion, meme and information are at the base of the divinity of the Loa in Gibson’s 
Sprawl Trilogy. Gods and religions are basic forms of the transcendental powers of 
the metaphor machine of the human brain to deal with reality, and, because of their 
powerful ancestry, they work beyond immanent individuality. The mediator in 
Ballard or even the writer in Cixous has a very similar power: control over the 
individual’s metaphor machine. 
 
Stephenson however presents the metavirus as the pillar of civilization and as an 
essential component of life: ‘The metavirus is everywhere. Anywhere life exists, the 
metavirus is there, too, propagating through it.’444 Both Lyotard and Stephenson see 
man as a system for the assimilation of information so it is only natural that the 
metavirus is part of life, but it is also an antagonist of language and logos, of 
humanism intended as the belief in human reason. No matter how much human 
reason is developed a meme or virus will always affect deep parts of the brain. The 
basic metaphor of the metavirus defeats more complex metaphors such as 
individuality or the idea of the self, in the same way as a single metaphor can destroy 
an entire allegory. The metavirus can reproduce itself because it is a very basic form 
                                                          
442 Ibid., p. 371. 
443 Ibid., p. 118: ‘You know, to the Mesopotamians, there was no independent 
concept of evil. Just disease and ill health. Evil was a synonym for disease.’ 
444 Ibid., p. 378. 
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of information, 0/1 whereas a complex individual metaphor machine is virtually 
impossible to replicate and, for this reason, it is so much more fragile.  
 
The Sumerians as described by Stephenson are very similar to Gibson’s characters 
but whereas the latter are only points of view, eyes, the Sumerians were merely ears:  
 
“The Sumerian word for ‘mind,’ or ‘wisdom,’ is identical to the word for 
‘ear’. That’s all those people were: ears with bodies attached. Passive 
receivers of information. But Enki was different. Enki was an en who just 
happened to be especially good at his job. He had the unusual ability to write 
new me - he was a hacker. He was, actually, the first modern man, a fully 
conscious human being, just like us.”445 
 
Enki is the hacker, the manipulator of codes, as Hayles (who is however still 
referring to Gibson’s novels) explains. Following Derrida, Hayles announces not 
merely the narrator’s passage from speaker to scribe, but also, going further than 
Derrida, the advent of the cyborg ‘authorized to access the relevant codes.’446 The 
narrator then becomes ‘a keyboarder, a hacker, a manipulator of codes.’447 This 
means the passage for the writer/narrator from a moment of unconscious writing to a 
moment of awareness of her tools.  
 
Whereas Gibson’s characters create unconsciously by being observers, Stephenson’s 
hackers are explicitly the makers of the Metaverse, and there are no divine entities in 
charge. Hiro has created for instance the sword-fighting program that runs in the 
Metaverse.448 In another example, Hiro needs something to deal with the scroll 
containing the metavirus. For this reason, he creates the tool he needs from nothing, 
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446 Hayles, p. 43. 
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448 Stephenson, p. 95. 
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data:  
 
It’s not easy working with a piece of data that can kill you. But that’s okay. 
In Reality, people work with dangerous substances all the time – radioactive 
isotopes and toxic chemicals. You just have to have the right tools: remote 
manipulator arms, gloves, goggles, leaded glass. And in Flatland449, when 
you need a tool, you just sit down and write it. So Hiro starts by writing a few 
simple programs that enable him to manipulate the contents of the scroll 
without ever seeing it.450  
 
It has to be understood that Hiro has no real authority over the metaverse. The 
metaverse remains a collective space without ownership: it is a shared narrative 
space. What Hiro is fighting against is a dominating narrative that flattens all the 
other individual narratives. 
 
According to the definition of information suggested by Claude Shannon as quoted 
by Hayles, it relies not on meaning but on pattern: ‘Shannon’s theory defines 
information as a probability function with no dimensions, no materiality, and no 
necessary connection with meaning. It is a pattern, not a presence.’451 As already 
partially observed, information is pure form without content or without a body.  
 
This premise leads to an understanding of the Loa as the epitome of the Gibsonian 
character: they really have no body and no referentiality452, literally, they do not 
exist if not in the matrix and, consequently, they have no powers outside the matrix: 
they are a purely fictional - and thus transcendental - entity. They are meaningless 
                                                          
449 Once again, the metaverse is only a space of two dimensions (not only it has no 
time in itself, but not even depth). 
450 Stephenson, p. 329. 
451 Hayles, p. 18 
452 One cannot consider being a Loa as a reference to reality, but they certainly use a 
symbolic form of referentiality, they need symbols to inhabit. 
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because they are not the product of an individual metaphor machine, they are not 
there to explain anything, like old myths used to do. 
 
The Loa choose to identify themselves with the gods from Voodoo merely in order 
to interact with humans: to communicate with humans they have to speak through 
metaphors or become characters in a fiction. Flat as they are they do not even really 
have the functions of ancient gods according to which Neptune stands for the sea, 
Apollo for the sun, etc. The Loa cannot be ‘Hiro’es or ‘Protagonists’ because a hero 
has to have immanent agency, agency beyond fiction. 
 
For a theory of the character in cyberpunk, we need to consider a concept very close 
to that of Hayles’s ‘pattern’, that is, the concept of universality. Universality is an 
important feature of the character. If a character is too real a reader can never 
identify with it, because we are never exactly as another person, we never share the 
same dreams or feelings. A reader gets attached to a few features of the character but 
if she finds too many aspects she does not share she will not be able to feel for the 
character. A character is more universal than a ‘real person’ for the very reason that 
it belongs to a tradition or a historical culture, it follows narrative-cultural laws that 
the reader understands. Stara points out that Aristotle believed characters are 
representatives of a culture, to which they belong453: Aristotle speaks in favour of the 
defeat of any referentialism.454  
 
The same of course can be said of people because if it is possible to read a person 
                                                          
453 Arrigo Stara, L’Avventura del Personaggio, Firenze: Le Monnier, 2004, pp. 52-
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454 Ibid., p. 54. 
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through her body language, for instance, this means that they are surface, like 
characters in a book, that they are maybe too transparent. Their gestures or their 
patterns reveal their inner life too, their subconscious and their past. The way a 
person speaks can tell a lot about where they were born, the cultural environment 
they grew up into, etc. A person, then, is a superficial space that takes life through 
narration, the intervention of time and depth. We recognize that a person is sad 
because we have already seen sadness on a person’s face in the past. One of the main 
concepts in Milan Kundera’s Immortality (1990) is based on a gesture transferred 
from mother to daughter as a pervasive meme.  
 
When we consider a person as superficial or shallow it is because we recognize too 
easily the clichés and patterns455, which make that person. When the combination of 
patterns does not leave room for any form of randomness or new information, the 
person becomes pure white noise: this is the difference between the transparency of a 
flat character and the opaqueness of a round character or, better, of a character of 
which we ignore the internal nature. 
 
In the same way as the reader can identify with the character if she can recognize 
part of her or her experiences in the fictional person, so we get closer to people, who 
we have shared experience with, or a sort of ‘sympathy’, that is, sharing feelings 
together with another person.  If I insist so much on the parallel between a ‘real’ 
person and a fictional one, it is to underline how easy it can be to identify with a 
character even when such a character is as transcendental as Gibson’s characters. 
 
                                                          
455 From this perspective cliché and pattern can actually be considered as 
synonymous. 
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So the simpler the set of patterns representing a character, the more abstract or 
transcendental, the easier it is for the reader to identify herself with it. A point of 
view is the perfect place for the reader to actually live through the eyes of the 
character without any consciousness: an observer does not have an opinion and does 
not follow particular patterns.  
 
Stara analyses Plato’s Ion, in which the main character loses his individuality in the 
mimesis of epic. Plato believes in the ‘principium individuationem’ according to 
which individuality has to be protected no matter the cost.456 Ion loses himself 
exactly in the violent actions of the characters he identifies with. Plato fears fiction 
because it deprives the individual of her individuality: the more violent the actions of 
a character are the more the viewer is destined to succumb and lose herself, in 
opposition to Aristotle’s later theorisation of catharsis. Is the power of the point of 
view, the metaphor that sees the reader in the place of the character, so powerful 
even when the mimetic nature of the character is limited and it is nothing but a 
function? 
 
When a character is only a point of view we risk losing the possibility of 
interpretation of the text, the necessary detachment the reader has to have to deal 
with the matters at hand, in order to recognize her desires, understand them and 
question them. Again with Cixous, this is fiction that would insinuate itself as the 
true reality,’457 where the character replaces the individual, who is reading about the 
character. This is why it is important to appreciate the task Stephenson has imposed 
upon himself: he pushes the reader to interpret by breaking the metaphor and inviting 
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the reader to think with long excursus. A pattern should be recognized as a pattern, 
after all, in order for to extrapolate information or even learn from it.   
 
Hayles offers an example of a character, which is a pattern in Neuromancer in Dixie 
Flatline: ‘Dixie Flatline, a cowboy who encountered something in cyberspace that 
flattened his EEG, ceased to exist as a physical body and lives now as a personality 
construct within the computer, defined by the magnetic patterns that store his 
identity.’458 Dixie Flatline is literally a series of patterns: he cannot grow or change 
his personality: he can only follow the pattern of the person, who used to be him, 
with his recognizable style. Information itself is the only content for the form of 
patterns called ‘Dixie Flatline.’  
 
As Wintermute underlines, predictability is what distinguishes the Flatline from 
humans: 
 
‘You guys,’ The Finn said, ‘you’re a pain. The Flatline here, if you were all 
like him, it would be real simple. He’s a construct, just a buncha ROM, so he 
always does what I expect him to. My projections said there wasn’t much 
chance of Molly wandering in on Ashpool’s big exit scene, give you one 
example.’ He sighed.459  
 
It is a certain level of randomness that characterizes human beings, the impossibility 
of ever predicting an exact human behaviour because of the complex mix of patterns. 
This is the opacity Stara observes but also the subject according to Cixous. 
 
Dixie also shows us what happens when the pattern is not incarnated in a body. I will 
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content myself with reminding us here of how disturbing it is for Case to hear the 
Flatline laughing in cyberspace: laughter, as Good Old Neon taught us, is something 
that makes us human, but a laughing pattern is the most inhuman sound one can 
hear: ‘The Flatline laughed. “Wish you weren’t so damn jolly today, man. That laugh 
of yours sort of gets me in the spine.”’460 Or another earlier example: ‘When the 
construct laughed, It came through as something else, not laughter, but a stab of cold 
down Case’s spine.’461 This represents a contradiction in Case’s refusal of the body: 
if Case prefers cyberspace over the body, why is he so disturbed by someone who is 
actually a part of it? Is he not horrified by something inhuman that acts like a 
human? 
 
If the individual is so close to the character what is the role of the writer and author? 
Where is the place of authority between the individual and the character? Who is 
responsible for violence: the character, the writer or the individual/reader? 
 
In the Ion, Socrates describes the poet as possessed by the gods when producing 
poetry. The term Plato uses is actually ‘inspiration’: ‘there is a divinity moving you, 
like that contained in the stone which Euripides calls a magnet.’462 The poet actually 
looks more like a prophet than an artist: ‘For the poet is a light and winged and holy 
thing, and there is no invention in him until he has been inspired and is out of his 
senses, and the mind is no longer in him: when he has not attained to this state, he is 
powerless and is unable to utter his oracles.’463 The poet is such only when she is 
possessed and transcends, ‘light’, ‘winged’ and ‘holy’. In this state, however, the 
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poet loses herself: she loses control of herself and the control of her mind. The poet 
becomes merely a vehicle, a tool, just like Angie is a tool for the Loa:  
 
God takes away the mind of the poets, and uses them as his ministers, as he 
also uses divines and holy prophets, in order that we who hear them may 
know them to be speaking not of themselves who utter these priceless words 
in a state of unconsciousness, but that God himself is the speaker, and that 
through them he is conversing with us.464  
 
Cixous rejects this idea of the possession of the poet when she affirms that the poet 
is the master.465   
 
A simple, Platonic conclusion would be that poets, characters, and all the possessed 
are empty vessels for ideas or information. For this to be possible, we should 
imagine a transcendental place made of thoughts and information, a place where 
godlike entities - made of information or born out of the imagination of man - can 
live. Cyberspace is exactly this place, an imaginary place, which speaks through the 
mind of the possessed.  
 
However, I do not believe that this hypothetical space exists or is more important 
than reality because in that case, it would not be the place of imagination anymore. It 
seems to me that this is more a place of deresponsibilization or of the abandonment 
of an ethical life. A place of no agency, which is the place where the Loa are gods, 
would be a place without movement; and without movement we would have only a 
surface without an observer. For this reason, to a character-without-agency has to 
correspond an agent, and to a passive character has also to correspond an active one.  
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If this does not happen metaphor is really ultimately a synonymous for death. Death 
is the place where violence cannot happen, but it is also the place where the human is 
violated and annihilated. 
 
This space of Death of the individual metaphor is where we have lost our will-to-say 
and will-to-listen. For this reason, in an ethics of extreme solipsism this is also the 
place where we forget about the Other. This conception of the posthuman present in 
the work of William Gibson is completely different from that of Rosi Braidotti. As if 
writing against the Gibsonian posthuman, Braidotti writes: ‘The emphasis on 
immanence allows us to respect the bond of mutual dependence between bodies and 
technological others, while avoiding the contempt for the flesh and the trans-
humanist fantasy of escape from the finite materiality of the enfleshed self.’466 The 
escape from the limitations of the body, which in Gibson translate as the suffering of 
the body and in Lyotard as in the temporary dimension of the human body, is 
ultimately a fantasy, that is a fiction that instead of looking for a place where the 
human body and technology co-exist, abandon the former instead in order to lose 
themselves in the latter. 
 
To the complete deresponsibilisation of the character in cyberpunk, where the 
character does not want to feel anymore, Braidotti opposes a posthuman whose 
subjectivity is a process of self-creation: ‘Subjectivity is rather a process of auto-
poiesis or self-styling, which involves complex and continuous negotiations with 
dominant norms and values and hence also multiple forms of accountability.’467 In a 
similar way to Cixous according to which the individual is a multitude of egos, 
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Braidotti envisages an individual who is responsible in every form she takes, because 
every mask she takes is the product of her own personal metaphor machine. There is 
no Law of Fiction that should take over the posthuman individual.  
 
The Witness and the Problem of Authority 
 
In order to try and give a new and extended answer to the Lyotard question about the 
witness I will now connect the witness with the narrative of the pov in Gibson. As 
we have seen in McCarthy, the witness is the only source of the event: without a 
witness one cannot tell if an event has really happened. The pov of the character in 
Neuromancer is the only testimony we have of the events in the novel. The writer 
controls the reader through the character thus creating a reality more real than the 
real (Cixous), in which the reader gets lost and forgets she is reading a work of 
fiction. To examine this question of the character as witness I will take, once again, 
the work of Giorgio Agamben. 
 
In Quel che resta di Auschwitz, Agamben posits the question of the witness in the 
infamous Polish concentration camp. The presence of the witness in an extreme 
situation is well apt to describe the situation in the dystopia that is described in 
cyberpunk novels. Agamben states that subjectivity (and especially that of the 
witness, who is a survivor too) originates from shame and repulsion towards oneself. 
Starting with Levinas’ ideas on shame, Agamben comments that shame is based on 
the ‘the impossibility of our being to desolidarize from oneself, on its absolute 
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incapacity to break with one self,’468 that is, an impossibility not to be with oneself 
and to escape one’s own objectification. One cannot subtract oneself to the eye of the 
Other in the same way as one cannot escape the pain of the body. Shame is the 
individual as both subject and subjected, active and passive. 
 
Similar to shame are disgust and repulsion towards oneself that is, following 
Benjamin via Agamben, ‘the fear of being recognized by what disgusts us.469 Case in 
Neuromancer is disgusted by the meat of his own body, by his very biological life, 
by the needs of the meat. He feels so ashamed that he takes on suicidal actions and 
contracts in the hope of getting rid of the very presence of his body.  
 
Molly is able somehow to escape the presence of her body when she works as a meat 
puppet. In Gibson’s world, the separation between the body and the mind is so total 
that thanks to the implantation of a ‘cut-out chip,’470 a prostitute can dissociate 
herself from her body while she is with a client. With different software available, a 
client can choose any perversion he can think of and the girl will be mostly unaware. 
She can witness from far away and in pure passivity the events of which her body is 
protagonist. In pure passivity, she has only flashes of memories of what happens 
when she is ‘out’. This situation puts the problem of shame on stand-by but it also 
entails an instrumentation of the body, a refusal of whatever happens to it, provided 
Molly’s conscience has no memory of it. The ‘cut-out chip’ does nothing but 
physically disembody her so that her body becomes ‘the body’, which can be easily 
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used for different performances. When her employers find out that Molly is buying 
prosthesis to make her body a weapon with the money they pay her they offer her for 
more and more peculiar services until one time she wakes up fully conscious with a 
client, both of them full of blood and a dead girl between them. As Molly describes 
it, the situation is similar to cyberspace or of simstim, where you have the point of 
view (Hayles’ pov) of a body, which you do not feel as your own: ‘“I wasn’t 
conscious. It’s like cyberspace, but blank. Silver. It smells like rain … You can see 
yourself orgasm, it’s like a little nova right out on the rim of space. But I was starting 
to remember. Like dreams, you know.”’471  
 
In cyberspace a hacker is unconscious like a meat puppet, as she experiences it as a 
mere pov in the same way as Bateman in American Psycho and the Ballardian man 
experience life as a film through the lenses of a camera. Seeing oneself orgasm could 
bring shame but it does not happen because shame belongs to consciousness and the 
self, whereas the point of view is like the shifters linguists talk about. Agamben 
explains that shifters are words such as the pronominal pronouns ‘I’, ‘you’,  or the 
adverbs ‘here’, ‘now’, etc. who are used by different people as I can say ‘I’ but the 
person close to me can say ‘I’ too: the referent shifts. Like the hacker’s pov, the 
shifters do not have in fact any real referent: ‘Common characteristics of these signs 
is that they do not possess, like other words, a lexical meaning, defined in real terms, 
but they can identify a sense for themselves only through a reference to the instance 
of discourse containing them.’472  
                                                          
471 Ibid., pp. 177-178. Italics in the original. 
472 Carattere comune di tutti questi segni è che essi non possiedono, come le altre 
parole, un significato lessicale, definibile in termini reali, ma possono identificare il 
loro senso solo attraverso un rimando all’istanza di discorso che li contiene.’ 
Agamben, Quel che resta di Auschwitz, p. 107. 
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Whenever I use a shifter, I enter language and somehow exit reality: ‘the 
psycosomatic individual has to integrally abolish herself and desubjectify herself as 
real individual in order to become the subject of the enunciation and identify herself 
with the pure shifter ‘I’, absolutely deprived of any substance or any content but the 
mere refence to the instance of discourse.’473 Without content, the individual has lost 
her ‘soma’, her body, and whatever she will say will be part of the discourse and not 
of reality. Becoming the subject of the sentence the individual is subjected and 
desubjected by language.  
 
What I call the transcendental gesture of the hacker, the flipping into cyberspace, has 
a very similar connotation: the subject is not a subject but a character, a point of 
view, the moment she enters the narrative space that is cyberspace. It has been 
remarked how Gibson and Stephenson have anticipated the internet and other trends 
of information technologies, but it is important not to forget that cyberspace is 
essentially a narrative space, an instance of discourse and, for this reason, it follows 
linguistic rules. Once the hacker flips into cyberspace it is faced with the 
impossibility of actually saying474 because it is now the witness of a purely linguistic 
moment. For this very reason, the hacker has lost agency the moment she flips and 
loses her body. 
                                                          
473 ‘L’individuo psicosomatico deve integralmente abolirsi e desoggettivarsi in 
quanto individuo reale per diventare il soggetto dell’enunciazione e identificarsi nel 
puro shifter “io”, assolutamente privo di ogni sostanzialità e di ogni contenuto che 
non sia il mero riferimento all’istanza di discorso.’ Ibid., p. 108. 
474 ‘The subject of the enunciation consists wholly in the discourse and of the 
discourse, but for this very reason, in it she cannot say anything, she cannot talk.’ ‘Il 
soggetto dell’enunciazione consiste integralmente nel discorso e del discorso, ma, 
proprio per questo, in esso, non può dire nulla, non può parlare.’ Agamben, Quel che 
resta di Auschwitz, p. 108. 
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In such a condition it is difficult to feel violence as violence explodes only with 
consciousness, and with that comes also the shame and disgust for what one has been 
part of:  
 
‘I came up. I was into this routine with a customer…’ She dug her fingers 
deep in the foam. ‘Senator, he was. Knew his fat face right away. She was all 
…’ She tugged at the temperfoam. “Dead. And that fat prick, he was saying, 
“What’s wrong. What’s wrong?” ‘Cause we weren’t finished yet…’  
She began to shake.475 
 
Molly then kills the senator as violence is her ethical and conscious response to 
violence. No pov kills because killing and being hurt in cyberpunk is always a 
response of the body in connection with the mind: consciousness is the result of 
shame, because shame is made of the mind’s awareness of the body.   
 
The writer lives a similar situation of activity/passivity, 
subjectification/desubjectification. Agamben quotes the letter Keats writes to John 
Woodhouse on the 27th October 1818. In this letter Keats argues that the poet has no 
identity because, as Ion, he always inhabits someone else’s body: the poet ‘has no 
identity - he’s constantly in place of - and occupying some other body.’ 476 To be 
more correct it should be said that the writer stands for someone else, as if she were 
that person, in a metaphorical stance that even here loses one term, the writer herself, 
who goes missing in the body she is speaking from.  
 
The place of writing is the place of absolute deresponsibilization because ‘not one 
                                                          
475 Gibson, Neuromancer, p. 178. 
476 il poeta ‘non ha identità – è continuamente in luogo di – e riempiendo qualche 
altro corpo’ Giorgio Agamben, Quel che resta di Auschwitz, p. 104. 
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word,’ writes Keats, that I pronounce can be taken with certainty as an opinion 
coming from my identical nature - and how could it, since I do not have a nature?’ 
477 If the writer is someone else when she writes, there is no way we can accuse her 
of anything. If that is true, not only the writer as the ghost in Gibson and the 
Sumerian in Stephenson have no ethical life, but to reach this level the writer, the 
ghost and the Sumerian have to act violently towards themselves, annihilate their 
own selves: that is the price to pay for transcendence.  
 
Who is the witness then, the observer, the pov and how can it reconcile with the 
survival of the logos hoped by Lyotard? How can we trust the writer? After all, she 
is the only witness of the worlds she creates through the character. According to 
Agamben, there is no real subject of testimony but more of a field of forces: ‘Every 
testimony is a process or a field of forces constantly crossed by subjectification and 
desubjectification. 478 This is the same multitude of egos of Cixous and the constant 
process of auto-poiesis of Braidotti.  
 
Even when the writer writes about reality she cannot do it entirely, because in 
writing she has entered a narrative, a space of possibilities and disembodiment, of 
the impossibility of responsibility and the place where authority is in doubt. In the 
non-authority of the writer maybe lies the possibility for us to choose if we want to 
believe or not. When we start to read and we start to interpret the fictional world and 
compare it with our world, without the writer literally doing it, we start to share her 
                                                          
477 ‘Non una sola parola che io pronuncio può essere presa con certezza come 
un’opinione che nasce dalla mia identica natura – e come potrebbe, dal momento che 
io non ho una natura?’ Ibid., p. 105. 
478 ‘Ogni testimonianza è un processo o un campo di forse incessantemente percorso 
da correnti di soggettivazione e di desoggettivazione.’ Ibid., p. 112. 
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authority. Under such authority, we readers take on our shoulders the ethical 
ramifications of the violence present in fiction because it is our own violence. There 
are books that simply dwell in the violence inside us; others wake us to it and give us 
a chance to witness our own violent inner life. Disembodied, we do not recognize 
ourselves in the violence of the narrative, we find ourselves with nothing to say, pure 
points of view. But the witness is a balance of forces that needs the body, the non-
narrative instance to mature a reflection and an ethical stance towards violence. The 
witness of narrative is a balance between writer, character and reader that disembody 
and re-embody themselves constantly, as the character is exactly the metaphor that 
can save and damn us, the metaphor that gives us another body at least for the time 
of the narrative and tells us of the possibilities of the future. Cyberpunk is the place 
where the future is lost and there is nothing to witness, no will-to-say the event. 
 
The Fictional Posthuman, the Ethics of the Character as Author 
 
 I would like to conclude this chapter with a brief analysis of what happens when a 
character undertakes an ethical journey towards life: that is, a character who escapes 
the dynamics of writer and reader, of the witness and becomes the event itself, it 
becomes a subject. The protagonist of Dantec’s Cosmos Incorporated, Plotkine is a 
character that becomes the writer of his own life, taking full authority of it, and then 
he becomes a man, and loses that authority and dies. 
 
The posthuman as auto-poiesis is a man who has taken full narrative control not only 
over his mental and political life, but also over his biological life. For this reason, he 
modifies his own body with science-fictional prostheses but also with tools that are 
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nowadays common: glasses are posthuman prostheses that allow seeing when one 
cannot; a hard drive is a place where we can transfer our memories; a car is a 
prosthesis for movement479, etc. The posthuman can modify herself according to 
what her imagination suggests and the resources of technology.  
 
Narrative control, in fact, means that the posthuman can make a myth of herself, 
modify her persona and her personality, become a character of her own fiction: in 
other words, she can choose her masks. This is the question of the posthuman in the 
end: the narrative possibilities of reality, the possibility of becoming the writer of 
one’s own life. The posthuman has the fictional power of modifying her own life, 
victim and executioner of her own life: it can violate the human as never before. But 
what is the stance of the posthuman as creator of her own fiction, that is, of the 
individual created by every one of us through our personal metaphor machine, what 
is the relation of this entity to ethics? 
 
To answer this question I deem useful to take the case of the character Serguei 
Plotkine, protagonist of Cosmos Incorporated. Plotkine is a post-human killer living 
in a society dominated by machines where even the human body is constituted by 
machines and men are the ‘simple “biological” operators of the world-machine.’480 
In other words, it is a world where cyberspace and reality have coagulated in one 
world, where all metaphors are real: ‘Plotkine is going to realize soon enough that 
there aren’t any metaphors here, or better, that they have taken shape into the 
                                                          
479 We have already observed the car as posthuman prosthesis in Ballard’s Crash. 
480 ‘Simples opérateurs “biologiques” du monde-machine.’ Dantec, Cosmos 
Incorporated, p. 273. 
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world.’481 Plotkine does not flip into cyberspace as cyberspace is everywhere; at 
most, he speaks with his cybernetic guardian angel Metatron, a developed AI, which 
is actually derived from the angel Metatron, the Voice of God.  
 
Viviane Velvet McNellis is Plotkine’s creator: she has the fire of Metatron, of the 
word that becomes reality:  
 
And this very fire, manifestation of a Logos, which finds its articulation 
beyond Good and evil, beyond even the Tree of Knowledge because it is its 
eternal guardian in the shape of the whirling sword, this fire allows him to 
create worlds, to write them, to narrate them, to give them life. This fire of 
the Word made Act, this is the same fire that burns, destroys, consumes the 
bringer of this Word.482  
 
The power of creation is beyond knowledge and consciousness or the Logos (beyond 
the limitation of humanism and Lyotard), it cannot be either understood or 
witnessed, and it is not a place for ethics. Such power destroys the creator, the writer, 
who as such starts a process of annihilation of her body. How does Plotkine react to 
such a revelation? 
 
‘I am then a living narration, answered the young woman. 
So you have invented me. I am not really a being made of flesh? I am… a 
simulacrum, like my computer angel.’483 
 
                                                          
481 ‘Plotkine va vite se rendre compte qu’ici il n’y a pas de métaphores ou, plus 
exactement, qu’elles ont pris forme dans le monde.’ Ibid., p. 354. This translation 
and the following from the novel are mine. 
482 ‘Et ce même feu, manifestation d’un Logos qui ne s’articule que par-delà le Bien 
et le Mal, par-delà même l’arbre de la Connaissance car il en est le gardien éternel 
sous la forme de l’épée tournoyante, ce feu lui permet de créer des mondes, de les 
écrire, de les narrer, de leur donner vie. Ce feu de la Parole faite Acte, ce feu est 
aussi ce qui brule, détruit, consume le porteur de cette Parole.’ Ibid., p. 262. 
483 ‘Je suis une narration vivante, répondit la jeune femme. Donc vous m’avez 
inventée. Je ne suis pas vraiment un être de chair ? Je suis… un simulacre, comme 
mon propre ange numérique ? Ibid., p. 299. 
241 
 
His disappointment and sense of loss at being a fiction is answered by what I 
consider one of the most fascinating description of a character: ‘You are a line that 
constantly joins the real and infinity, you’re a paradox, so an impossible truth, but 
compossible with all the others. You have a real physical existence, and yet it has 
never existed.’484 The physical existence of the character is in the reader, who 
identifies with it; it is an impossible truth because the character is a man but is a man 
only on paper, a possibility that meets reality but is never real, a shifter that can be 
inhabited by an infinite number of readers, but still one character with one name. 
 
Plotkine is dangerous as a killer because he is not limited by the rules of reality; his 
own fictionality puts him outside knowledge, logos and ethics. Even more 
dangerously, Plotkine is a character who is already conscious, already a step towards 
humanity, because he is aware of his role of agent of the narrative event: ‘Plotkine 
was the Agent, who put in touch all of these incompossible worlds, he was that 
which happens, the bringer of the event.’485  
 
Plotkine’s antagonist is l’enfant-Machine, who like Angie, is a medium for the 
machines: ‘The child-Machine was never in the middle but on the outskirts, he was 
the interface, hyperlink, a hollow space, he was the media who the machines of the 
world used, machines he had put in a box in order for them to communicate with 
                                                          
484 ‘Vous êtes une ligne qui rejoint constamment le réel à l’infini, vous êtes un 
paradoxe, donc une vérité impossible, mais compossible avec toutes les autres. Vous 
avez une véritable existence physique, et pourtant elle n’a jamais existé.’ Ibid., p. 
300. 
485 ‘Plotkine, il était l’Agent qui mettait en contact tous ces mondes incompossibles, 
il était ce qui advient, le porteur de l’événement, il était plus dangereux encore qu’un 
morceau de chaos tombé sur la terre, se disait-il.’ Ibid., p. 417. 
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each other.’ 486 If Angie was an empty vessel in Gibson in the hands of Dantec her 
passivity is seen as a virus that robs man of his freedom and individuality, of his very 
narrative: ‘The child-Box had to be considered, for this reason, as the dissolving 
agent of all narration.’487  
 
Plotkine, the dangerous fictional character, takes control of his life becoming its poet 
(etymologically the word ‘poet’ derives from poiesis), doubled as subject and object 
of his own life: ‘He wrote at his desk, in room 108 of the Laika hotel, but at the same 
time his other ‘I’, become an ‘I’ other, actualized the narration in the Created 
World.’488 The shifter ‘je’ coagulates both writer and character in the balance of 
subjectification and desubjectification of the witness. 
 
Plotkine becomes a man the moment he dies,489 because the possibility of really 
dying in a body, escaping the immortality of fiction is the greatest price for Plotkine 
in entering an ethical, ‘radical immanence.’ When he loses the power of the fictional 
character in the weak state of a normal man, that he knows he is powerless and alive 
in front of the killers waiting for him: ‘He wasn’t but a normal man now. He had 
strictly no chance whatsoever.’490 
 
                                                          
486 ‘L’enfant-Machine ne se tenait pas au centre mais à la périphérie, il était 
interface, hyperlien, il était un espace en creux, il était le media dont se servaient les 
machines du monde qu’il avait mises en boite pour communiquer entre elles.’ Ibid., 
p. 412. 
487 ‘L’enfant-Boite devait, pour cette raison, être considéré comme l’agent dissolutif 
de toute narration.’ Ibid., p. 417. 
488 ‘Il écrivait sur son bureau, dans la chambre 108 de l’hotel Laika, mais dans le 
même temps son autre « je », devenu un « je » autre, actualisait simultanément la 
narration dans le Monde Créé.’ Ibid., p. 442. 
489 Ibid., p. 536. 
490 ‘Il n’était plus qu’un homme normal maintenant. Il n’avait strictement aucune 
chance.’ Ibid., p. 536. 
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In death he can make his Voice heard, his will to live is his will-to-say his humanity. 
To quote Agamben again: ‘the voice is death which preserves and remembers the 
living as dead and, at the same time, immediately traces and memory of death, pure 
negativity.’491 The event Plotkine witnesses is his own death and only from death, 
like Neon in Wallace’s story, can he be human. Becoming a subject he loses control 
over his narrative because in every narrative one loses oneself in language. However, 
with his death, with the Voice which is the starting point of the articulated voice, 
which is conscience, he becomes posthuman in the sense Braidotti gives it as ‘radical 
immanence,’ in complete opposition to the transcendental transhuman of traditional 
cyberpunk.  
 
Plotkine’s example illustrates a path inverse to that undertaken by Gibson’s 
characters. If Count Zero undertakes a journey from immanence to transcendence, 
from man to character, Plotkine moves from transcendence to immanence. Whereas 
death for Count Zero equals the possible eternity in a fictional space as a ghost, for 
Plotkine it is synonymous with reality. An ethical choice is made only when there is 
the possibility of death, in immanence. The final violence Plotkine suffers reveals 
pain as the fundamental aspect of being human, in a parallel with the characters in 
Fight Club.  
 
There cannot be a witness of the end of times as Lyotard envisions it without a body 
that can actually die. Lyotard invites us to a paradox, of a character without agency 
lost in a narrative. At the same time, however, the writer can imagine man at the end 
                                                          
491 ‘La voce è morte che conserva e ricorda il vivente come morto e, insieme, 
immediatamente traccia e memoria della morte, negatività pura.’ Agamben, Il 
linguaggio e la morte, p. 59. 
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of times. The writer is the witness of the future, but only if she keeps a body that can 
suffer, if she is subject and object; writer, character and man: this is the only 
authority the writer needs: that of a prophet of the possible. 
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4 Ethics 
4.1 Crisis, Hyperbole and the Ethics of Ecocentrism: The New Epic of Wu Ming 
and China Miéville 
 
The journey undertaken with this research has conducted us more than once to the 
question of the Voice, that inexpressible will-to-say of the individual at the roots of 
her need to communicate to the Other her metaphor machine. It has taken various 
forms and various names: in ‘Good Old Neon’ by David Foster Wallace, ‘what one 
has inside’ is what the narrator fails to convey; somewhere else, in Giorgio Agamben 
it takes the name of infancy, an inability to speak, or better, the birthplace of 
language; in cyberpunk it is the disgust/fear for the body, etc. Wu Ming 1 of the 
Italian collective Wu Ming calls it epic.492 
 
In the title to this dissertation I use the word epic to describe new narrative 
approaches to the problem of ethics. I have however not yet discussed what I intend 
by epic and what its connection with ethics is. In the following chapter I will deal 
with this connection in order to propose a way of intending ethics in fiction beyond 
the posthuman violence that we have discussed so far. To explore the New Italian 
Epic I will apply it to an English author, China Miéville, and his Perdido Street 
Station (2000) in order to show how this contemporary form of epic is not limited to 
                                                          
492 Wu Ming 1, New Italian Epic, “Memorandum 1993-2008”. All of my quotations 
are taken from the published edition (the actual third version of the memorandum 
after a version 2.0 appeared in October 2008 and the first was published online in 
April 2008), and published in 2009 by Einaudi. This last edition contains the 
memorandum, (divided in ‘New Italian Epic’ and ‘Sentimiento Nuevo’) and ‘Noi 
dobbiamo essere I genitori’ by Wu Ming 1 and ‘La salvezza di Euridice,’ by Wu 
Ming 2. If not indicated otherwise, the quotes are from Wu Ming 1’s essay.  
246 
 
the Italian peninsula. I will observe especially three lines of inquiry into the plane of 
epic which correspond to the premise for epic, that is conflict or the line of crisis; the 
style of epic, in the line of hyperbole or excess; and finally in the line of ecocentrism 
I will propose a new form of ethics in balance between transcendence and 
immanence, the individual and the other. 
 
The Problem of Epic and the Individual 
 
Mikhail Bakhtin describes the characteristics of epic as ‘Absolute conclusiveness 
and closedness is the outstanding feature of the temporally valorized epic past.’493 
This past that Bakhtin, following Goethe and Schiller, calls the "absolute past."494 
The past is absolute in the sense that it cannot be changed and is then concluded and 
closed to the present reader or listener: 
 
‘The epic past is called the "absolute past" for good reason: it is both 
monochronic and valorized (hierarchical); it lacks any relativity, that is, any 
gradual, purely temporal progressions that might connect it with the present. 
It is walled off absolutely from all subsequent times, and above all from 
those times in which the singer and his listeners are located. This boundary, 
consequently, is immanent in the form of the epic itself and is felt and heard 
in its every word.’495 
 
The way Bakhtin describes the epic form reminds of the monologisms we have 
already observed in the narratives of Society in Wallace and Ballard, of the Law in 
McCarthy and the one-dimensional narrative of the Superego in Ellis.  All of these 
narratives represent the mythical form of violence described by Benjamin. They are 
                                                          
493 M. M. Bakhtin. The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, Austin, Texas: 
University of Texas, 1981, Kindle Location 470. 
494 Ibid. Kindle Location 425. 
495 Ibid., Kindle Location 462-465. 
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monologic and one-dimensional because they aim to control and overcome the 
individual metaphor machine.  
 
Bakhtin himself individuates the absolute distance between the epic narrative and the 
individual narrative: ‘By its very nature the epic world of the absolute past is 
inaccessible to personal experience and does not permit an individual, personal point 
of view or evaluation.’496 The dominating language of poetry and the past that the 
epic form makes use of is the language that cannot be touched because of this 
distance from the contemporary individual. In the previous pages I have pointed out 
the violence these dominating transcendental narrative have over the individual 
narrative so why am I suggesting the epic form as a solution against the dominating 
narrative? Also, how is it possible to use a form ‘walled’ in the past to describe the 
ethics of contemporary narratives? 
 
To this epic Bakhtin opposes the novel, the narrative of the incomplete present, 
where ‘The novelist is drawn toward everything that is not yet completed.’497  The 
novel is the narrative of the contemporary, still going time in contrast with the epic 
world, which ‘is constructed in the zone of an absolute distanced image, beyond the 
sphere of possible contact with the developing, incomplete and therefore re-thinking 
and re-evaluating present.’498 The novel then destroys the transcendental nature of 
the epic form by obliterating the idea of a time that is immutable.  
 
                                                          
496 Ibid., Kindle Location 473-474. 
497 Ibid., Kindle Location 613. 
498 Ibid., Kindle Location 492-493. 
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Bakhtin argues for a distinction between epic as immutable memory, a fixed image 
in the past and the knowledge that is possible only through direct experience in the 
novel:  
 
In ancient literature it is memory, and not knowledge, that serves as the 
source and power for the creative impulse. That is how it was, it is 
impossible to change it: the tradition of the past is sacred. There is as yet no 
consciousness of the possible relativity of any past. The novel, by contrast, is 
determined by experience, knowledge edge and practice (the future).499 
 
Here we see how this distinction between epic and novel becomes problematic in the 
works I have studied so far: I have argued with Agamben about the devaluation of 
direct experience due to the development of science and the substitution of media 
and other forms of dominating mythic narratives for the experiences and 
interpretations of the individual metaphor machine. In other words, the novel today 
cannot express experience, only facts. The memory of the event depends on the 
narrative of the witness and, as such, memory is always individual without being less 
mythic. The narrative of judge Holden is individual but epic at the same time, 
because it is set in a past that is not McCarthy, but a sort of absolute past, while at 
the same time, it is the narration of a mythic Law of War promulgated by one 
individual of epic stature. The narrative of the kid is not anti-epic, but it is meant to 
break the totality of the eternal past of the Judge and the dominion of the mythic 
narrative.  
 
The epic described by Bakhtin corresponds to the mythic narration then but, as I will 
argue in the next section, it is not the only form of epic available today. Interestingly, 
Bakhtin recognizes the distance between epic and novel in the laughter: ‘It is 
                                                          
499 Ibid., Kindle Location 458-460. 
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precisely laughter that destroys the epic, and in general destroys any hierarchical 
(distancing and valorized) distance. As a distanced image a subject cannot be 
comical; to be made comical, it must be brought close.’500 This is the comical 
laughter that has nothing to do with the irony of the philosopher that we have seen 
with Wallace, Baudelaire and De Man. The philosopher in fact has a distance from 
his contemporaneity and it is only in this distance that he can see himself falling and 
laugh. This is the very distance from the mythic narrative Bakhtin deplores and, for 
this reason, I would consider the epic in Bakhtin and the mythical narrative as one 
and the same. At this point, then, I have distanced myself from the description of 
epic in Bakhtin but I have not yet explained what the epic re-writings of ethics in the 
contemporary novel are.  
 
According to György Lukács, ‘the novel is the epic of an age in which the extensive 
totality of life is no longer directly given, in which the immanence of meaning in life 
has become a problem, yet which still thinks in terms of totality.’501 As well as in 
Bakhtin, epic is a totality for Lukács, something whole that, in the contemporary 
novel, loses its grip on meaning. By totality Lukács means that epic is 
subjectless,’502 thus echoing Bakhtin’s concern.  
 
Lukács however is comparing verse and prose and the relationship in the epic 
narration between the heaviness of tragic verse and the lightness of epic verse. 
Heaviness for Lukács is that of a world where meaning is difficult to grasp, whereas 
                                                          
500 Ibid., Kindle Location 558-560. 
501 György Lukács, The Theory of the Novel: A Historico-philosophical Essay on the 
Forms of Great Epic Literature, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1971, p. 56.  
502 Ibid., p. 58. 
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the epic prose of the novel is lighter because it represents ‘a world henceforth 
immanently radiant with found meaning.’503  
 
Lukács describes this game between heaviness and lightness, immanence and 
transcendence describing Dante’s verse: ‘The immanence of the meaning of life is 
present and existent in Dante’s world, but only in the beyond: it is the perfect 
immanence of the transcendent.’504 It is in his imagined Inferno, the product of his 
metaphor machine, that Dante finds the immanence of the meaning of life. I would 
like to insist on Lukács’ underlining that the meaning of life is immanent, that is, 
translated in the terms of my argument, the metaphor machine is meant to give 
meaning to an immanent, chaotic reality. The distance for Lukács is that of the tragic 
verse, which is too heavy to grasp meaning, too individual almost, because it 
represents the metaphor apparatus of the poet. Instead of looking for the immanence 
of the meaning of life, the lyrical poet shuts himself in his fantasies. Lyric poetry 
‘can create a protean mythology of substantial subjectivity out of the constitutive 
strength of its ignorance.’505 The poet ignores immanent reality and gets lost in his 
own metaphor machine.  
 
Paradoxically, Lukács observes, when the subject ‘dissolves the whole outside world 
in mood,’506 she tends to lose her subjectivity: ‘The desire to know a world cleansed 
of all wanting and all willing transforms the subject into an a-subjective, constructive 
and constructing embodiment of cognitive functions.’507 This means that the 
                                                          
503 Ibid., p. 59. 
504 Ibid., p. 59. 
505 Ibid., p. 63. 
506 Ibid., p. 65. 
507 Ibid.  
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individual surrenders to the mythic narrative of society and of its laws. Only ethics 
can then save the individual: ‘it can only avoid falling prey to laws and moods if the 
arena of its actions, the normative object of its actions, is made of the stuff of pure 
ethics.’508 Only can the ethical life save the individual from falling into the self-
absorption of the personal metaphor machine that has lost interest in finding 
meanings in the immanence of life  on one said and from the de-subjectification 
created by surrendering to the mythical Law.  
 
The epic hero according to Lukács is no individual because ‘when the world is 
internally homogenous, men do not differ qualitatively from one another,’509 which 
is the one-dimensional world of the mythic narrative which we have observed in 
Ballard and Ellis. The autonomous life of the individual is only possible when 
‘incapable of becoming a symbol through deeds and dissolving them in turn into 
symbols.’510 The individual ethical life then is only possible when her actions do not 
become metaphor, that is, when they lose their immanence. In the typical 
monological voice of epic the individual is lost, becomes a Hiro Protagonist or a 
Patrick Bateman.  
 
Epic narrates ‘not a personal destiny but the destiny of a community,’511 and for this 
reason, in such a world, personal responsibility, ethics is impossible: ‘The 
omnipotence of ethics, which posits every soul as autonomous and incomparable, is 
still unknown in such a world.’512 
                                                          
508 Ibid.  
509 Ibid., p. 66. 
510 Ibid.  
511 Ibid.  
512 Ibid.  
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We have found once again ourselves in a description of epic, in which the individual 
and, consequently, ethics are lost. At the same time, however, we should pay 
attention to the movement between the solipsism of Wallace or of the poet against 
the mythic domination of the Law in which the subject has to find a balance or an 
anchor: in both cases in fact the individual loses her personal immanence of the 
meaning of life. The Epic form represents this struggle which is not only a struggle 
for ethics but for individuality itself.  The epic form envisioned by Lukács then, 
leads us to a stronger connection between individual and ethics: ethics is immanent 
(and, consequently, individual) and its purpose is the purpose of the metaphor 
machine: to give meaning to an immanent reality. 
 
In more recent years, Franco Moretti introduces the term ‘modern epic’ to define 
texts like Goethe’s Faust, that is narrative revealing ‘a discrepancy between the 
totalizing will of the epic and the subdivided reality of the modern world.’513 
Compared to the epic in Bakhtin, these works ‘live in history,’514 not in a distant 
past. Following Hegel, Moretti describes the epic hero as no longer about to be 
universal, to stand out as an exceptional individual while at the same time, being a 
representative for humanity: ‘With the coming of the State, in short, individuality 
must no longer give totality a form, but confine itself to obeying it: master its own 
energies, and keep to what is prescribed.’515 The Faust represents then ‘an epic with 
no hero,’516 where the protagonist’s actions are mostly internal: ‘the genuinely epic 
                                                          
513 Franco Moretti, Modern Epic. The World System from Goethe to García 
Márquez, London: Verso, 1996, p. 5. 
514 Ibid. 
515 Ibid., p. 12. 
516 Ibid., p. 17. 
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immensity – the experience allotted to the whole of mankind – of a universe to be 
‘embraced in one’s inner self.’517 This closure into the self sees the hero to be deeply 
rooted in history and her present: ‘The universal hero, in short, as a figure based 
upon the universal dominion of the West.’518 From here, Moretti notices how in 
modern epic ‘history this becomes a gigantic metaphor for geography.’519 This idea 
is in line with Moretti’s concept of world-system: 
 
In world-systems analysis the coordinates change, as the onset of capitalism 
brusquely reduces the many independent spaces needed for the origin of 
species (or of languages) to just three positions: core, periphery, semi-
periphery. The world becomes one, and unequal: one, because capitalism 
constrains production everywhere on the planet; and unequal, because its 
network of exchanges requires, and reinforces, a marked unevenness between 
the three areas.520 
 
Modern epic has to deal with relationships of dominance, where the West is at the 
core and all the rest is either semi-periphery or periphery. The world is no more 
enclosed in the past, in time, but in geography, space. We have seen something 
similar in American Psycho where the sociological synecdoche man represented by 
Bateman is actually a geographical representation of the West.  
 
Moretti is then important for our discourse for two reasons: first because he 
introduces epic works that are not set in a distant, ‘absolute’ past anymore but which 
deal with contemporaneity in a relation with space, not time without, for this reason, 
being less victims of a dominant narrative: in this case that of the West which invests 
all the narratives I have studied: Wallace, McCarthy, Ballard, Ellis.  
                                                          
517 Ibid., p. 17. 
518 Ibid., p. 34. 
519 Ibid., p. 52. 
520 Franco Moretti, Distant Reading, London: Verso, 2013, Kindle Locations 1977-
1981. 
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Secondly, it sees the hero as more of an individual and less of a universal. However, 
in narratives like American Psycho we have seen how this fall of the epic hero does 
not mean that the protagonist of the novel is not less an example, a synecdoche for 
humanity but, on the contrary, it reinforces the fall of individuality tout court. 
 
In conclusion to this short excursus on epic I would like to summarise pointing out 
that epic has always been about the struggle between a totality and the individual for 
the stake of individuality itself. From a dominating narrative, be it a closed past or a 
core geography, the individual’s metaphor machine is always at stake. As noticed by 
Bakhtin, the epic narrative so far has always been monologic, that is, the narrative of 
a dominant metaphor machine, of the mythic Law. As a consequence, there is not 
only no room for the individual narrative but no conception of the Other at all. 
Lukács has suggested the connection between the individual and ethics and as such 
we can argue that without the individual there can be no conception of the Other and, 
as such, the Other will be always at the periphery of the mythic epic of the Law. We 
cannot be satisfied with similar epic forms and in the next sections I will argue that 
Chine Miéville offers a new, more ethical form of epic and I will do this by 
concerning myself with a theory of the epic that finally takes into account the 
importance of the Other. This theory was published in 2009 by Wu Ming 1 under the 
name of New Italian Epic. I will abstract in a way from the Italian component of the 
theory in order to arrive to a more generally theory of contemporary epic as rewriting 
of ethics. 
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The New Epic and the State of Crisis 
 
Epic narratives, Wu Ming 1 explains, are stories of nations, of heroic or mythical 
actions, stories bigger than the individual or at least, with a historical background of 
crisis or change: ‘wars, anabasis, journeys of initiation, fights for survival, always 
inside larger conflicts deciding of the fate of classes, peoples, nations or even the 
entire human race, in the background of historical crisis, catastrophes, collapsing 
social formations.’521 Here Wu Ming 1 stresses the epic dimension of the subject 
matter in something that extends beyond the individual so that we come to a first 
feature of epic: epic is concerned with Man with a capital letter in a historical 
process. Here Wu Ming 1 still follows the tradition of epic, the balance between the 
individual and humanity. 
  
Wu Ming 1’s definition also provides another key that is even more important for 
my discourse because in a way subverts what he has just affirmed: epic deals with 
crisis and chance, which come to be through wars and conflicts, in other words, 
through violence. Crisis is etymologically the dimension of separation and split, 
where the one becomes many, or else, where Man is split into men, where 
individuals cannot be so simply reunited in one single humanity, one single story or 
history. Split, as we have seen, is also the dimension of irony, of the conflict of the 
self with the world through the metaphor machine of the brain, and it is ultimately 
the conflict between transcendence and immanence. Epic then deals with humanity 
                                                          
521 ‘Guerre, anabasi, viaggi iniziatici, lotte per la sopravvivenza, sempre all’interno 
di conflitti più vasti che decidono le sorti di classi, popoli, nazioni o addirittura 
dell’intera umanità, sugli sfondi di crisi storiche, catastrofi, formazioni sociali al 
collasso.’ Wu Ming 1, New Italian Epic, “Memorandum 1993-2008”, Torino: 
Einaudi, 2009, p. 15. 
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in its critical condition of separation and conflict, in a continuous balance (or 
unbalance) between humanity as a whole and the individuals, who constitute it. 
Violence is at the core of the impossibility for humanity to be one. 
 
China Miéville makes crisis theory the pivotal element of his Perdido Street Station. 
Isaac studies a unified energy theory522, which he calls crisis energy and under which 
all the different thaumaturgies,523 that is, the control of the elements, in the novel are 
connected. Crisis energy is set off in the transition from one element to the other: 
‘Transition. The point where one thing becomes another. … The zone where the 
disparate becomes part of the whole.’524 This means that this form of energy is 
generated in the space of the synecdoche, which indeed is a unifying figure of 
speech, but also the place where the part and the whole, the individual and humanity 
enter in conflict. The individual is the example and stands for humanity, the crisis of 
the individual is the crisis of an entire species. 
   
Thus formulated, the question seems less scientific than rhetoric, but as Isaac himself 
is aware, it is mostly a question of philosophy: ‘It’s philosophy.’525 Isaac leaves the 
calculations to the supreme machine, the primordial A.I. or C.I. (Constructed 
Intelligence) in the novel. The machine will never be able to reproduce Isaac’s 
theory because it lacks philosophy, a leap of creativity and imagination. Philosophy, 
Isaac explains, is made of a triangle with at the three points the physical, the social 
and the occult or the mental (that is, everything concerning gods, the spiritual, magic 
                                                          
522 China Miéville, Perdido Street Station, London: Macmillan, 2000, p. 35. 
523 ‘Hexes and charms are mostly the manipulation of theoretical particles – the 
“enchanted particles” – called thaumaturgons.’ Ibid., p. 203. 
524 Miéville, Perdido Street Station, p. 51. 
525 Ibid., p. 202. 
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if we want).526 He then distinguishes two unified theories: one static, the other 
moving:  
 
See, if you think that matter and therefore the unified force under 
investigation are essentially static, then falling, flying, rolling, changing your 
mind, casting a spell, growing older, moving, are basically deviations from 
an essential state. Otherwise, you think that motion is part of the fabric of 
ontology, and the question’s how best to theorize that.527  
 
Isaac is a MUFTI, ‘a Moving Unified Field Theorist,’528 that is, he basis his theory 
on the potential energy of movement. In Blood Meridian, Crash, American Psycho, 
Fight Club we have explored sudden explosions of violence in novels made essential 
of movement, be it along the old Far West, in the motorways, in crazy serial murders 
or in fights and revolutions in postmodern society. These are all novels of crisis, of 
the individual splitting herself from the social Laws after the frustrations that this 
Law forces on their individual metaphor machine. The status quo, the paradoxical 
staticity of liquid society is a problem at the core of all of these novels where 
characters that are apparently completely absorbed by society start shaking the status 
quo with acts of violence that they themselves at times seem not to be aware of. This 
crisis is immanent in the frustration of the individual metaphor machine that 
genetically struggles to make its Voice heard. 
 
If we position a piece of wood ten feet from the floor, it has the potential energy to 
turn into kinetic energy and fall:  
 
See, potential energy’s all about placing something in a situation where it’s 
                                                          
526 Ibid., pp. 203-205. 
527 Ibid., p. 206. 
528 Ibid. 
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teetering, where it’s about to change state. Just like when you put enough 
strain on a group of people, they’ll suddenly explode. They’ll go from 
grumpy and quiescent to violent and creative in one moment. The transition 
from one state to another’s affected by taking something – a social group, a 
piece of wood, a hex – to a place where its interactions with other forces 
make its own energy pull against its current state.529  
 
The sentence above perfectly describes what happens in Millennium People and 
High-rise where Ballard depicts the bored middle class suddenly exploding, only to 
later go back to their status quo. Crisis and potential, the possibility also not to 
(Agamben), are one and the same. When the crisis energy becomes act in fact it 
should by hypothesized, it empties itself and is no energy anymore. When the piece 
of wood falls, it has fallen, it has no more energy left, it is static, probably destroyed 
in the same way as a revolution cannot last forever but it has to settle in a new 
political form. 
  
The problem is that the explosion can be either violent or creative or both. Agamben 
would say that a painter is a painter even if she is not painting. She has the potential 
to be a painter but like Bartleby she can choose not to. According to Isaac, this 
potentiality has an incredible amount of energy, which tipped on the right side can be 
used. This energy is both a division and a transition in the sense that the piece of 
wood is divided between two states and has the potential to pass from one to the 
other. Body, mind and our spiritual dimension are all unbalanced by crisis energy. 
We could also say science, the social and the spiritual/artistic.  
 
What is more revelatory of crisis theory is that philosophically speaking, being is 
naturally in crisis: ‘the point of crisis theory is that things are in crisis just as part of 
                                                          
529 Ibid., pp. 206-207. 
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being.’530 Consequently, man is born in the world in crisis: he is a being in crisis, 
always on the point of being thrown beyond his potentiality. Man is full of the 
possibility both of creativity and violence: it is in his very being. The nature of man 
is a difficult balance between transcendence and immanence where hypothetical and 
thus transcendent energy can only be released in immanence.  
 
Wu Ming 1 also argues that epic does not relate only to the dimensions of the subject 
matter but also to the effort on the part of the writer to create vast narratives:  
 
Epic are the dimensions of the problems to solve in order to write these 
books, task that requires usually years, and even longer when the work is 
destined to transcend measure and limits of the novel-form, such as in the 
case of transmedia narrations, which continue in different contexts.531 
(Emphasis in the original)  
 
Epic is the amount of time it takes for the writer to produce such works, which take 
her important portions of their life. The writer sacrifices time in exchange for the 
production of works that transcend the novel or genre itself, time to cover a large 
amount of space. All the novels analysed so far, except for the works of Ballard, are 
large books, even if not extremely long. ‘Good Old Neon,’ is extremely long 
considering it is a short form.  
 
Sacrifice, exchange and transcendence are terms that need to be analysed. Sacrifice 
is a sacred act, an act (from Lat. facere) or rite that is also devotion, to a god or, in 
our case, a purpose. A sacrifice may have a transcendental, teleological aim but it is 
                                                          
530 Ibid., p. 207. 
531 ‘Sono epiche le dimensioni dei problemi da risolvere per scrivere questi libri, 
compito che di solito richiede diversi anni, e ancora più quando l’opera è destinata a 
trascendere misura e confini della forma-romanzo, come nel caso di narrazioni 
transmediali, che proseguono in diversi contesti.’ Wu Ming 1, p. 15. 
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immanent, connected to life all the same. A priest makes a sacrifice in order to 
receive something from a god, it is a form of exchange, of giving away something 
important (life itself has been given in the past as sacrifice) in order to obtain 
something even more important. Why would a writer spend so much time of her life 
to write something, which is less worth than her life? 
 
China Miéville develops  concepts in his novels such as sacrifice, exchange and 
translation in different and fantastic ways. The idea of remaking developed in the 
Bas-Lag trilogy represents a form of exchange as contrapasso. Contrapasso was 
widely used in Dante’s Comedy, and consists in the punishment the people 
condemned in Hell and Purgatory receive, which is the opposite of the sin they have 
committed in life. Freccero in her analysis of American Psycho has defined it as 
infernal irony. 
 
Remaking sees people, who have committed crimes being punished with body 
modifications reflecting their crime. A woman, who has killed her baby because it 
would not stop crying, is condemned to this remaking: ‘Her baby’s arms are going to 
be grafted to her face. “So she doesn’t forget what she did,” [the Magister] says.’532 
Derkhan, who relates the anecdote to Isaac thus comments: ‘“I’m an art critic, 
Isaac,” Derkhan said eventually. “Remaking’s art, you know. Sick art. The 
imagination it takes!”’ Only to continue: ‘“Remaking’s creativity gone bad. Gone 
rotten. Gone rancid.”’533 Remaking is another form of a psychopathology that takes 
an immanent presence in reality through the modifications of the human body. 
Remaking is the punishment for individuals who have acted against the mythical 
                                                          
532 Miéville, Perdido Street Station, p. 115. 
533 Ibid. 
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Law and is the way the Law re-instates its dominion. Remaking is a punishment 
against individuality as there are never two remakings that are the same they make, 
according to infernal irony, an individual ‘special.’ 
 
As it is evident we are in the realm of pure biopolitcs: the body of the criminal or 
simply of the dissident is utterly vulnerable in the hands of the people in power. The 
body can be manipulated, violated, ultimately ridiculed and remade for new purposes 
more akin to what the powerful require. Or else, the remaking is in service of the 
industry of pleasure:  
 
There were rumours that many had been sentenced to some other Remaking, 
only to find themselves Remade by the punishment factories according to 
strange carnal designs and sold to the pimps and madams. It was a profitable 
sideline run by the bio-thaumaturges of the state.534  
 
The ease with which it is possible to transform the body for pleasure reminds of 
cyberpunk, but also of the abuse of the female body Patrick Bateman is guilty of. 
 
Miéville offers a description of the Remade prostitutes:  
 
David paced past naked bodies covered in breasts like plump scales; 
monstrous crablike torsos with nubile girlish legs at both ends; a woman who 
gazed at him with intelligent eyes above a second vulva, her mouth a vertical 
slit with moist labia, a meat-echo of the other vagina between her splayed 
legs. Two little boys gazing bewildered at the massive phalluses they 
sprouted. A hermaphrodite with many hands.535 
 
Crisis then is at the core of the epic struggle between the potential of the individual’s 
metaphor machine and the totalitarian Law of Society. The potential for violence of 
                                                          
534 Ibid., p. 416. 
535 Ibid., p. 416. 
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the metaphor machine stays latent until the individual reaches the limit of her 
frustration. When she rebels the individual is the infernal irony of remaking. 
Remaking is a distortion of Braidotti posthuman as work in progress in her 
relationship to technology. To quote Braidotti’s definition of subjectivity once again: 
‘Subjectivity is rather a process of auto-poiesis or self-styling, which involves 
complex and continuous negotiations with dominant norms and values and hence 
also multiple forms of accountability.’536 Remaking breaks this process of auto-
poiesis by forcing a mask, an identity, that of the criminal that is forever accountable 
for her desire of being an individual. 
  
Hyperbole and Transcendence 
 
Epic transcends the individual, a specific historical period (the time of the epic story 
can span many years, like in the case of the Odyssey), a specific place and/or genres. 
Going beyond is an important feature of epic and is the genre that maybe exemplifies 
better the struggle with its own immanence. The amplitude of the subject matter and 
the number of characters has to be balanced by the attention to the individual, like 
Homer does in the Iliad when he depicts Hector saying goodbye to wife Andromache 
and son Astyanax (scared of his helmet) before going into battle in the book XI of 
the Iliad.  
 
Transcendence indicates a vertical movement (from the Latin scandere, to climb) 
towards other spheres, often otherworldly. The New Epic however deals with 
humanity (even when gods are among its characters) and the world: it is immanent. 
                                                          
536 Braidotti, p. 35. 
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Epic is not transcendent but hyperbolic. I  argue then that hyperbole is the figure of 
speech characteristic of the epic form. 
 
Hyperbole is not an ascending movement but a throwing (bolein in Greek) over or 
beyond (hyper): it is a jump over genre boundaries, over dimensions and a writer’s 
throwing herself beyond her limits (which might be, in a poetic way, what happened 
to David Foster Wallace). Transcendence goes up whereas hyperbole has no 
direction except the outward. Once again, it could be pointed out that to throw is a 
verb of violence compared to climb. Bolein indicates the throwing of a missile for 
instance.  
 
Hyperbole is exaggeration but in the etymological sense of piling up, constantly 
adding, moving (the Latin gerere is a verb of movement, meaning carry). Epic as the 
genre of hyperbole involves a continuous expansion, a sudden, violent movement out 
of the core towards the Other, towards what is outside the individual. In this sense, 
the hyperbolic individual finds himself continuously in her surroundings and her 
encounters with the other. 
 
Wu Ming 1 explains the essence of the epic in its opposition with realism. Even if 
most of the stories of the New Italian Epic belong to the crime fiction genre, that is, 
deal with a realistic world, realism is not their main aim. On the contrary, there is a 
difference between realism and epic that is the difference between denotation and 
connotation:  ‘Realism,’ writes Wu Ming 1, ‘is in search of a representation of the 
world as “objective” as possible, close to (materialism) “the perceptive compromise” 
called “reality”; it presupposes then a working on denotation, on the main, shared 
264 
 
meanings.’537 Realism is based on a strict correspondence between the sign and the 
object, with a straightforward meaning that can be easily perceived whereas epic is 
based on connotation : ‘it’s the result of a working on the tone, on the figurative 
sense, on the affective attributes of words, on the vast and multiform reverberation of 
meanings, all meanings of a story.’ 538 Connotation is more the regime of metaphor 
and imagination, both transcendence in the multitude of meanings and immanence in 
that the meanings are never abstract, because they always mean something, they 
always have a more or less implicit reference to reality. 
 
According to Wu Ming 1, man always ultimately discards pure realism because it is 
only a compromise, that is, the acceptance of impossibility. Epic aims at something 
deeper, less ‘real’ but more pressing, something that cannot be defined in reality, 
something very akin to the unsayable will-to-say. 
  
Connotation is more natural539 to man than the construction that is reality. Wu Ming 
1 reminds us once again that science has proved that metaphor is literally and 
physically part of the human brain, the way we relate to the world: ‘neuroscience has 
ascertained that the metaphoric is corporeal, it is a dimension which is not abstract at 
all but very actual, described in the literalness of cerebral processes.’540 Metaphor 
                                                          
537 ‘Il realismo è la ricerca di una rappresentazione per quanto possibile « oggettiva » 
del mondo, vicina al (tangibile, materialismo) « compromesso percettivo » chiamato 
« realtà » ; presuppone quindi un lavoro sulla denotazione, sui significati principali e 
condivisi. Wu Ming, pp. 68-69. Italics in the original. 
538 ‘è il risultato di un lavoro sul tono, sui sensi figurati, sugli attributi affettivi delle 
parole, sul vasto e multiforme riverberare dei significati, tutti i significati del 
racconto.’ Ibid. p. 69. 
539 Ibid., p. 71. 
540 ‘Le neuroscienze hanno appurato che il metaforico è corporeo, è una dimensione 
non astratta ma concretissima, descrivibile nella letteralità dei processi cerebrali.’ 
Ibid., p. 70. See also what Wu Ming 2 writes: ‘‘La scienza cognitiva ha scoperto che 
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has a body and if connotation is a necessary part of cognition it is because only 
imagination can create metaphors connecting two realities, then connotation is 
ingrained in the human brain. 
 
According to Wu Ming 1, ‘in the same way as connotation is a “more” of the word, a 
surplus of meaning, which escapes and transforms so epic is a ‘more’ of the story, a 
“discrepancy”  with respect to the events related. In epic hyperbole goes on a 
rampage, each element denser, more charged, more vivid, and yet, at the same time 
more elusive, hard to define and surround. Epic is a surplus on the story, its 
hyperbolic dimension, bigger but less defined.’541 This element, denser, more 
charged (of meaning or than meaning) but at the same time harder to define because 
always elusive is exactly the something that cannot be said, but only narrated, 
making of epic the space of the Voice, of the possibility of the will-to-say. The 
potential of the condition of crisis in the individual is rooted in the individual’s need-
to-say her metaphor machine, to have a Voice that is simply but meaningfully a 
surplus, something more than just the words we say. 
  
Epic then is both crisis, that is, split and violent struggle and the dimension of the 
Voice and the hyperbolic. I will now explore the possibility that the Voice is created 
as a surplus by violence or else, if it is violence, which is a direct result of the 
incapacity to grasp the unsayable. In other words, violence can be the reaction to 
                                                                                                                                                                    
il pensiero lavora per lo più in maniera inconscia e che buona parte di questi 
meccanismi neurali richiamano strutture narrative.’ Wu Ming 2, ‘Il « mondo nuovo » 
delle storie,’ in Wu Ming, New Italian Epic, p. 135. Italics in the original. 
541 ‘Come la connotazione è un “di più” del vocabolo, eccedenza di significato che 
sfugge e si trasforma, così l’epica è un « di più » del racconto, uno « scarto » rispetto 
agli eventi narrati. Nell’epica si scatena l’iperbole, ogni elemento è più denso, più 
carico, più vivido, eppure al tempo stesso più sfuggente, difficile da definire e 
contornare.’ Ibid., p. 72. 
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something we cannot understand or express (the Voice comes before consciousness 
or Logos). However, it is also possible that epic and violence have only in common a 
certain excess, a constant exaggeration, a going too far. What distinguishes them and 
makes the New Italian Epic so significant in contemporary fiction is a new ethics of 
narrative. Wu Ming 1 proposes a different attitude to human hubris that he calls 
ecocentrism. 
 
Ecocentrism and the Other 
 
The ethics of the NIE offers a different perspective to Lyotard’s question of the last 
and ultimate witness. The end of the world is another going too far, the ultimate 
excess that means the death of everything, when the end of the teller comes. The 
Voice lives in the space of this unknown which belongs to man because it is 
individual but is also outside him, like an object, because he cannot reach or grasp it. 
Violence is then converted in fear of the unknown, which is often reverted into an 
attraction for it. The concern for the future becomes synonymous with concepts of 
consciousness and the deep space inside man. 
  
There is something in stories that cannot be easily grasped because stories can tell 
something that we cannot explain in other ways. Writing the story ‘Good Old Neon’, 
David Foster Wallace has been able to tell what Neon was not able to explain, 
Wallace gave a feeling of the inexpressible, and we understood it without being able 
to explain it. As Wu Ming 2 writes: ‘We often grasp a concept or an event only if we 
find the right words to describe it. A similitude can make us understand the 
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connection between two facts better than a causal explanation.’542 This sentence 
explains my insistence on creating a sort of rhetoric of contemporary fiction because 
it is often through figures of speech that the individual will-to-say can be conveyed. 
Considering the brain is a metaphor machine it is only logical that rhetoric is an 
indispensable tool for us to understand. 
 
Wu Ming 1 invites to accept the fact that the world is going to end, but his question 
is on the now, not on the future itself: not, that is, what we can do to witness the end, 
but what we can do now to keep it away or to reach it in a more human, ethical way. 
In other words, he asks how to live towards the end, which, on a private level, is the 
question of how the individual should live before her ineluctable death (which is the 
individual’s end of the world as she dies as witness).  
 
Wu Ming 1 suggests that in order to accept the end we have to step away from our 
hubris and arrogance: ‘Yes, hubris and short-sightedness are what we can not accept 
anymore. We cannot accept that the species is doing anything to speed up the 
process of extinction and make it the most painful - and the less dignified - as 
possible.’543 Hubris generates a blindness towards the Other, which is an echo of the 
Christian church’s refusal to accept the Copernican revolution, to accept that the 
earth was not at the centre of the solar system and that man was not a privileged 
creature.  
                                                          
542 ‘Spesso riusciamo a capire un concetto, o un evento, solo se troviamo le parole 
giuste per descriverlo. Una similitudine può farci comprendere il legame tra due fatti 
molto più di una spiegazione causale.’ Wu Ming 2, ‘Una termodinamica della 
fantasia’, in Wu Ming, New Italian Epic, pp. 191-192.  
543 ‘Sì, tracotanza. Tracotanza e ristrettezza di vedute sono quello che non possiamo 
più accettare. Non possiamo accettare che la specie stia facendo di tutto per 
accelerare il processo di estinzione e renderlo il più doloroso – e il meno dignitoso – 
possibile.’ Wu Ming, New Italian Epic, p. 57. Emphasis in the original. 
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Braidotti has individuated in this hubris over the ideal of Man the remnants of a 
humanism that has no place in the posthuman age:  
 
The Vitruvian ideal of Man as the standard of both perfection and 
perfectibility (as shown in figure 1.1) was literally pulled down from his 
pedestal and deconstructed. This humanistic ideal constituted, in fact, the 
core of a liberal individualistic view of the subject, which defined 
perfectibility in terms of autonomy and self-determination.544 
 
Autonomous and self-determined the individual would be isolated by the world 
outside herself and the Other. The Other in fact becomes the opposite of the 
individual:  
 
Central to this universalistic posture and its binary logic is the notion of 
‘difference’ as pejoration. Subjectivity is equated with consciousness, 
universal rationality, and self-regulating ethical behaviour, whereas 
Otherness is defined as its negative and specular counterpart.545  
 
Wu Ming 1 observes how either cultural or natural this anthropocentrism means that 
man is unable to deal with his accidental nature:  
 
And yet anthropocentrism,’ writes Wu Ming 1, ‘is alive and well and fights 
against us. Scientific discoveries, objective evidence, the crisis of the Subject, 
the downfall of old ideologies. Nothing has dissuaded mankind from the 
absurd idea that man is at the centre of the universe, the Chosen Species - on 
the contrary, we are not even a species, we transcend taxonomies, we are the 
only beings imbued with a soul, the only interlocutors of God.546 
 
                                                          
544 Braidotti, p. 23. 
545 Ibid., p. 15. 
546 ’è vivo e vegeto, e lotta contro di noi. Scoperte scientifiche, prove oggettive, crisi 
del Soggetto, crolli di vecchie ideologie. Nulla pare aver distolto il genere umano 
dall’assurda idea di essere al centro dell’universo, la Specie Eletta – anzi, per molti 
non siamo nemmeno una specie, trascendiamo le tassonomie, siamo gli unici esseri 
dotati di anima, unici interlocutori di Dio. Wu Ming 1, p. 58.  
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To this suicidal anthropocentrism, Wu Ming 1 opposes what he calls ecocentrism, a 
point of view, not merely empty or transcendental as in Gibson’s cyberpunk, but 
always Other, ex-anthropo-centric, ex-centric.547 Ecocentrism explains the 
recurrence of such themes in the NIE as going crazy, going out of oneself through 
metamorphosis, fighting against the loss of the self.548 The core of the individual is 
continually pulled out in a centrifugal movement towards the periphery that makes, I 
would say, the individual continually explode. This means not only that the core is 
not stable but also that the individual constantly moves outwardly and, as a 
consequence, towards the Other. The Other is always on the periphery as other 
literatures, as Moretti suggests, are at the periphery of core world-systems. 
 
Ecocentrism however is not only a thematic or ethical aspect of the NIE narrative but 
also an important technical one based on the ‘squinting, sideways glance’, ‘the 
gamble of the point of view.’549 where ethics and style meet. ‘The epic hero, when he 
is present, is not at the centre of everything but he has a slanted influence on the 
action. When he is not present, his function is taken by a multitude, by objects and 
places, by context and by time.’550 The epic hero is not at the centre of the story in 
the same way as the force field of the NIE has no central leader or core, in the same 
way as the individual has troubles with her core. There is literally nothing at the 
centre neither of the NIE nor of its narratives. This tendency is the opposite of the 
one Franco Moretti proposes for the modern epic that starts with Goethe’s Faust. 
Modern epic for Moretti represents a passage ‘from polyphony, towards 
                                                          
547 Ibid., p. 59. 
548 Ibid., p. 73. 
549 «sguardo obliquo », ‘azzardo del punto di vista’ Ibid., p. 26. 
550 ‘L’eroe epico, quando c’è, non è al centro di tutto ma influisce sull’azione in 
modo sghembo. Quando non c’è, la sua funzione viene svolta dalla moltitudine, da 
cose e luoghi, dal contesto e dal tempo.’ Ibid., pp. 31-32. 
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monologism,’551 whereas in the NIE monologism is very difficult in that there is no 
main logic or voice. 
  
Ecocentrism is the opposite of egocentrism and then of a monologic vision of life. 
The Wu Ming collective represents this attempt to avoid even the monologic voice 
of the author: four writers (previously five), writing under one pen name in an 
attempt to extirpate any individual voice at the root. In their works, voices indeed are 
spread among many examples of humanity but they also include objects or a bar as 
in 54 (2002). 
 
In his study of the work of Bakhtin, Augusto Ponzio details the relationship between 
the ‘I’ and the Other. Ponzio affirms that the ‘I’ is a compromise of the internal 
dialogue between the individual and the Other.552 This dialogue is immanent in 
language because our own words are always the words of the Other: ‘despite all of 
his efforts, the I cannot contain the word of the Other, the Other’s accentuations, the 
Other’s thoughts, in the limits of her own identity: everything connotating alterity 
escapes the identity of the I like a sack with a hole.’553 We encounter here another 
form of the hyperbole at the very basis of language, the excess of the words of the 
Other in our own words, the words that we learn as children from our parents, and 
the other adults.  
                                                          
551 Moretti, Modern Epic, p. 73. Moretti however reflects on a tradition that goes 
from Hegel to Bakhtin.  
552 Augusto Ponzio, La rivoluzione bachtiniana. Il pensiero di Bachtin e l’ideologia 
contemporanea, Bari: Levante Editori, 1997, p. 17. All the translations from this text 
are mine. 
553 ‘Malgrado tutti I suoi sforzi, l’io non riesce a contenere la parola altrui, le 
accenzuazioni altrui, i pensieri altrui, entro i limiti della sua propria identità : tutto 
ciò che connota l’alterità fuorisce dall’identià dell’io come da un sacco bucato.’ 
Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
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Ponzio argues for a Critique of the Dialogic Reason against the Dialectic Reason that 
sees identity still as the final focus, as so still a totalizing and monologic narrative. 
The critique of the Dialogic reason is ‘the critique of the category of identity as the 
dominant category today of the logos and praxis of the West.’554 Both the Ballardian 
man and Patrick Bateman identify themselves with the identity imposed by Society, 
by that logic that according to Bauman forces us to choose an identity. The subject is 
the author of the narrative of the I where identity is the plan from the beginning.555 
 
From an ethical point of view, in the relation with the Other, Ponzio, following 
Bakhtin, distinguishes two forms of responsibility : ‘special responsibility’ and 
‘moral’ or ‘absolute responsibility.’556 The former concerns the role or function one 
has in Society and as such it respects and follows the Law: it is a limited 
responsibility, defined, and ‘referred to the repeatable identity of the objective and 
interchangeable individual.’557  This is exemplified by the professions in Ballard or 
Ellis, where all the characters are interchangeable and, for this reason, they have 
alibis: their responsibility is limited by the role that Society has assigned to them 
and, as such, they are not responsible as human beings: Bateman’s alibi is that he is 
only a synecdoche.  
 
Absolute responsibility has no alibis, no limits and makes of every action not a 
repetition (as in Ballard, Ellis, Palahniuk), but a unique event which the individual 
                                                          
554 ‘critica della categoria dell’identità in quanto categoria oggi dominante del 
pensiero e della prassi occidentale.’ Ibid., p. 302. 
555 Ibid., p. 306. 
556 Ibid., pp. 25-26. 
557 ‘riferita all’identità ripetibile di individuo oggettivo e intercambiabile.’ Ibid., p. 
25. 
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cannot derogate to someone else.558 This is the ethic of the individual anticipated by 
Lukàcs, which finds accomplishment in a form of ethics in which the individual is 
responsible as human being. He responsibly accepts the irreducible alterity of her 
own language and of the existence of the Other.  Ecocentrism is based on a similar 
perspective according to which the life of the Other is not dependent on us, in which 
not only the language of the other is not dominated by my metaphor machine but, on 
the contrary, my will-to-say must correspond to a will-to-listen the Voice of the 
Other in my voice.  
 
Another text that will help me consider the question of the Other is Le temps et 
l’autre (1979) by Emmanuel Levinas. Whereas Bakhtin and Ponzio start with the 
inevitable alterity of my own language and my own identity Levinas starts with the 
inevitable solitude of the individual. This solitude derives by the is the individual’s 
very existence, because my existence cannot be someone else’s: ‘Everything can be 
exchanged between beings but existence. In this sense, being, means being isolated 
by existence.’559 This condition is not communicable and it is the condition of my 
very existence,560 something very akin to the concept of the Voice.  
 
The subject when she says I says it in the present, there is no time in solitude. For 
this very reason though, the subject is somehow in control of her subjectivity. Death, 
however, changes this condition because it is the one event of which the individual 
                                                          
558 Ibid., p. 26. 
559 ‘On peut tout échanger entre êtres sauf l’exister. Dans ce sens, être, c’est s’isoler 
par l’exister.’ Emmanuel Levinas, Le temps et l’autre, Paris : Presse Universitaire de 
France, 2007, p. 21. All the translations from this text are mine.  
560 Ibid. 
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cannot control and for which, he is always alone. This event is a mystery561 because 
it does not live in the present but it is an event in the future that cannot be 
anticipated, and thus controlled. This event that arrives to the subject but over which 
the subject has no power corresponds to the relationship with the Other or, better, 
with the face of the Other. It is this face to face with the Other that situates the 
individual in time.562 It is now easier to grasp why the absolute past of Bakhtin is a 
monologic narrative: it is a dead time and closed narrative because there is no room 
for the Other, for the future and the presence of the Other in it.  
 
The Other, of course is in the same position as the individual: ‘The one is for the 
other that which the other is for the one; the subject has no exceptional place.’563 
There is no hierarchy of existence no dominant individual, or there should not be. 
The Other is as important as we are because she is in our same condition of solitude 
and in the same relationship with death. It is impossible to control the Other or melt 
with the Other because the relationship with the Other is based on the ‘absence of the 
Other,’564 absence that is the unknowable of the future and thus, of time.  
 
In death and time, the individual is not herself anymore because she cannot control 
her own death.  In death somehow, we lose our individuality, in what we have 
characterized more than once in this work as the death cry of the animal or Voice. 
But in the relationship with the Other: ‘this absence of the other is precisely her 
                                                          
561 Ibid., p. 65. 
562 Ibid., p. 69. 
563  ‘L’un est pour l’autre ce que l’autre est pour lui; il n’y a pas pour le sujet de 
place exceptionnelle.’ Ibid., p. 74. 
564 Ibid., p. 83. 
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presence as other.’565 The Other is presence, immanence as Other, even if her 
absence and irremediable otherness makes the Other transcendental to the individual. 
Otherness is both transcendence and immanence then and it is the place where the 
individual can express her ethical life among other individuals like her. Her will-to-
say must correspond to a will-to-listen because, put very simply, the Other has a 
will-to-say too. Up to this point in my work in fact I have mostly being concerned 
with the question of the individual metaphor machine and the individual’s will-to-
say. But an ethics of contemporary narrative irremediably necessitates of a writer 
capable of narrating a will-to-listen. 
 
How does a writer like China Miéville deal with the question of the Other? How do I 
justify him as a writer of ecocentrism, without alibi, and attentive to the will-to-say 
of the Other? Mièville gives voice to strange beings that sometimes are only barely 
human, such as for instance ‘Familiar’ in the collection Looking for Jake and Other 
Stories (2005). In this short story, a witch (a man) creates a familiar with his own 
flesh. The familiar is a creature able to assimilate and ‘learn’ the materials around it: 
‘his familiar manipulated things, was a channel for manipulation; it lived to change, 
use, and know.’566 The last three verbs aptly describe the familiar, what moves it, 
what it does. A natural, extreme desire to know pushes to change and use the objects 
around it so that everything becomes a tool and the familiar itself changes and sheds 
many shapes. Knowledge and use are one and the same so that its mental processes 
are quite basic and not exactly human, but Miéville is able to make of the familiar a 
character, a different point of view, we feel its presence as Other.  
                                                          
565 ‘Cette absence de l’autre est précisément sa presence comme autre.’ Ibid., p. 83.  
566 China Miéville, ‘Familiar’, Looking for Jake and Other Stories, (London: 
Macmillan, 2006), p. 85. 
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In the story, we can recognize the presence of information, desire and ultimately, 
language, which the familiar slowly learns after acquiring ears. The presence of 
language approaches the familiar to man, because the familiar at the same time has 
developed a brain: ‘it spoke English words in the mind it had built itself.’567 The 
familiar mimics the brain because it has learned brain from animals and it has 
discovered sounds with its ears. Curiously, it creates its own metaphor machine.  
 
The hunger of the familiar, however, is reflected by the emptying of the witch’s 
flesh: ‘The man’s body was faded away in random holes. There was no blood. Two 
handspans of sternum, inches of belly, slivers of arm-meat all faded to nothing, as if 
the flesh had given up existing. Entropic wounds.’568 As it is typical of Miéville the 
change the familiar is so apt to is actually exchange as the more it fills itself of 
knowledge and matter the more the witch loses his own matter to nothing. The more 
the Other becomes a presence the more the witch becomes an absence. Miéville 
portrays then the relationship of the human and the non-human as based on hunger 
and privation, as they are made of the same substance: if one grows the other has to 
shrink or lose bits. This also means that knowledge and growth are purely immanent, 
made of flesh. In this case, in a paradoxical alteration of the monistic matter 
suggested by Braidotti, the matter shared by the individual and the Other are one and 
the same. The witch is not in control of his coming death because it is irremediably 
other, an event he cannot control. 
 
The writer also confronts their point of views and the final page of the story sees the 
                                                          
567 Ibid., p. 89. 
568 Ibid., p. 95. 
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witch begging desperately for the familiar to ‘come back’ to him or end his agony: 
‘Come back or make it stop. Do something to finish.’569 The witch started as agent in 
the story, but by the end is ousted by its creation, which is the only entity able to act. 
It is not paradoxical that the last act of the familiar is speech and the reflection of it: 
‘“Sun,” it said. Its droning speech intrigued it.’570 With the self-awareness brought 
by language, the familiar is at the beginning of developing a consciousness and the 
story can finally end. 
 
It can be said that the story ends anthropocentrically, as the familiar has become the 
more and more human. However, the human point of view, the possible protagonist 
of the story, loses his flesh and its place is taken by the object, the creature, who 
takes its place. The alternation between the point of view of the witch, of his client 
(for whom he practices the ritual, which gives life to the familiar) and the familiar 
creates such a balance that no one is really a protagonist. In a double hyperbolic 
movement, the human projects (projectile?) his flesh outside himself in another 
creature while, at the same time, the familiar itself is a hyperbolic creature, 
constantly expanding and challenging the environment around it. The familiar 
exemplifies the danger of hyperbole when one’s will-to-live and, ultimately –say 
(“Sun”) crashes over the Other.  
 
Furthermore, from an ethical point of view we understand that the ecological balance 
between the witch and the familiar is tipped over by the familiar’s hunger, which is 
totally endocentric. In other words, the familiar becomes the more human the more it 
thinks of itself as the only creature that matters. It does not display cruelty towards 
                                                          
569 Ibid., p. 96. 
570 Ibid. 
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the witch: it is too self-absorbed to really mind his creator. With its hunger for 
appropriation the familiar is the bodily manifestation of the dominant narrative of 
capitalism. 
 
The work of China Miéville is full of examples of ecocentric points of view since he 
is renowned to create strange, alien creatures in his novels, especially in the Bas-Lag 
trilogy, in a speculative fiction tradition, which goes back to the epics of Homer and 
Gulliver’s Travels. The Garuda society is a perfect example of another culture:  
 
They’re so egalitarian … Well… Their society’s all based on maximising 
choice for the individual, which is why they’re communistic. Grants the most 
uninhibited choice to everyone. And as far as I remember the only crime they 
have is depriving another garuda of choice.571 
 
The novel becomes challenging when the writer invites us to understand Yagharek’s 
crime from the perspective of his culture, which is irremediably Other for us and, for 
this reason, he challenges our anthropocentrism, face to face with the Other.  
  
Yagharek’s rape of another garuda is translated in his culture as ‘choice-theft in the 
second degree, with utter disrespect.’572 The way he describes his criminal status in 
his culture posits him in the problematic of transcendence: ‘That is who I am now. I 
am no longer Concrete Individual and Respected Yagharek. He is gone. I told you 
my name, and my name-title. I am Too Too Abstract Yagharek Not To Be 
Respected.’573 The Garuda culture relies on the distinction between concrete and 
abstract so much so that a criminal is someone that has lost physical presence and 
                                                          
571 Miéville, Perdido Street Station, p. 87.  
572 Ibid, p. 847. 
573 Ibid, p. 60. 
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has somehow disappeared, become too abstract. The abstraction of the criminal is 
relative to the fact that as an individual he has forgotten, abstracted the other’s 
choice: ‘“To take the choice of another … to forget their concrete reality, to abstract 
them, to forget that you are a node in a matrix, that actions have consequences.’574 
He has become too transcendent and has forgotten about the immanence of the 
Other, he has forsaken his absolute responsibility and lost his immanence as a result. 
His solitude is the consequence of trying to take control over the Other without alibi. 
 
Murder for the garuda is the worst crime because ‘you take not only the choice of 
whether to live or die that moment … but every other choice for all of time that 
might be made.’575 The crime is not murder but theft of all the possible choices. The 
murderer deprives her victim of possibility itself, of any form of immanence. 
 
Yagharek’s crime is rape but Kar’uchai, his victim finds it hard to make Isaac 
understand that rape does not translate576: ‘“I was not violated or ravaged, 
Grimneb’lin. I am not abused or defiled … or ravished or spoiled. You would call 
his actions rape, but I do not: that tells me nothing. He stole my choice, and that is 
why he was … judged.”’577 Ecocentrism means, first of all, the acceptance that the 
mythic Law is not the only possible Law and that our personal metaphor machine is 
met by the Other’s metaphor machine. Ecocentrism requires a will-to-listen to the 
Other. 
  
                                                          
574 China Miéville, Perdido Street Station, p. 847. 
575 China Miéville, Perdido Street Station, p. 848. Italics in the original. 
576 ‘You cannot translate, Grimneb’lin.’ China Miéville, Perdido Street Station, p. 
849. Italic in the original.  
577 China Miéville, Perdido Street Station, p. 849. 
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The epic of China Miéville then brings together the concepts of crisis, hyperbole and 
ecocentrism offering an ethics that in time of crisis does degenerate in violence only 
when the individual is so self-centred that she deprives the Other at the same time of 
choice and flesh, the potential transcendence and the immanent flesh. The Voice is 
finally presented as excess, going beyond what the individual can grasp, towards the 
Other, who is another witness, another possibility that the end is not the end, but 
only unknown, irremediably Other.  
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4.2 Of Lying: From Simile to Metaphor as Hyperbole in China Miéville's 
Embassytown 
 
Embassytown is a novel about the passage from simile to metaphor, from a language 
made of pure reference to one made of lying. In this novel about language, metaphor 
functions as a hyperbole for the infinity possibilities of imagination. To understand 
these assumptions of mine I will first connect two parallel thematics running through 
the novel.  
 
Avice, protagonist and narrating voice of the novel, is an Immerser, going in a space 
which is out of the known universe, or better, the known universe is a manifestation, 
realization of the Immer. ‘The best we can do is say that the immer underlies or 
overlies, infuses, is a foundation, is langue of which our actuality is a parole.’578 
Referring to the Saussurian dichotomy langue/parole Mièville remarks that language 
is the main theme of the novel from the very beginning. To create an equation that 
reconstructs the quote above we can write: Immer : actuality = langue : parole.  
 
As foundation, both the Immer and la langue do not strictly speaking exist, hence the 
Immer is outside time, in the always in the same way as langue is the theoretical part 
of language, its grammar, which does not exist until it is not spoken in reality: they 
are transcendent dimensions. Here is a description of a battle against the creature of 
the Immer: ‘It was put down quickly. They hammered it with sometimes-guns, that 
                                                          
578 China Miéville, Embassytown, London: Macmillan, 2011, p. 31. Italics in the 
original. 
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violently assert the manchmal, this stuff, our everyday, against the always of the 
immer. It was banished or dispatched after minutes of shrieking.’579 Quotidianity is 
the weapon to fix the eternal, bind it and subjugate it to the reality of time, of the 
here and now: sometimes-guns are weapons of immanence.  
 
The sometimes-guns are an evolution of the Possible Sword branded by Uther Doul 
in The Scar (2002). This sword mines the virtual possibilities and strikes in all the 
possible points its wielder could have swung the sword but at the same time: ‘When 
the clockwork is running, my arm and the sword mine possibilities. For every factual 
attack there are a thousand possibilities, nigh-sword ghosts, and all of them strike 
down together.’580 This weapon makes every possibility real, while at the same time, 
remaining a ghost, a possibility. What if we could say all of the words possible in a 
determined context in one sentence? 
 
With the Immer, Miéville seems somehow to be thinking of cyberpunk and the 
transcendental escape of the hackers into the eternity without body of cyberspace. 
Avice has the temerity of a hacker but she is a woman, which already constitutes a 
major difference. Furthermore, when the novel moves from the Immer581, to delve 
fully into the problem of Language and the alien Ariekei, who speak it, Miéville 
enacts a reversal of Gibson’s take by making the novel a struggle towards 
transcendence. Avice indeed escapes to the Immer to free herself from the 
materiality of her hometown, Embassytown, but also allegorically from the 
                                                          
579 Ibid., p. 22. 
580 China Miéville, The Scar, London: Macmillan, 2002, p. 544. 
581 And mostly abandons this line of narrative altogether. But, how we will see, the 
line of the Immer stays alive throughout the novel as a metaphor for the theme of 
Language. 
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impossible referentiality of Language. Embassytown, in other words, offers an 
example of what happens on the other extreme of the line, from transcendence to 
pure referentiality, passing through the ideal that we have seen is immanence, the 
presence of the transcendent in the material. 
 
Ariekei’s Language is spoken by the two-mouthed aliens as purely referential 
language where each word corresponds to a real object and to reality in general. As a 
consequence the Ariekei can only speak the truth, reality itself, and find it impossible 
to lie. They even have a festival of lies where they awkwardly try to speak lies only 
to constantly fail. Lies assume in the course of the novel a form of freedom and 
rebellion against a language that is controlling and manipulating them. A second 
thematic to read the novel then is connected to an ethics of truth where lying 
expresses the truth of the individual and where imagination offers the possibility for 
salvation. 
 
The concept of truth will be dealt in the following paragraphs according to the 
assumption that truth and referentiality can be seen as synonymous for being and 
lying as non-being. Indeed, the Ariekei can only speak of what exists or has 
happened unable to conceive the non-being and so deprived of imagination and 
individuality.  
 
The concept of being thus developed suggests an aesthetic or rhetorical take on the 
novel. The novel deals with the passage from simile, which still respects reality, to 
metaphor, which disrupts the real to the level of creating a shortcut in the alien mind. 
In the unlimited possibilities metaphor offers (like the Possible Sword) to create 
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worlds it wears the mantle of hyperbole, of continual creation and of a constant 
movement only apparently away from reality. Metaphor in fact is in the end the way 
the individual conceives of reality. 
 
These three conceptual problematics of truth/lying, being/non-being and simile-
metaphor will cross each other in the course of the following paragraphs because 
they are inevitably connected to the epic resources of language. 
 
To speak something that has never happened, the Ariekei have to make the event 
happen: ‘“Everything in Language is a truth claim. So they need the similes to 
compare things to, to make true things that aren’t there yet, that they need to say.”’582  
What is more important, the sentence has to be true in the mind of the speaker, who 
infuses it with her very soul:  
 
the Ariekei… when they speak they do hear the soul in each voice. That’s 
how the meaning lives there. The words have got…” he shook his head, 
hesitating, then just using that religious term. “Got the soul in them. And it 
has to be there, the meaning. Has to be true to be Language. That’s why they 
make similes.”583  
 
Similes are the means by which the Ariekei can create new Language but for their 
concept to be true, Language itself, it has to happen. Hence, they create living 
similes by which they can enact their speech and make it meaningful. Avice becomes 
part of a simile and becomes part of a language and a figure of speech: 
 
‘You were in a simile?’ they said. 
‘I am a simile,’ I said. 
                                                          
582 China Miéville, Embassytown, p. 56. 
583 Ibid., p. 56. 
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‘You’re a story?’584 
 
The Ariekei do not use other Ariekei to create similes but only humans, as if they 
were objects of Language. This is significant because in the very simile involving 
Avice, she has to endure pain.585 The Ariekei do not consider humans to be at their 
level (their technology reaches godlike dimensions for the human mind), but make 
them part of stories. Now, for these aliens these stories are real, not fiction, that is 
why they need a performance that in their case, is paradoxically interpreted as real 
and not as fiction. If an act or event has happened this means that it is real so there is 
no difference between performance and real event, between acting and action. 
 
The Ariekei can speak the truth of their soul through language but treat humans as 
characters and entrap them in Language. To be more correct, Avice is not even a 
character, but a simile, a figure of speech, that can be ultimately repeated ad 
infinitum without any need to tell the story: in other words she becomes a 
commonplace. The truth of a commonplace comes from the experience of the 
generations before but can an act performed for the sake of Language really function 
as experience? The only person to experience pain in the end is Avice, a part of 
Language itself, a simile. 
  
Avice then suffers violence on different levels: according to the concept of truth, she 
suffers in order to make speech real and thus possible; according to rhetoric, she is a 
simile, trapped in language, not even a subject. For all their materiality, the Ariekei 
are superficial on the pain they inflict, in the same way as we abstract on the 
                                                          
584 Ibid., p. 37. 
585 Which is interestingly enough, not really described in the novel, as if she feels 
shame about it. 
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sufferance the animals we eat may endure.  
 
From the quotation above another equation can be induced between language and 
thought since if the speaker’s mind has to believe what she is saying, then Language 
can only speak thoughts and thoughts equal reality. Language is intent, the presence 
of a conscious, willing mind: pure Logos and monologic Language. ‘A Host could 
understand nothing not spoken in Language, by a speaker, with intent, with a mind 
behind the words.’586 The voice is the voice of the individual with his soul and 
intent, the Voice, the will-to-say, but the words it speaks are pure totalizing 
Language: Language, in this case, is a mythic force. For this reason, the Ariekei 
cannot understand writing or a computer, since they cannot read in them any mind:  
 
An Ariekes couldn’t type into an artmind, of course: writing was 
incomprehensible to them. Oral input was no better: as far as any exopsych 
specialists could discern, the Hosts couldn’t ken interacting with a machine. 
The computer would speak back to them in what we heard as flawless 
vernacular, but to the Ariekei, with no sentience behind them, those words 
were just noises.587  
 
The Ariekei seem to refuse any form of mediation or transposition of Language in 
another medium. In a way, it is as if the voice corresponded to the will of the 
speaker, the voice of the soul. And yet, it is through science that humans can speak 
Language, after being genetically modified and connected to another human in order 
to speak the double-mouthed words of the alien language. Even though 
technologically advanced, the Ariekei do not communicate through and with 
technology. For them it would be unthinkable to imagine the presence of the Loa of 
the Sprawl Trilogy because an informational god would be invisible to them: the 
                                                          
586 Ibid., p. 55. 
587 Ibid., p. 77. 
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Ariekei are unable to transcend. Anything that does not have Language spoken with 
a mind is not sentient for them: objects, animals, humans are all alike. Killing a 
human is not murder because regular men do not speak Language and Language is 
the only characteristic trait of a sentient being.  
 
The full power of Logos then is what distinguishes between beings and non-beings. 
Language does not make beings social by itself, as Aristotle would have said, but 
intelligible. Despite a kind humanistic/positivist vision the Ariekei do not advocate 
for reason but for will, will as power as seen in McCarthy. Language is monologic, 
one-dimensional and endocentric: it does not conceive of beings that speaks another 
language, a periphery language. Ultimately, what distinguishes Ariekei and humans 
is the realisation that the former do not have a metaphor machine as a brain but a 
referential one. This means that Language equals reality and anything outside 
Language does not exist. 
 
Humans then are objects of Language, which suggests a different definition of what 
a subject is. The subject with two voices or the human Ambassadors, couplets of 
lookalike people genetically engineered to speak language recalls Alain Badiou’s 
theory of the subject. The subject in Badiou is at least double: when two lovers fall 
in love, there are no two subjects but only one as both of them constitute the subject 
of the event of love as without the both of them there would be no event: ‘The lovers 
enter like this in the composition of a subject of love, who exceed the one and the 
other.’588 The Two, the double subject in Badiou, is a subject of difference not 
                                                          
588 ‘Les amants entrent comme tels dans la composition d’un sujet d’amour, qui les 
excède l’un et l’autre.’ Alain Badiou, L’ethique, essai sur la conscience du mal, 
Caen: Nous, 2003, p. 71. Emphasis in the original. All translations from Badiou are 
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identity: ‘What is the world like when it is experimented according to the two and 
not by the one? What is the world like, examined, practiced and lived according to 
difference and not according to identity?589 Badiou is talking about love here, but the 
example is useful to understand the different possibilities of the two.  
 
The Ariekes’ double mouthed system belongs to a same body whereas the 
Ambassadors have two identical bodies but different minds. The Ambassador Ezra 
has two different bodies and personalities, which will create an impossible 
Language. Language is made then not only of an identity with reality but with the 
perfect identity of the two speakers, even if there are two individuals, the subject of 
Languages is one, in contrast with Badiou’s ethics of the two. 
 
There are more parallels between Badiou’s sujet and the Ariekei’s language. In the 
same way as man becomes a Subject only at the moment of the event and the 
acceptance of its truth590, so an Ariekes is such only when he speaks Language. 
Event and Language give life to the Subject, not the other way around, as Badiou 
writes: ‘It could be said that a subject, who surpasses the animal (but the animal is its 
only support), requires that something happens…)591 This something is the event, 
which actually makes the animal of everyday life into something more, a subject. In 
                                                                                                                                                                    
mine. 
589 ‘Qu’est-ce que c’est le monde quand on l’expérimente à partir du deux et non pas 
de l’un? Qu’est-ce que c’est que le mond, examiné, pratiqué et vécu à partir de la 
différence et non à partir de l’identité?’Alain Badiou avec Nicolas Truong, Éloge de 
l’amour, Paris: Flammarion, 2009, p. 30. 
590 ’Il n’y a qu’un animal particulier, convoqué par des circonstances à devenir sujet. 
Ou plutot à entrer dans la composition d’un sujet. Ce qui veut dire que tout ce qu’il 
est, son corps, ses capacitées, se trouve, à un moment donné, requis pour qu’une 
vérité fasse son chemin. Alain Badiou, L’ethique, p. 67. 
591 ‘Disons qu’un sujet, qui outrepasse l’animal (mais l’animal en est le seul 
support), exige qu’il se soit passé quelque chose…).’Alain Badiou, L’éthique, p. 68. 
Emphasis in the original. 
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the case of Language592, the subject is such through the event of Language but, she 
becomes slowly a victim when Language itself becomes a manipulative drug and 
turns the very subject back into an animal. This happens when the Ariekei’s fidélité 
towards Language is disrupted by the new Ambassador EzRa, who speaks an 
impossible Language, with the two speakers talking Language at the same time, but 
having very different bodies and brains. For the Ariekei this difference in the subject 
is striking in the way they speak, as if they were invested by the sublime, by the 
impossible: it is as if EzRa were able to speak the Voice of our language. 
 
Ez and Ra are not identical at all in appearance and character and are not genetically 
engineered but naturally synchronized. The Ariekei understand them but there is a 
break in the way EzRa talks, a unity, which is not unity:  
 
“Ambassadors speak with empathic unity. That’s our job. What if that unity’s 
there and not-there?” He waited. “It’s impossible, is what. Right there in its 
form. And that is intoxicating. And they mainline it. It’s like a hallucination, 
a there-not-there. a contradiction that gets them high.”593  
 
The Language of EzRa is a there-not-there, the impossibility of presence and 
absence at the same time. This impossible gap is what inebriates the Hosts594, turning 
EzRa’s Language into a drug. ‘“Ambassadors are orators, and those to whom their 
oration happens are oratees. Oratees are addicts. Strung out on an Ambassador’s 
Language.”’595 
 
                                                          
592 It is worth reminding that Badiou uses language only because it is the only means 
to communicate but he does not believe it is a foundation for philosophy. 
593 Miéville, Embassytown, p. 169. 
594 Another name for the Ariekei, who host the humans on their planet Arieka. 
595 Miéville, Embassytown, p. 169. 
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The event provoked by the appearance of EzRa opens the possibility for being and 
not being to co-exist, which could also be translated as the possibility that there 
could be something that has no referent, which is not really there.  When Language 
was just a saying of the world it was merely a repetition: ‘Language had always been 
redundant: it had only ever been the world. Now the Ariekei were learning to speak, 
and to think, and it hurt.’596 Whereas Language is part of the routine for the Ariekei, 
the event in Badiou brings a revolution, something new. The impossibility of EzRa 
represents this rupture of the event, which will revolutionize Language itself and 
make it evolve towards metaphor.  
 
This rupture represents the real event in the novel, which will make the Ariekei real 
subjects, not mere victims of Language. Having to come out of their Language, 
learning a new language, the Ariekei feel pain, they feel the difficulty of thinking in 
another way. This pain which shakes and in some cases shatters the very structures 
of their brains, this breach in the relationship between thought and reality has a 
devastating effect on the Hosts, who react with senseless violence, because thinking 
of another language also means thinking of the language of the Other. 
 
The only rhetorical tool Language permits is simile because, in the same way as the 
Ariekei refuse technology as a medium of communication so they refuse any 
rhetorical artificiality in Language, that is, anything that can detach referential 
thought from reality. When they speak the Ariekei do not try to convince, entertain 
or manipulate their listener but simile is used to prove a point or express something 
that has not been expressed before. The ‘like’ of the simile allows to compare 
                                                          
596 Ibid., p. 311. 
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thought and event (because even when performed the event actually happens), 
without stating that they are one and the same. In this way, abstract thought is 
anchored to reality and for this reason actuable:  
 
Scile, linguist and Avice’s husband (in a way), offers a more accurate, 
linguistic analysis of Language. He reflects on the impossibility of a 
language in which words equal existents: “Does it ever occur to you that this 
language is impossible, Avice--?” he said. “Im, poss, ih, bul. It makes no 
sense. They don’t have polysemy. Words don’t signify: they are their 
referents. How can they be sentient and not have symbolic language? How do 
their numbers work? It makes no sense.”597  
 
Interestingly enough, Scile equates sentience and symbolism, where the latter allows 
for words to mean something other than their obvious referential level, offering 
different meanings. Fiction would not be possible without symbolism and certainly 
genre such as science fiction, fantasy or weird fiction (to which the novel belongs) 
would not be literally thinkable. At this level, not even religion would be possible 
since it is essentially based on the presence of the divine in everyday reality and in 
the transcendental promises of words.  
 
Scile’s point of view is the opposite of the Ariekei whose sentience he is here 
questioning. Whereas the typical Ariekes can understand only if there is sentience in 
the speaker, Scile questions this assumption because he equals thought and symbol, 
in other words, he thinks that the brain works as a metaphor. As we have seen with 
Porush and the discoveries of neuroscience 598, the mind actually thinks in 
metaphors, in short-circuits, it necessarily judges. The Ariekei’s brain than is not a 
human brain, it does not need symbols, metaphors to perceive reality. How can 
                                                          
597 Ibid., p. 80. 
598 Miéville cites Lakoff for instance among Scile’s lectures: Miéville, Embassytown, 
p. 141 
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individuality be possible when there is no room for metaphor in Language?  
 
In another example, Scile actually separates the old concept of Logos, which implies 
judgement, from the thought of the Ariekei. Simile is said to be truth without 
judgement:  
 
“Simile spells an argument out: it’s ongoing, explicit, truth-making. You 
don’t need … logos, they used to call it. Judgement. You don’t need to … to 
link incommensurables. Unlike if you claim: ‘This is that.’ When it patently 
is not. That’s what we do. That’s what we call ‘reason’, that exchange, 
metaphor. That lying. The world becomes a lie. That’s what Surl Teshecher 
wants. To bring in a lie.” He spoke very calmly. “it wants to usher in evil.”599  
 
Simile speaks truth without mediation, whereas metaphor, ‘this is that,’ is a lying, 
which is not necessarily a lie. Simile says that something is like something else 
whereas metaphor says that something is something else. This being of metaphor is a 
lying, because something cannot be something else in reality, but it is not a lie 
because its purpose is not to tell a false reality; on the contrary, it tries to tell a truth 
that simile cannot tell. For our purpose it is worth to reiterate that only through 
metaphor we can tell the inexpressible in human language, that line between the 
transcendence in the human thought and the immanence of the body and the world. 
Simile implies a referential independent of thought but the brain needs a metaphor to 
relate or create an outside reality that otherwise would not exist. This space is what 
the Ariekei do not even have a conscience for, the basis for a conscience, meta-
thinking, which is what really makes humans, at least in the novel, humans. Spanish 
Dancer at the end of the novel calls metaphor ‘lie.that.truths’ or ‘truthing.lie.’600 
 
                                                          
599 Miéville, Embassytown, p. 141. Emphasis in the original. 
600 Ibid., p. 337. 
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What are the epic possibilities offered by metaphor as hyperbole? Mièville lists a 
few: ‘Anything was anything, now. Their minds sudden merchants: metaphor, like 
money, equalised the incommensurable. They could be mythologers now: they’d 
never had monsters, but now the world was all chimeras, each metaphor a 
splicing.’601 What is more epic than thinking that anything can be anything else? But 
this is what metaphor can do: we can imagine anything as anything else. Such power 
is apparently limitless and as such it can end up into total transcendence as in 
cyberpunk. Cyberpunk completely erases the need not only for reality but for the 
body as well and the next stage of human devolution through technology is 
becoming a ghost in the machine. 
 
The revolution brought by EzRa is often violent, some of the Hosts self-harming by 
ripping off their auditory wings and becoming deaf and primitively violent. Before 
the revolution the Ariekei have followed a distorted form of Heidegger’s diktat that 
language speaks us: ‘Language spoke us, the words that wanted to be city and 
machines had us speak them so they could be.’602 Because they are victims of 
Language as well as the humans some of their number rebel by learning to lie: ‘their 
longtime striving for lies, to make Language mean what they wanted.’603 In order to 
take possession of Language, the Hosts have to learn to abstract, make their 
Language lie, or better, symbolize.  
 
It goes without saying that this is true up to the point that language becomes and 
instrument to manipulate other people. Taking into account this danger, freedom 
                                                          
601 Ibid., p. 311. 
602 Ibid., p. 335. 
603 Ibid., p. 262. 
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from referentiality offers the possibility of changing the world and the challenge is 
worthier than living a life of slavery. ‘“The Ariekei in this room want to lie. That 
means thinking the world differently. Not referring: signifying.’604 Thinking the 
world differently means to change it because the. only way we can conceive of the 
world  critically is through our shared metaphors.  
 
This lying, which is the possibility of fiction to challenge our conception of reality, 
is the only place left for an ethics of truth: ‘“If similes do their job well enough, they 
turn into something else. We tell the truth best by becoming lies.”605 In a rare 
impetus of commitment Alice even comes  to proclaim: ‘“I don’t want to be a simile 
anymore,” I said. “I want to be a metaphor.”’606 But what is this truth? The truth is 
exactly that Language can be a drug or our master if we do not learn to control it, to 
first make it other than reality and then to realize that language is not reality, there is 
no equivalence between the two. This means to accept that we conceive of reality 
through fiction and that only fiction can say of the Voice that connects the 
transcendence of our metaphor machine to the immanence of our lives. 
 
The question ultimately arises: ‘Can they think? If they can’t speak, can they think? 
Language for the Ariekei was speech and thought at once. Wasn’t it?’607 Can they 
think indeed? Is it for this reason that they start to behave as animal and kill other 
Ariekei and humans? Or in another reflection on  the same theme: ‘Language, for the 
Ariekei, was truth: without it, what were they? An unsociety of psychopaths.’608    
                                                          
604 Ibid., p. 295.  
605 Ibid., p. 296. 
606 Ibid. 
607 Ibid., p. 272. 
608 Ibid., p. 274. 
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They are an unsociety because they cannot communicate. How do they interact then? 
‘Each trapped in itself. God knew how many of them, a strike-force of the lonely and 
lost. How did they move together? How did they coordinate their assaults? I thought 
again that they must be gusted by instinct and some deep-grammar of chaos: they 
could not plan.’609 This mythic Language traps us in our solitude when we do not 
face the other as Other. Unfortunately, Miéville only hints at this deep-grammar of 
chaos because it would have been interesting to imagine life outside of language but 
what we are left for now is that violence is the alternative form of communication 
with the Other when language is lost. Embassytown is an epic of metaphor that 
shows us that an ethical life is possible thanks to our metaphor machine when we 
accept that it is individual and that the Other also possesses one. The Ariekei 
mutilate their ears because they cannot conceive the will-to-listen, which is the will-
to-say of the Other, her Voice which is always individual and, as such, immanently 
ethic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
                                                          
609 Ibid. 
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When I started this work I set myself the task to study narratives of the last thirty 
years or so where violence had a predominant role. I have started from a 
neuroscience perspective to understand the connections between the way the brain 
thinks and its representations of violence in fiction. From a perspective that was only 
superficially scientific I have rapidly moved to more literary and philosophically 
territories that were more in accordance with my field of studies and interests.  
 
The step from science to metaphysics however has been more natural than expected 
when neuroscience has suggested that the brain was actually a metaphor machine. 
This has entailed a study between the transcendence connected to metaphor and 
metaphysics and the immanence of the applied metaphor. The brain’s purpose is to 
give order and meaning to a chaotic reality, chaotic because ultimately and 
irremediably outside it.  
 
In order to investigate this connection between transcendence and immanence in the 
workings of the metaphor machine I have decided to use basic tools of rhetoric to 
frame my analysis and I have thus come to the realisation of a rhetoric of posthuman 
fiction which is not really bound to any school of rhetoric. I repeat, my intention was 
to use the tools of rhetoric to examine posthuman narratives and not to create a 
theory of the contemporary novel.  
 
I have set the basis of the posthuman on the work of Rosi Braidotti and her theory of 
monistic matter that works on auto-poiesis for a constant re-creation of the subject in 
accordance to ever changing relationships she has with the culture, technology and 
nature around her. One of the main concerns of this work has been the definition of 
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the posthuman individual taking into account its connection to the narrative of 
violence.  
 
The need for such a definition of the individual in relation to violence stems from the 
main theory I have tried to argue for that these narrative of violence find their origin 
in the frustration of the individual metaphor machine as suppressed by a dominating 
narrative that, following Walter Benjamin, I have variously called the narrative of 
the Law, of War, of Society, of the Superego, of Language. The question of the 
posthuman individual is fundamentally ethic: how does the individual behave when a 
narrative tries to impose itself and the individual loses her Voice, her will-to-say 
(both expressions come from the work of Agamben) the unique metaphor machine 
the individual has inside. 
 
In the first part I have observed the relationship between the subject and language 
and noticed the various instances the individual uses in order to find her own identity 
against the predominant narrative. With ‘Good Old Neon’ I have observed a 
character, which has lost himself in the language of Society that he is able to 
reproduce so well that he ends up being a fraud. Frustrated by his inability to express 
his will-to-say, Neon commits suicide and from the grave is finally able to submit to 
a narrative that subverts with irony the status quote. The philosophical irony 
subsumed by Baudelaire and De Man creates a split in the individual in which the 
individual is able to finally look at her life from outside and thus cast a shadow over 
the narrative that has been dominating her narrative for so long. Irony then is the 
rhetorical tool used by Wallace and the ironic philosopher the form the posthuman 
takes in his work. As a consequence of the split between the metaphor machine and 
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the reality of the self the subject is revealed, following Bauman, as a liquid entity 
that wears any masks society offers without however having a choice not to choose. 
Where Bauman seems to deplore this incapacity of the individual not to choose 
Wallace considers the choice the individual has to decide which mask to wear 
instead as free will. Both with Braidotti and Bauman then we can say that the liquid 
posthuman expresses her individual Voice following the Law of Society but with the 
detachment of an ironist that takes seriously her relationship with the Other. Neon 
realises all of this after committing suicide because in death cry of the animal  the 
Voice can finally be heard, and that Voice can also be a laugh. 
 
With McCarthy’s Blood Meridian I have individuated ellipsis as the main rhetorical 
tool. The elliptical posthuman represented by the kid survives without a name to the 
aggressive monologues of Judge Holden and his Law of War. In the silent 
withdrawal and refuse to act violently Holden sees his archenemy. Against the 
verbosity of the Judge the kid opposes his silent clemency. The Judge deprives 
reality of its immanence and changes it into signs in his book. Men are violently 
turned into empty signs in a reality made so bleak by the godlike figure of the Judge. 
Holden is a mythical figure that has to instate his power by being the only presence 
in the novel. The elliptical kid whoever is not reduced to a sign because he already 
has no name and no history. He not only refuses to wear the mask of the murderer 
but remains in an impossible state of non-choice where, like Bartelby, he simply 
decides not to. His absence is so overwhelming that the Judge has to kill him in order 
to fortify the mythical Law. Where the liquid posthuman had a choice, the elliptical 
posthuman decides not-to and to the split, ironic narrative opposes the absence in 
which her will-to-say finds its loudest expression in the sound of silence. 
298 
 
 
After Language I have observed the presence of desire in the work of James Ballard. 
The Ballardian posthuman, living in the same Society as Neon, is affected by the 
peculiar situation of having all of her desire fulfilled. In the boredom of a life 
without desires she finds in the figure of the intermediator a source for new desire. 
The responsibilities of these characters are limited to their professions and positions 
and, consequently, they do not lead an ethical life. Their life on the contrary is 
mediated by the media of which the mediator is a personification. In the fusion 
between body and technology we find a perversion of Braidotti’s theory but also a 
complete lack of interest in the fate of the Other. The protagonists of Ballard’s 
novels aim to replace the intermediator in the creation of a psychopathology that 
invests the entire reality around them. The dominating narratives of these works in 
fact are created by an individual that is able to create and manipulate desire and then 
be a vehicle for its diffusion.  Extreme metaphor is the tool used by the writer 
treating his novels and characters as experiments. The Ballardian posthuman is the 
place of an experiment, of a simulation of the real, in order to understand what goes 
wrong in a completely mediated reality. As a marionette, this posthuman moves in 
the stylised forms prescribed by the mythic, liquid Society in an imperfect repetition 
(Luckhurst) that sees her trying to control her life through the manipulations offered 
by the media. Murder and rape become activities that can be constantly edited in 
order for the experiment to reach the expected result. In the vacuum created by the 
apparent lack of a will-to-say the individual looks for new desires. The Ballardian 
posthuman can almost be represented by the figure of the bored, mad scientist 
dangerous for her distorted psychopathologies. 
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In the detachment created by the media and seeing life through a camera also lives 
the synecdoche that is Patrick Bateman. Dominated by the narrative of the Superego 
Bateman is another exchangeable character. He stands for any American white 
yuppie of the 80’s. In the ideology dominating his narrative this corresponds the 
being human, anything beyond that is non-human. It is tempting not considering 
Bateman as a posthuman at all because he is at the opposite pole of Braidotti’s 
theory: where Braidotti refuses a unifying theory of the European and Vitruvian man 
and of the presence of difference in posthumanity, Bateman only recognizes and 
exchanges identities with his similar. He is full of alibi because anyone could be him 
but at the same time he is frustrated by the fact that, in such a world, he has no 
individuality. Bateman’s narrative is blank, without individuality while at the same 
time he searches for his individuality through the violence he commits against the 
Other that he considers as the non-human. In the factual, information based life of 
Bateman the Other is an object through which Bateman seeks the recognition of his 
individuality. His will-to-say is misdirected by the fact that he seeks himself in 
people he considers as non-human. For this reason he is deaf to their suffering, they 
have no will-to-say for him because they are not human and as such have no Voice. 
Bateman wants to scream his Voice, screaming his individual presence but, 
unfortunately, his metaphor machine is already completely obliterated by the 
paternal metaphor of the superego. Bateman represents the failure to notice his 
condition as victim of a dominating narrative.   
 
The oxymoronic man represented by the narrator of Palahniuk’s Fight Club 
represents another example of the split in the posthuman. This time however, the 
narrator is not aware of the split, the paradox being he develops a fictional separate 
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identity he is unaware of until the very end of the novel. Victim to the same narrative 
of Society as Neon and Bateman, the narrator is slowly losing his identity whereas 
his alter ego is ever more real. In this other narrative of information, Tyler Durden is 
full of it and with it starts a revolution. He hears the suffering of the people around 
him, the people like the narrator himself, and gives them a way out through violence: 
in the fight club they can find their individuality once again by beating each other. In 
the dumbness and boredom created by the narrative of the Superego the fighters can 
only hear each other by punching their Voice out. The creation of this fighter self 
however is the result of a contradiction, that is, the fact that it is a fictional identity 
that aims to take the place of the individual. Instead of developing a mask for the 
individual to deal with reality, the metaphor machine wants to replace the individual. 
This is the first instance of the posthuman as fictional being. 
 
In the analysis of cyberpunk I develop a theory of the character that is also a theory 
of the witness. Following Lyotard and Agamben I try to study the process of 
subjectification and de-subjectification of the individual in order to create a personal 
narrative of the event. As only witness of the even, in fact, the individual is the only 
source we have to validate such an event. The character in cyberpunk abandons the 
body to lose herself in cyberspace, which is a collective dominating narrative. The 
postcyberpunk of Stephenson offers an alternative to the posthuman in the 
detachment of the individual that recognizes the narrative of the Metaverse for what 
it is: a fiction. With the postcyberpunk of Dantec I have observed the transformation 
into man of a character in a sort of rewriting of the fable of Pinocchio. If the story of 
the character started with its continual reference to the individual, in a history that 
predates the story of literature, Dantec offers a character that not only is aware of 
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being a fiction, in opposition to Durden, but who becomes a human and dies as a 
human. The posthuman is a fictional construct who acquires a will-to-say that makes 
her ultimately human or humane. From Bauman we had already studied the tendency 
of man to wear masks. The posthuman is the narrative of the stories the individual 
metaphor machine tells in order to build the individual. The Voice is the will-to-say 
this narration. 
 
In the last part I have argued for a new form of epic, based on the New Italian Epic 
suggested by Wu Ming 1, which is able to offer an ethical solution to the problems 
created by these narrative of violence. The three characteristics of this form of epic 
are: the state of crisis in which the individual constantly lives between the potential 
possibilities of identity and its actuation often frustration by society; hyperbole, as 
figure of speech of this epic, which is the excess of connotation embedded in these 
narratives. This excess is synonymous with the will-to-say of the individual, which 
can never be in the form of denotation but only in the surplus of connotation. The 
posthuman is always beyond herself, in the shout of her Voice that always lives a 
trace or an echo. The final aspect of New Epic is ecocentrism, which is a 
consequence of the theory of the posthuman articulated by Braidotti. Ecocentrism 
comes with the loss not of the individual but of the epic hero. The will-to-say of the 
individual is placed side by side with the will-to-listen for the Voice of the Other. 
The epic re-writings of ethic represented by the works of China Miéville finally give 
a Voice to the Other through the representation of impossible characters and 
different cultures. 
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The work of Miéville then is one of the first to offer an ethical position towards these 
narratives of Violence. He shows the failure of the core narratives in favour of the 
narratives of periphery. He shows that violence is caused not so much by the 
frustration of the individual’s metaphor machine suffocated by a dominated narrative 
but the fact that the obsession of the individual metaphor machine has made him deaf 
to the sound of the Voice of the Other. Both the individual and the Other have 
personal metaphor machines and the new ethical epic should be founded on the 
dialogue of many individuals and many Others each and every one with the potential 
of creating entire fictional worlds and realities. We express our Voice and 
individuality through our personal metaphor machines and so does the Other. An 
ethic for the posthuman presupposes first of all a will-to-listen because in the Voice 
of the Other is also our Voice. This figure of the Posthuman corresponds to the 
reader who, by the act of starting reading the narration of the Other, has already 
performed the ecocentric act of listening. 
 
This theory of listening has implications that could be developed in at least three 
areas.  
The first is geographic and involves extending these theories to Voices from the 
peripheries. Natsuo Kirino or Otsuichi in Japan, Victor Pelevin and Vladimir 
Sorokin in Russia, Nnedi Okorafor and  Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o from Africa, are just 
examples of narratives from the periphery that offer narratives of violence that need 
to be explored. World literature is the literature that listens to all the Voices be it 
from the core or the periphery. 
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The second area of exploration concerns those narratives that directly deal with 
violence written between fiction and essay. I refer to Gomorra (2006) by Roberto 
Saviano but also that enciclopedia on violence that is Rising Up and Rising Down: 
Some Thoughts on Violence, Freedom and Urgent Means (2003), written by William 
T. Vollmann.  
 
Finally it would be worth exploring other media. I am not thinking about films as it 
is an area already overwhelmed by criticism but comic books such as the works of 
Warren Ellis and Alan Moore or manga such as Death Note. The media of the 
graphic novel is ever more successful but it has not been explored enough yet, 
especially considering how graphic violence often is in these works. 
 
I am sure that other areas can be visited because where there is a reader or a viewer 
or a listener there is the need for an ethics of narrative that explores the way violence 
is expressed in contemporary art. I am not talking of art that should aim to narratives 
that explore violence but of criticism that explores the ways in which narratives deal 
with violence. It is a criticism for the reader and for whoever is concerned with an 
ethics of the posthuman. 
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